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The Somali conflict is not completely driven by internal factors and not prosecuted entirely 
by internal actors.  Significant involvements, interventions and varying forms of alliances of 
external and internal actors combined to escalate and sustain the conflict at one time or 
another.  Much as the conflict has festered on domestic factors, including the seeming 
irreconcilable goals of the internal actors, the activities of the external actors in pursuit of 
their divergent interests have proven to be a major driving factor in the conflict. The major 
point of departure in the Somali conflict has been the alignment of internal actor to external 
actor in the conflict. This brought more complexities to the conflict as each external actor 
brought its independent agenda into the conflict.  
 
The alliances between the Somali moderate/conservative internal actors, Ethiopia and the 
United States have remained at counterpoint to the alliance between the radical Islamists 
inside Somalia, Eritrea and international Islamist network operating within and outside the 
Horn of Africa and the East African region. The dynamics of the Somali conflict have greatly 
been defined by the interests, actions and responses of the external actors whose positions on 
the conflict tend to dictate the behaviour and/or posturing of their internal allies and 
opponents alike in Somalia. Using the index of battle related deaths, quantity of weapons 
purchases and the internal displacements of people inside Somalia at specific periods in the 
Somali conflict clearly shows a correlation between the period of mobilization and high 
intensity conflict with periods when assistance funneled to the internal warring factions by 
external actors are at their peak.   
 
The competing divergent interests of the external actors in Somalia have equally impeded all 
the peace processes on Somalia with each of the two major domestic alliance partners always 
postured to antagonize any peace process which results in the enthronement of a government 
for Somalia headed by the opposing group. Wheeling Somalia out of the present conflict is 
still possible. An insistence on a strong centralist arrangement will continue to bear 
negatively on the attempts at ending the conflict and rebuilding the Somali society. A 
concerted support and stabilization of the emerging organic administrative entities inside 
Somalia would be a necessary step. These would in turn become the building blocks for a 
new Somali state in which the center is made less attractive and, thus, less competitive.  
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This chapter introduces the research study. It discusses the hypothesis and background to the 
study and outlines the research problem, research objectives, the key questions, and the 
research problems. The research methodology and methods, as well as the limitations of 
study are discussed. The chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of the thesis.   
 
1.1 Hypothesis: The divergent interests of external actors in a stable Somali state have 
sustained the Somali conflict.   
 
1.2 Background to the study and outline of the research problem: Somalia ceased to exist 
as a functional state in 1991 following the conflict that engulfed the country in 1990.  It has 
thus produced the most enduring stateless environment within which violent exchanges have 
persisted.   
 
The Somali conflict has mutated over the years.  Many factors have been identified as causes 
of the conflict, including clan politics, competition among the political elites for power and 
resources, and the high-handedness of the Siad Barre regime.  However, Somalia’s 
experiences at the hands of external actors -- both neighbouring and more distant countries -- 
lie at the core of the conflict. Colonial occupations, the geopolitical rivalry between the 
United States (US) and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, US counterterrorism activity, 
the International Islamist Network or al-Qaeda’s interests in the failed state environment in 
Somalia as a shield and staging ground, and the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 
Somalian territory played (and continue to play) a critical role in the transformation of the 
Somalian conflict over the years (Wais 2002:  id).  
 
The independent Somalia showed clear weaknesses from its inception.  Differences between 
the colonial and decolonization experiences of British Somaliland (the north) and Italian 
Somaliland (the south), and the hasty unification process predisposed the young state to 
internal conflict.  Irredentism, which has characterized Somalia’s behaviour towards its 
neighbours, is a product of its balkanization by the colonial powers into the neighbouring 
states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (Nkaisserry 1997: 3). 
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Somalia is geo-strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea, at the Gulf of Aden, and has 
a very long Indian Ocean coastline, located close to some of the most important oil fields in 
the world as well as major shipping lanes (Little 2003:7). As a result, Somalia was deemed an 
attractive location by both the US and the former USSR during the Cold War and became the 
theatre for a bitter struggle for strategic advantage in the Horn of Africa (US National 
Security Council 2008: 5).  The US also sought to contain the USSR’s influence in the Horn.  
The friendship between Somalia and the USSR (while it lasted) resulted in the building of a 
Somali army that was ranked “the fourth largest modern sophisticated [military] in Sub-
Saharan Africa” (Bryden 1999:134).  The adoption of a socialist system by the new Ethiopian 
military regime in 1977 resulted in the US shifting its support to Somalia and the USSR 
pledging its support to Ethiopia.  This sharpened the rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, 
with each seeking to support dissident activities from within its borders against the other.  
The Cold War also resulted in an enormous quantity of weapons in Somalia, many of which 
ended up in the hands of either the militia fighters and/or the various warring factions in the 
country that sought the fall of Siad Barre (Elmi and Barise 2006: 37). 
 
US interest and involvement in Somalia has changed over time.  More recently – especially 
(but not exclusively) since the global war on terror in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks in the US – a number of events combined to shift the US focus in Somalia to 
that of counterterrorism.   These include the October 1993 killing of 18 US marines inside 
Somalia by militia loyal to Farah Aideed; and the 7 August 1998 bombings of the US 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians 
and 12 Americans killed and more than 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured.   Since 
9/11, US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa have centred on preventing Somalia from 
becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda and/or preventing the domestication of jihadist groups 
inside the country. For example, in 2005 the US sponsored the emergence of a coalition of 
Somali warlords inside Somalia, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Counterterrorism (ARPCT), coordinated by Ethiopia. This group were saddled with the 
responsibility of tracking down and arresting all al-Qaeda elements inside Somalia 
(International Crisis Group 2005:  46). 
 
In pursuing its counterterrorism strategy, the US seems to have found common cause with 
Ethiopia, given the latter’s decades-long battle to contain Somali separatists in its Ogaden 
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region.  While the US alliance with Ethiopia may seem to have short-term tactical 
advantages, it appears to have complicated the conflict, creating an opportunity for another 
neighbouring state – Eritrea – to justify its own involvement and mobilization of both 
external and internal support for the Somali Islamist rebel movement.  Ethiopia has always 
been mindful of Somalia irredentism.  It fought with Somalia in 1977-1978 over its Ogaden 
region which Somalia believes is part of the ‘Greater Somalia’.  This predisposed Ethiopia to 
support any activity that would destabilize Somalia.  Such support has taken different forms, 
including arms supplies, logistic support and, sometimes, outright mobilization and 
sponsorship of opposition military activities against the government in Mogadishu (Elmi and 
Barise 2006:  36, 39; Ahmed and Green 2007:116)).  After the fall of Siad Barre, Ethiopia 
resorted to using one faction against the other, only to turn around and destroy the ally.  This 
was illustrated when Ethiopia switched its support from Ali Mahdi (the head of the interim 
administration in 1992) to General Aideed and back to Ali Mahdi in 1994 (Elmi and Barise 
2006:  42).  Ethiopia effectively used factional leaders to stymy peace accords (Elmi and 
Barise 2006:  39).  For example, it used Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and General Adan 
Abdullahi to destroy the outcome of the Cairo peace conference in 1997 (Elmi and Barise 
2006:  40), and Colonel Hassan Mohamed to sabotage the Arta peace agreement in 2000 
(Elmi and Barise 2006: 41).  Given this context, Kahssay (2009:  29) argues that: “the main 
reason for the intervention [involvement] of Ethiopia in Somalia’s conflict is the priority it 
gives to its national interest.  Ethiopia never opts to see a strong government in Somalia 
which might revive demands for the return of the Ogaden province from itself”.   
 
Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia (from 2006 until its withdrawal in early 2009) greatly 
undermined the legitimacy of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is 
perceived as too close to the Ethiopians.  It also provided a platform for the Islamic Courts 
Union to mobilize opposition and attacks on the TFG (Observatoire de l’Afrique 2009: 9) and 
brought Ethiopia and Eritrea’s divergent interests to the fore.
1
   Eritrea’s resentment of 
Ethiopia’s presence inside Somalia manifests itself in support for the Islamic Courts Union in 
the form of the provision of  an operational base, arms supplies, training, logistics and 
material provisions (Observatoire de L’Afrique 2010:  9; UN Monitoring Group 2006: 11-14; 
UN Monitoring Group 2007: 8-10).  Furthermore, while Eritrea seeks an Islamic government 
in Somalia, Cornwell (cited in Kahssay, 2009: 32) contends that the dynamics of the Somali 
                                                          
1
 In December 2006 the Ethiopian army was invited by the then TFG to assist it against the Islamic Courts 
Union which had taken control of over 80% of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in a swift offensive that began in 
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conflict ‘suits Eritrean government which seeks to enmesh Ethiopia in an unwinnable war of 
attrition in Somalia that proves embarrassing to the authorities in Addis Ababa and the 
distraction from the unfinished business of settling their protracted border dispute’.   
 
Al-Qaeda (through its international Jihad) has become a major player in the Somali conflict.  
It seeks both a foothold in Somalia and the installation of an Islamic government in the 
country – thereby countering the influence of the US in the region.  The environment of the 
failed state of Somalia presents an ideal safe haven for wanted terrorists, and a transit point 
and recruitment and training ground for the  global al-Qaeda network (US State Department 
May 2002; World Peace Foundation  2005: 19; Elmi and Barise 2006: 37).  Somalia’s long 
coastline and its proximity to the Middle East heighten its attractiveness to al-Qaeda, which 
has invested enormous energy and operational resources in achieving its objectives in the 
country; its activities have been and continue to be pivotal in shaping the evolution of the 
Somali conflict. 
 
The following questions therefore lie at the heart of the current investigation: Would the 
Somali conflict have taken on the dimensions it has without the involvement of external 
actors? Would it have lasted this long, defying every attempt at resolution, without the 
interference of external actors whose interests have usually been factored into the truncated 
or unsuccessful peace processes? 
 
1.3 Research objectives: Key questions 
This research study is concerned not only with the identification of the key external actors in 
the Somali conflict but also with analysing and evaluating the effect of these actors’ 
behaviour on the dialectics of the conflict in Somalia. The study also seeks to make 
recommendations for a more transparent and productive regional and external engagement in 
Somalia.  Therefore, the objectives of this research study are to: 
 
i. Identify the key external actors in the Somali conflict and their specific interests and 
roles; 
 
ii.  Determine the extent to which these external actors’ divergent interests and roles 
contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflict; 
 
 
10 | P a g e  
 
iii. Identify the internal factors which the external actors exploit in pursuit of their 
interests, which in turn have contributed to the shaping and transformation of the 
Somalia conflict; 
 
iv.  Offer recommendations on external engagement with the domestic actors in the 
Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process. 
 
The study therefore addresses the following specific questions:  
 
i. Who are the key external actors and why are they involved in the Somali conflict? 
 
ii.  What are the specific interests and roles of these external actors in the Somali 
conflict? 
 
iii. To what extent have these external actors’ divergent interests and roles contributed 
to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflict? 
 
iv. What internal factors in Somalia that are exploited by the external actors in pursuit 
of their interests have contributed to the transformation of the Somali conflict? 
 
v. How can Somalia be genuinely engaged and steered out of the protracted conflict 
and state failure? 
 
1.4. Research problem: Broader issues: The Somali conflict occupies a unique position in 
the discourse of conflicts around the globe due to the significant precedents it has set.   The 
conflict and the state collapse have endured for more than two decades (since January 1991).   
Writing on the complete and protracted collapse of the state and its experiences of unending 
conflict and lawlessness, Menkhaus observed that Somalia is “in a class by itself among the 
world’s failed states” (Menkhaus 2003: 27).  This research study breaks new ground in that it 
approaches the Somali conflict from a relatively new perspective – eternal actors’ 
involvement that seems to have continued to play a significant role in shaping and sharpening 
the conflict.  The study therefore seeks to determine the critical characteristics of external 
involvement and how they combine to drive and deepen the Somali conflict.  In addressing 
the transformative implications of the external actors’ role in the Somali conflict, this study 
focuses on a critical dimension of the Somali conflict narrative. Previous studies have 
generally focused on the behaviours of the domestic actors, their intransigence, and the 
clannish heterogeneity of Somali society as the drivers of the conflict. 
 
This study offers students of conflict, peace, security, politics and international relations 
further insight into the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia in particular and conflict in 
general.   It is hoped that its findings and suggestions will benefit practitioners of conflict 
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transformation or conflict resolution and management as they continue to engage all relevant 
actors in their quest to find a lasting solution to the Somali conflict.  It will also be useful in 
assessing and engaging other conflicts in Africa and at the global level. The research, 
therefore, is timely and relevant. 
 
Clearly, no single research effort is complete in itself; rather, each makes a contribution to a 
particular field.  In this vein, this research study focuses on the roles of four major external 
actors – two neighbouring state actors (Ethiopia and Eritrea), one global state actor (the US) 
and one global non-state actor (Al Qaeda/International Islamist Network).  More than any 
others, the interaction of these actors’ activities with local actors and internal conditions has 
influenced the dynamics of the Somali conflict.  It should be noted that while this study does 
not investigate the roles of international organizations and non-governmental organizations, it 
will allude to them when necessary. Future research endeavours would focus on this group of 
actors.   
 
1.5   Research methodology and methods  
The study employs an integrative qualitative method. Silverman (1997: 1) describes the 
qualitative research method as being “built on a dialogue between Social Science and the 
community …”.  He observes also that “qualitative research provides a deeper understanding 
of social phenomena” (Silverman, 2005: 10).   According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000:  8), 
qualitative research stresses “the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied, the situational constraints that shape 
inquiry.” This methodology is therefore appropriate for this study as it seeks to assess the 
behaviour of the external actors in the Somali conflict, their interactions in the conflict 
environment and the impact of such interactions on the conflict.  It is invaluable in placing 
the issues under investigation in their proper social context while getting as close as possible 
to the “actors’ perspective … prioritizing the study of perceptions and meanings” from the 
subject’s perspective through interaction (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 10).  The qualitative 
method prides itself on shying away from “deducing information about a phenomenon under 
study, but engages in an empirical” method of interaction, conversation and explanation 
(Holstein & Gubrium 1995:  113).  As Payne & Payne (2004: 176) observe, the qualitative 
method therefore, “treats actions as part of holistic social process and context, rather than 
something that can be extracted and studied in isolation.”  
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The data for this study were generated from primary and secondary sources.  The primary 
sources were personal in-depth interviews.  This technique is invaluable in conducting 
“systematic social inquiry, generating empirical data about [the] social world by asking 
people to talk about their lives” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995: 113).  Bearing in mind the need 
for diverse sources of data, interviews were conducted with a range of individuals who are 
informed on the Somali conflict.  These included a senior diplomatic official concerned with 
Somali affairs in the US Embassy in Kenya, two of the high-ranking officials in the Ethiopian 
and Eritrean Embassies in Kenya; a senior representative of the Somali TFG in Kenya; two 
members of the Somali Diaspora each in South Africa and Kenya, and one undercover 
Somali Islamists Contact.   
 
In order to generate further data to facilitate more informed conclusions, side by side with 
those of the key actors, the researcher also interviewed other high-ranking African 
government officials and experts in Kenya. They include: an official at the Nigerian 
Embassy, three senior Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) representatives 
(two working inside Somalia), two senior Kenyan academics with the Kenyan Institute of 
Diplomacy at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, two other academics at the University of 
Nairobi, and a top commander of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) at its 
headquarters in Kenya. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in Kenya.  The Kenyan 
Institute of Diplomacy and the University of Nairobi Library provided a research assistant 
and access to library materials, respectively.  As interviews are likened to “prospecting for 
the true facts and feelings residing within the respondent” (Holstein & Gubrium 1995:  115), 
and in order to present accurate and reportable findings, the researcher employed the 
structured, detailed interview method.   
 
I also gathered primary data using focus group discussions (FGD) research tool. This is to 
validate the findings of the structured interviews. According to Kitzinger (1994:  103), “focus 
groups are group discussions organized to explore people’s views and experiences on a 
specific set of issues” such as what we are dealing with in this research. According to the 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (2008), FGD tool is very useful in research. It 
enables the researcher to gather “subjective perspectives from key stakeholders” which may 
include the participants’ “perceptions, insights, attitudes, experiences, or beliefs” (Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2008: 1).  It also helps in “providing interpretations for data 
collected” using other methods (CDC 2008:  1). Two groups of ten (10) and eight (8) 
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participants respectively were randomly selected. While the group of 10 was drawn from 
Somalis living in the Mayfair district of Johannesburg, South Africa, the group of 8 was 
drawn from the Somali refugees living inside Kenya. The two focus groups of 10 and 8 
respectively were randomly selected among different categories of Somalis that the 
researcher considered relevant. The 10 participants group, which was selected from the 
Mayfair district of Johannesburg in South Africa, was made up as follows: 4 members of the 
leadership of the Association of Somalis in South Africa (ASSA, LASSA1-4), 2 former clan 
elders in Somalia (FCESA 1&2), 2 women who worked under Siad Barre and saw the 
conflict up to 2001 (SWSA 1&2), and 2 former militia fighters FMFSA 1&2). The second 
group was composed of 8 participants randomly drawn from the Somali refugees in Dadaab 
refugee camp in Kenya. They included: 5 (five) members of the Somali camp leadership 
(SCLK 1-5); and 3 (three) former militia fighters (FMFK 1-3). For the purpose of presenting 
the data from the focus group discussions, the two groups are merged as the same set of 
discussion questions were used in their separate interactions.   
 
Table 1.1 Focus Group participants  
Category of participants Number of participants  
Leadership of Association of Somalis in South 
Africa 
04 
Former Somali Clan Elders 02 
Somali Women formerly in government 02 
Former Somali Militia Fighters 05 
Somali Camp Leaders 05 
 18 
Source: The Researcher 2013 
 
The researcher also consulted a wide range of secondary sources including books, 
journal/academic articles, newspaper articles, government foreign policy papers, government 
reports and internet material. The data collected through the primary and secondary sources is 
analysed using content analysis.  Neuendorf defines content analysis as: 
 
a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the 
scientific method (including attention to objectivity, inter-subjectivity, a 
priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and 
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hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may 
be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented  
(Neuendorf 2002:10). 
 
This method enables researchers to analyse all the texts and interviews to present synthesized 
studies on different subjects.    
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized in ten chapters. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter presents the general focus of the study, the research hypothesis, the research 
problem and objectives, and the questions which the study sought to address, the research 
methodology and methods as well as the structure of the thesis.   
 
Chapter Two: An overview of Somalia’s geography and history  
This chapter briefly examines Somalia’s geographical location and how this has defined the 
country’s social and economic patterns. It highlights Somalia’s size, population, position, 
landscape, altitude and climate. The chapter also discusses the social formation of Somali 
society including the clan kinship system, language, religion and occupation – the majority of 
the population live a nomadic life. A brief outline is presented of the Somalis’ early contact 
with the Arab world and early advances. Finally, the chapter discusses the historical 
landmarks of pre-colonial Somalia, its experiences under multiple colonial powers, anti-
colonial movements, independence and the unification of the north and south. It concludes 
with a review of the struggle for state power which gradually but steadily led to the collapse 
of the Somali state. 
 
Chapter Three: Literature review  
This chapter presents an overview of armed conflict at the global level, with special reference 
to Somalia.  It outlines the typologies under which conflicts are categorized and reviews the 
nature and trends of contemporary armed conflicts.  The chapter also discusses conflicts in 
Africa, touching on some of the causes of African conflicts.  It concludes by focusing on the 
contemporary conflict in Somalia and analysing the various factors that contributed to the 
conflict as underlying, proximate or driving factors. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework  
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion on the various theoretical approaches employed 
in this research study – Realist Theory, the Political Economy Framework, Securitization 
Theory, and Enemy Image Framework. It highlights the reasons for adopting these 
approaches in order to analyse and understand the various interests of the external actors 
under investigation which, in turn, inform their behaviour in the conflict in Somalia.  
 
Chapter Five: External actors and conflict transformation 
This chapter discusses external actors’ involvement in conflicts outside their borders. It 
distinguishes between the interventions of major global powers from the 19
th
 to the middle of 
the 20
th
 centuries in the internal conflicts states’ as well as interventions during the Cold War 
era. It also discusses some of the reasons for external actors’ intervention in an internal 
conflict. The chapter concludes with an examination of the various implications of external 
actors’ intervention in other countries’ internal conflict.    
 
Chapter Six:  External actors in the Somali conflict: interests and roles  
This chapter analyses the research data to discuss external actors’ involvement in the Somali 
conflict.  Serious attention is paid to the interests, roles and behaviours of the target external 
actors, the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the International Islamist Network or al-Qaeda, as well 
as their interactions and alliances with domestic actors in the Somali conflict. The chapter 
concludes with a critical examination of how these alliances and interaction define the 
dynamics of the conflict. 
 
Chapter Seven: Internal factors exploited by external actors in the Somali conflict 
This chapter examines the critical internal factors exploited by external actors in the Somali 
conflict and the extent to which the synergy of these internal factors and the targeted external 
actors’ disposition towards them influence the dynamics of the Somali conflict.   
 
Chapter Eight: The impact of external actors on the dynamics of the Somali conflict  
This chapter examines the various alliances and realignments of internal actors and the extent 
of external actors’ involvement in the conflict. It assesses the extent to which alliances and 
counter-alliances among the external and internal actors have continued to drive the Somali 
conflict, transforming it from one stage to another. The discussion is based on information 
collected from the respondents and the literature. 
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Chapter Nine: Towards a workable initiative on Somalia 
This chapter discusses some of the failed efforts to return Somalia to a state of peace and 
restore its statehood. It analyses the weaknesses of these initiatives. Drawing on the findings, 
it proposes a new, purposeful path to resolve the Somali conflict and the eventual 
reconstitution of the Somali state. 
 
Chapter Ten: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the thesis and the findings.  It synthesizes the key issues discussed 
in the study and reaches conclusions based on its findings, focusing on the hypothesis. It also 
offers recommendations that could be very useful in common efforts to resolve the Somali 
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Chapter Two 
An overview of Somalia’s geography and history 
2.0 Introduction  
Post-colonial Africa has witnessed many interstate and intrastate conflicts and wars.  The 
interplay of the social structures and the historical factors leading to the emergence of most 
African states defines events in those states, including conflicts, either as a root cause or as an 
aggravating factor. For example, ethnic differences have been readily exploited by the elite in 
most African states that have experienced/are experiencing conflict to mobilize political 
support. Existing animosities are exploited to create and/or foster an image of an ‘enemy’ in 
the struggle for political positions that the elite can use to control the distribution of national 
resources.    
The Somalia crisis is not only one of the most protracted conflicts in Africa but also one with 
very peculiar characteristics. Somalia is believed to be made up of one ethnic group, ‘the 
Somalis’, but is organized around a traditional clan system which has defined the dimensions 
of the Somali conflict in the absence of ethnicity. The unifying and centralizing policies of 
the Siad Barre administration tended to undermine clan formation and activities, leading to a 
coalition of clan opposition to the central government. Combined with deadly conflicts 
among the clan warlords themselves, this coalition played a major role in the eventual and 
sustained collapse of the Somali state (Adam 1992:11). Therefore, the process of 
understanding the Somali situation goes beyond a uni-dimensional focus on the Somali 
conflict to a deeper and broader geopolitical, economic, and socio-cultural historicity.  
2.1 The geography, people and economic formation of Somalia  
Somalia lies at the mouth of the Red Sea. It stretches 3,200 kilometres along the coastline 
from Bab-el-Mendeb
2
 westward along the Gulf of Aden to the Cape of Guardafui, and then 
southwest along a very long Indian ocean coast to Ras Kiamboni at the border with Kenya 
(Fitzgibbon 1984: 1; Little 2003:7; Bryden 1999: 137). Inland, it is bordered to the west by 
Ethiopia; Kenya to the south-west; and Djibouti to the north-west. Somalia occupies a total 
land area of about 640,000 sq. km. This is approximately the size of Italy and France 
combined.  
                                                          
2
 Bab-el-Mendeb is also called the Southern Gate of the Red Sea  
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The Somali landscape is mountainous, flowing from the south to the highest peak in the north 
at about 2,438 metres above sea level. The climate is hot and dry almost throughout the year, 
with temperatures reaching above 40 degrees centigrade.  A short rainy season is experienced 
in May and June each year (Fitzgibbon 1984: 1).  
Somalia is comprised of six main confederating clans, namely, the Dir, Ishaq, the Darod, the 
Hawiye, the Digil and the Rahanweye. The Dir and Ishaq live in the north, while the Darod 
occupy the centre as well as in the extreme south west. The Hawiye live along the southern 
coast and in the south west, while the Digil and the Rahanweye occupy the plain between the 
Shebelle and Juba Rivers.  
Figure 2.1 A physiographical map of Somalia 
 
 Source: The CIA Library – World Facebook 2012 
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The Somali live in the present Djibouti, northern Kenya, Ethiopia, and in Somalia. The 
average Somali nomad values freedom and have developed an irredentist orientation due 
(probably) to their recent political history. The five stars on the flag of the Republic of 
Somalia envisage the unification of the Somalis of Djibouti (French Somaliland), Northern 
Kenya (northern frontier), Ethiopia (Ogaden), British Somaliland (northern Somalia), and 
Italian Somaliland (southern Somalia).  
Somalia has been described by some scholars as a nation rather than a state (Fitzgibbon 1984: 
3). This claim, though, may be challenged should the lack of bonds which the conflict-driven 
interactions among the clans exemplifies is considered. Somalis belong to one ethnic group 
and religion (in the main), speak one language (the Somali language), and belong to the 
“Cushitic-speaking family”.
3
 Somalia is a Muslim nation, with a very tiny Christian 
population; Islam acts as the strongest element that binds the nation together (Harper 2012: 
10). The majority of Somalis are pastoralists or nomads, with the Digil and Rahanweye 
cultivating the Shebelle and Juba plains. While camels, sheep, goats and cows are pastured by 
the Somalis, the camel is the most prized. Apart from being part of their diet, the camel is 
also used by the Somali as a form of currency for payments: for instance, for bride price or 
blood compensation in cases of murder. Abdullah Fara summarizes the importance of the 
camel to the Somali: 
We Somalis are completely inseparable from our camels. Historically we 
have depended on them for milk, meat, money and transport. They were 
our first form of long-haul transport, carrying all of our worldly 
belongings on their backs without water. They are the backbones of the 
rural areas. Somalis have a sort of romantic relationship with their camels 
because we are so deeply attached to them (quoted in Harper 2012:  17). 
 
Somalia also has other resources, although not in very large quantities. The north-eastern part 
of Somalia earned the name “Land of Punt” which translates to “Land of fine scents” due to 
the straggly trees whose sap is used to produce myrrh and frankincense. These commodities 
have been traded for centuries by the Arabs and are used for religious rituals by both 
Christians and Muslims. Banana, maize, millet, sorghum and other food crops are grown in 
the fertile area between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in the south. Before the civil war broke 
out in the late 1980s, the massive Somali banana plantations produced bananas for export as 
                                                          
3
  The Cushitic languages consist of more than 30 languages which are spoken in eastern and north-eastern 
Africa including Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, the Horn of Africa and Sudan. It is a sub-family of the Afro-asiatic 
language family which is named after the Biblical Cush, identified as the traditional ancestor of the speakers of 
these languages.  
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well as domestic consumption. However, these plantations have been plundered by different 
warring factions. The country’s long coastline also offers a massive fishing area and seafood 
is a fall-back during times of severe drought (Harper 2012: 14-19).    
2.2 Historical background 
Somali ports are believed to have attracted merchants before 1500 BC. The “The Periplus of 
the Erythraean Sea” written by Wilfred H. Schoff in AD 40, comments on the independent 
and democratic nature of the Somali institution (Fitzgibbon 1984: 6). The advent of Islam 
marked a surge in the outside world’s interest in Somalia with development and growth in 
contacts and trade. Mogadishu, Warsheikh, Merca and Brava in the south and Zeila, Berbera 
and Bender Abbas in the north all attracted foreign settlers. Zeila was the capital of the first 
Somali state of Adal. The following Arab scholars wrote about Somalia:  Al Masudi (AD 
935), Al Bakri (AD 1067), Al Idrisa (AD 1154), Ibn Battuta (AD 1331) and Ibn Said (AD 
1344). These writers, especially Ibn Said, Ibn Battuta and Al Idrisa emphasised the absolute 
independence of Somalia from any foreign domination (Fitzgibbon 1984: 18). Sir Burton, a 
British explorer, was quoted by Louis Fitzgibbon in his 1854 book, First Steps in East Africa, 
as stating the following about the city of Harar:  
An ancient metropolis of once a mighty race, the only permanent settlement in 
East Africa, the reputed seat of Muslim learning, a walled city of stone houses, 
possessing its independent chief, its peculiar population, its unknown language 
and its coinage, an emporium of the coffee trade, … the great manufactory of 
cotton cloth, and the country of the somal as by no means a destitute of 
capabilities. Though partially desert and thinly populated, it possesses valuable 
articles of traffic and its harbours export the produce of Gurage, Abyssinia, 
Galla and other inland races (Fitzgibbon 1984: 19-20).   
2.2.1 Pre-colonial Somalia 
The pre-colonial Somali political system was characterized by a segmentary kinship system. 
This can be said to be a peculiar indigenous system. The society was organised politically and 
socially along clans, sub-clans and lineage structures which differ from those of most other 
African societies where political hierarchy and institutionalised leadership exist (Little 
2003:14). The clans are determined by patrilineal descent and can range from several hundred 
to several thousand members. The clans are believed to have common ancestral origins, with 
a “complex network of social relationships” which often go beyond individual clans (Ssesrio 
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2003:  25). Clan boundaries are not clearly marked within national boundaries and the 
borders are fluid.  
There is a traditional democratic culture among the Somalis. Lewis (1987:41) observes that 
this is a ‘blend of democracy, equality and anarchy’. The heer is the political and the legal 
framework for addressing both political and legal disputes and applies to members who 
belong to the heer through a covenant entered into by lineage groups of the same clan (Laitin 
and Samatar 1987:42). The heer is an ad hoc body entrusted with the responsibility to resolve 
conflicts with the participation of all the male members. “Wealth [in camels], skill in public 
oratory and poetry, and religious knowledge, or bravery” can bring a man to prominence, but 
do not in any way arrogate any special rights, privilege or authority as “all men are 
councillors, and all men are politicians” in the heer assembly (Lewis 1961:198). 
Individual freedom is highly valued by the Somalis and egalitarianism is evident in the equal 
right to participation. Surprisingly, homogeneous as it is, Somali society is dysfunctional 
(Gilkes 1994: 10). Laitin and Samatar (1987: 43) argue that Somali society is an anarchic 
system that lacks “institutionalized authority roles”. They maintain that the election of a 
sultan by some shirs and the recognition of some religious men by others does not confer any 
special “power or authority” on such people. Little (2003:14) observed that central control is 
non-existent in Somalia as individualism is the hallmark of political and social life. He notes 
that “men are divided among political units without any administrative hierarchy of officials 
and with no instituted positions of leadership to direct their affairs”. Lewis (1961: 241) 
concurs and notes that: 
Even the office of the clan head is generally little more than a nominal 
title…..Within the diya-paying groups and at every level of association, 
policy is determined by the majority decision of all the adult men in the 
group concerned, in an ad hoc council.  
 
Like every other society, conflicts occurred in Somalia. In the Somali traditional setting, 
these were mostly among clans and around resources such as livestock, water and grazing 
areas. These conflicts are resolved through the heer, the Somali traditional legal system. Elmi 
and Barise (2006:38) suggest that a “reward for violence” is embedded in the Somali cultural 
system. Young men could attack a clan and steal their camels, but are forbidden from doing 
the same within their own clan. There is intense clan rivalry. The strong cleavages around the 
dia-paying groups and allegiances to them where families agree among themselves on 
collective responsibility and punishment through an ‘informal’ contract tend to widen the 
22 | P a g e  
 
distance among clans. An image of the ‘enemy’ has been developed and nurtured over the 
years. Harper (2012: 11) argues that the Somali clan system is “inherently divisive” with an 
almost endless splitting from clans to sub-clans and further down the line which negates any 
form of central authority. It is on this notion of the individual as the referent that the now 
popular philosophy of the Somali is predicated:  
 
Me and my clan against the world 
Me and my family against my clan 
Me and my brother against my family 
Me against my brother (Harper 2012: 11) 
 
For the average Somali, the primary interest is the self, then the brother, family, clan and 
world. The clan is the highest level of social organization and nationalism begins and ends 
with the clan. This has been a major snag in the attempts to forge a united Somalia from the 
very beginning of the Somali project. 
 
Having said this, the system is not without its strengths. It has an enduring and enabling 
feature whereby groups collectively undertake to support any member experiencing 
problems. This may take the form of paying for the cost of murder or injury to another group, 
loaning animals, mixed-herding and arms-giving (Ahmed and Green 1999:114). This 
traditional system is also the basis for the enforcement of property rights. The interplay of 
factors and the subsequent conflicts in colonial and post-colonial Somalia can only be fully 
understood in light of the traditional pre-colonial social formation of Somali society (Coyne 
2006:347).   
 
2.2.2 The pre-colonial Somali economy 
The Somali economy was driven by pastoralism in both the pre-colonial and post-colonial 
epochs. What has changed is the social system that has driven each historical epoch. The pre-
colonial Somali social system engaged in what Samatar Abdi Ismail (2008:  128) calls 
“communitarian pastoralism”. The production of use value was the central motive as against 
contemporary commodification where the exchange value has become the propelling motive. 
This was a stateless society where every adult engaged in production. Communitarian 
pastoralism is characterized by the absence of the institutionalized social and economic 
hierarchy that characterizes a class-based society (Samatar 2008:  131).  This interpretation of 
pre-colonial Somali society does not overlook the pre-colonial existence of riverine 
communities in the southern part of Somalia whose social relations were slightly different 
from that of the rest of society. However, the turn of 19th century, and the advent of 
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colonialism saw Somalia becoming part of the global capitalist system, with livestock 
becoming commoditised in the new pastoralist-merchant state.  
 
2.2.3 The Somali Colonial State 
Somalia’s colonial history can be traced back to Britain’s capture of the Gulf of Aden in 1839 
as a coaling station for its steam ships sailing between India and the Suez. At first the British 
were not keen to become directly involved in the area, but the fear of the coast falling into the 
hands of a rival and competition from rival imperial powers made it difficult for Britain to let 
go of the coast (Laitin and Samatar 1987:48). Britain made direct contact with the Somali 
clans in 1884, resulting in colonial outposts on the coast. The annexation of the southern 
frontiers of the Somali peninsula began in 1886 with the sole aim of controlling the mouth of 
the Nile. While Britain was settling in Aden, France established itself at the Afar coast on the 
Red Sea and, by 1884, the strip was declared French Somaliland -- the present Djibouti. Italy 
came a little later than Britain and France. Britain welcomed Italy as it regarded the latter as a 
counter force to the ambitious France. It encouraged Italian operations in the southern interior 
of Somalia. By 1888, Britain, France, and Italy had established themselves on the coast of the 
Red Sea and engaged in heated competition over Ethiopia. Its alliance with Italy changed 
Ethiopia’s fortunes, making it an imperial player in the region, and becoming the only 
territory in this region that not only withstood the colonial ambitions of the imperial powers 
but also acted on its own territorial interests by endeavouring to capture other territories, 
including the Ogaden area of Somalia. 
By 1900, Somalia had been partitioned into five units: British Somaliland, the northern part 
of Somalia came under British colonial rule; French Somaliland, which eventually became 
what is today known as Djibouti;  Italian Somaliland in southern Somalia was colonised by 
Italy; Ethiopian Somaliland, the Ogaden region (was conquered by Menilik of Ethiopia 
between 1817 and 1895), which has remained part of Ethiopia till today; and the Northern 
Frontier District, which is still part of Kenya (Dersso 2009:2; Laitin and Samatar 1987:53). 
This arbitrary partitioning of Somalia destroyed the homogeneity of Somali society. For 
example, the British and the Italian colonial powers introduced their variant cultures and 
languages in their Northern Somaliland and Southern Somaliland respectively, with severe 
implications for the future political landscape of a unified Somali state. This historical period 
had lasting implications for political, economic, and social experiences in years to come. 
Laitin and Samatar argue that “many of the problems faced by the post-colonial Somali 
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society were set in motion by the peculiar character of colonial occupation of Somalia and by 
the nature of resistance that the occupation provoked” (1987: 53). 
While Britain and France operated at the periphery and Italy was involved in southern 
Somaliland, Ethiopia ventured deep inside Somalia, expanding into the pasturelands and even 
dispossessing some groups, especially the Ogaadeen Somalis. Plunder by Ethiopia led to the 
emergence of a ‘pan- Somali’ resistance alliance led by Sayyid Mahamad. The second half of 
the 1940s witnessed heightened political activities in the Somali protectorate (all four 
territories had come under temporary British control). This raised the hopes of the effective 
unification of Somalia, aided by the transformation of the Somaliland National Society to the 
Somali National League (SNL) in 1947. The SNL’s activities transcended the colonial 
territorial boundaries of British Somaliland where it originated. In southern Somalia 
(formally Italian Somaliland), the Somali Youth League (SYL) was established in 1945. The 
SYL was highly conscious politically and led by a radical, Abdillahi Cise. This factor, 
together with Britain’s continued trusteeship of the entire Somalia, and the eventual handing 
back of the Ogaadeen to Ethiopia in 1948, escalated agitations across Somalia (Samatar 
1988:46). The more liberal British administration in southern Somalia -- after the ousting of 
Italy -- also stimulated growth in political activities.  
 
The SYL adopted a three-point plan of “opposition to re-imposition of Italian rule; working 
for the unification of Somalia territories; and the march towards independence under the 
trusteeship of the Four Powers” (Samatar 1988: 53). Clannish activities led to some members 
of SYL breaking away to form the Hizbia Digale Mirifle (HDM). This new political 
organization posed a great challenge to the SYL, as it was more radical and not predisposed 
to any form of compromise on the freedom of Somalia. The HDM organised other smaller 
(clan-based) parties under the auspices of the ‘Somali Conference’, and disrupted the ‘Four 
Power Commission’ of 1948 which was mandated to explore the possibility of the 
withdrawal of the British military administration by 1950. The losses and injuries resulting 
from the confrontation between the SYL and a coalition of the HDM and other pro-Italian 
clannish parties (supported by Italian settlers), led to the deaths of 52 Italians and 14 Somalis, 
with 51 Italians and 48 Somalis injured. In 1949, the United Nations General Assembly 
decided to place southern Somalia (former Italian Somaliland) “under UN trusteeship to be 
administered by Italy”. The independence of the territory was set for 1960 (Samatar 
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1988:54). This decision did not go down well with the Somali Youth Movement and was 
greeted with riots in many areas of Somalia.  
2.2.4 Somalia’s march towards independence and unification 
The 1950s ushered in a new phase in the life of Somalia. The Italians, supervised by the UN, 
became more committed to the country’s development, especially in the area of education. 
This paid off as the SYL toned down their antagonism towards the Italian administrators and 
began to cooperate. A policy shift saw Somalis brought into administrative positions. The 
first municipal election was held in 1954 and the legislative election followed in 1956. The 
SYL won 43 of the 60 seats allotted to Somalis in the legislative election, making the party’s 
leader, Abdillahi Cise, the first prime minister. The party dominated the run-up to elections 
towards independence in 1960, despite strong and sometimes violent opposition from the 
HDM and other opposition parties. It won 83 of the 90 seats in the parliamentary election of 
1959 (Samatar 1988: 55; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 65). 
 
In northern Somalia (British Somaliland), the new constitution was only introduced in 1959 
and an election was held in February 1960. The SNL won 20 of the 33 parliamentary seats.  
Britain’s announcement in April 1960 that it would grant the territory independence in June, 
only few months after that of the South, came as a big surprise. Expectedly, the Somalis 
grabbed the opportunity with both hands, notwithstanding the lack of adequate preparation as 
well as internal problems (party/clan bickering). The SNL and the United Somali Party (USP) 
engaged in heated debates over structural arrangements between the two Somali entities but 
eventually reached a consensus on the North’s future relationship with the South. In July 
1960, it was agreed that the North would form a union with the South as the Federal Republic 
of Somalia. This was just six days after the North was granted independence (Gilkes 1994: 
3). Thus, the two Somali territories ‘joined’ together in July 1960 after a few meetings of the 
elites on both sides to give birth to the independent Somali Republic, with a coalition 
government between the SYL in the South and the SNL and USP in the North.   
From the beginning, the foundation of independent Somalia exhibited clear weaknesses. The 
differences in the colonial and decolonization experiences of British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland, and the hasty unification process predisposed the young state to internal 
conflicts. For example, there was no agreement on the terms of unification prior to 
implementation. Writing in 1969, Cotini (quoted in Laitin and Samatar, 1987:67) states that 
at the union of the territories, there were 
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two different judicial systems; different currencies; different organization 
and conditions of service for the army, the police and the civil 
servants….the governmental institutions, both at the central and local 
level, were differently organised and had different powers; the systems 
and rates of taxation and custom were different, and so were the 
educational systems. 
 
Clearly, the newly formed Somali federation was established and anchored on a weak 
footing, driven largely by the emotional (kinship propinquity) interests of its founders rather 
than the practical issues of bureaucratic order and governance, and social cohesion. These 
issues will be revisited in the discussion on the factors that contributed to the perennial 
conflict in Somalia and its distinct character.  
 
2.2.5 The contest for state control 
Laitin and Samatar (1987: 69) observe that while independence was greeted with euphoria 
throughout the Somali Republic, Somali society “continued to be anarchic” in the initial 
stages. Indeed, some Somalis termed independence a “bitter harvest”. The provisional 
president, Abdullaah Usmaan, and the premier, Abdirashiid Shermaarke, sought to douse the 
flames of simmering tension in the new republic by extending cabinet positions to all the 
clans and sub-clans (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 69). 
The first test was the ratification of the constitution in 1961. The draft constitution was 
completed in the South before independence. The move to have it ratified as the constitution 
for the whole republic caused considerable resentment in the North, which felt that the 
document was being foisted on it. While voters in the South voted overwhelmingly in favour 
of the constitution, it received less than 50 percent support in the North. The constitution laid 
the foundation for a crisis in the polity as it conferred substantial powers on the president and 
head of state. For example, the president has the power to: appoint and fire the prime 
minister; sponsor government bills which the national assembly is obliged to pass into law; 
compel the national assembly to reconsider existing laws; and to dissolve the assembly if the 
president feels that the assembly is no longer functioning properly. It did not take long for 
unease to surface in the republic, especially in the North. To aggravate the situation, both the 
president and the prime minister were from the South. Discontent in the North culminated in 
an unsuccessful attempt to sack Usmaan’s government through a military coup in northern 
Somalia in December 1961 led by army officers of northern descent (Laitin and Samatar 
1987: 71).   
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Sheikh Ali Jamaale’s activities against President Usmaan, both of whom were members of 
the Hawiye sub-clan, were an example of the power struggles early in the life of the republic 
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 73). Jamaale formed an alliance with deputies from the Isaaq clan, 
who complained that the president’s Daarood clan was usurping power. Usmaan was voted 
president of the republic in July 1961 by a very slim margin of two votes, with 61 votes for 
and 59 against and the premier, Sharmaarke nearly lost in a vote of confidence in 1962 to a 
coalition of deputies that wanted the government out. The contest for power resulted in the 
factionalization of existing political parties and the formation of new ones such as the Somali 
National Congress (SNC) by two SNL cabinet ministers that resigned in 1962 (Cornwell 
2004: 2).  
The tussle between President Usmaan and Prime Minister Shermaarke led to the latter being 
removed by the president in 1964 and replaced with Abdirizaaq Haaji Husseen. This 
exacerbated political tension and led to a stalemate that made it impossible for Abdirizaaq to 
form a government for six months. The power struggle came to a head in 1967 when the 
former Prime Minister, Shermaarke, defeated Usmaan in the presidential election. President 
Shermaarke appointed Mahammad Igaal, a northern Somali politician and a strong critic of 
Usmaan (the former president) as Prime Minister. Igaal had left the ruling SYL party and the 
cabinet in 1962 to help form the SNC, which engaged both the SYL and President Usmaan in 
a running battle (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:74). Subsequent sections will examine both how 
these contestations assumed the nature of clan alignments over time and the implications of 
the configuration for the Somali conflict that unfolded.  
 
2.2.6 The conflict and the collapse of the Somali State  
The collapse of the Somali state was not a sudden event. In the years after independence, the 
young republic showed a significant lack of cohesion. The pull towards disintegration seemed 
to be stronger than the push towards unity. Many factors were responsible for this lack of 
unity and formed a synergy around which the eventual state collapse materialized. Ahmed 
(1999:116) argues that the Somali state’s failure goes beyond “clanism and factional 
competition” which are merely the symptoms of state collapse rather than the causes. He 
argues that the root cause lies in the rapid union of the Somali territories to form the united 
Somalia at independence in 1960. In contrast, as noted earlier, Elmi and Barise (2006) 
maintain that the struggle for resources and power, the autocratic Barre regime and the 
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colonial legacy were the root causes of the conflict. Farah Ahmed also holds a contrary view. 
He notes that the majority of Somalis share common ethnic origins, religion and language, 
and are of the same pastoral or nomadic background. Ahmed (in WSP 2001:7) notes that,                                             
The vibrant democracy practiced in those formative early years of 
independence, along with the remarkable cultural and economic cohesion 
of Somali society, impressed observers and raised premature hope about 
Somalia becoming a ‘model democracy in Africa’.  
 
Therefore, a sound understanding of the Somali situation goes beyond a one-dimensional 
focus, to encompass deeper and broader political, economic, and socio-cultural causal factors.  
The foundations of the Somali state encouraged clannishness. Early political struggles in the 
country began with the formation of political parties in the pre-independence period, most of 
which were based on clans. For example, of the 21 parties that contested the 1954 municipal 
election in the former Italian Somaliland, only the SYL tended to have membership from 
other clans, even though it was still seen as a Sannaale clan party (Laitin and Samatar 
1987:65). Clans did form opposition alliances, such as those during the 1956 general election 
in the South where six small clan-based parties formed the Somali Democratic Party (SDP) to 
enable them to compete more effectively with the Sannaale, Digil and Rahanwayn clans in 
the SYL and the HDM, respectively. Most Northern members of the first legislative council 
of 1957 were nominated; this resulted in the elevation of the “traditional clannish cleavages 
encouraged by the colonial administration” (Samatar 1988:46). The influence of clans 
outweighed that of the parties, all of which equally “drew their strength from particular clan 
families and lineage segments” (Samarar 1988:48). However, some scholars have argued that 
clan politics was simply a platform employed by the elite in the contest for power and 
resources in Somalia rather than the cause of the country’s tumble into crisis and eventual 
state collapse (Samatar 1988: 63; Elmi and Barise 2006: 37; Osondu 2009: 41).  The report of 
the 15 January 1994 international conference on ‘Somalia: A State and Society in Turmoil’ 
stated that ‘the Somali crisis is rooted in the Somali colonial past and post-colonial 
mismanagement of state and society. The contradictions between the state’s drive towards 
modernisation and civil society based on clan and kinship have not been democratically 
resolved’ (quoted in Salih and Wohlgemuth 1994:79) 
Following the assassination of president Shermaarke, the military took over leadership of the 
country in a bloodless coup in December 1969under the leadership of Siad Barre. The new 
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military government quickly suspended the constitution and introduced what it called 
“scientific socialism”.  Ajulu (2004:76) argues that the intervention of the strong-handed 
Barre regime actually stemmed what would have been an early collapse of the Somali state. 
The military government rejected clan politics, introduced a written Somali language script, 
embarked on a national mass literacy programme and adopted pan-Somali rhetoric as well as 
the propagation of socialism. Although only for a very short while, it gained widespread 
national support even among feuding politicians. The military government also raised the 
spirit of nationalism to a level never achieved before (Harper 2012: 12). However, this was 
short-lived in the wake of perceived corruption in the military over the years and the lopsided 
promotions and appointments by the Barre administration in favour of his Darod clan.   
During the Cold War, Somalia’s geo-strategic location made it attractive to the US and the 
former Soviet Union, the two globally acknowledged superpowers at the time.  The 
superpowers engaged in a debilitating competition over Somalia, with both the president of 
the US(Richard Nixon) and the USSR (Lenoid Brezhnev) wooing the Siad Barre government 
not only with massive military assistance in the form of arms and equipment, but also the 
training of its military forces and the arming of the other security services. Bryden (1999: 
134) described this competitive military support of the Barre regime by the principal Cold 
War actors as “a ruinous exercise”. He noted that access to arms and equipment emboldened 
Siad Barre throughout his dictatorship, eventually plunging Somalia into its human tragedy 
(Bryden 1999: 136). Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) point out that a good deal of those arms 
ended up in the hands of warlords and militias after the collapse of the Barre administration.  
By 1981, the Somali National Movement which had emerged on the Somali political scene 
the year before had started a campaign for the secession of the North from the Republic. 
Although this bid failed, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 enabled the declaration of 
self-independence by the former British Somaliland as the Republic of Somaliland on 1 
February 1991. Although Somaliland has received no assistance from the UN or the African 
Union, it has succeeded in restoring order and security within its own territorial boundaries. 
This was quickly followed by North-Eastern Somalia which declared independence as the 
Republic of Puntland. Pockets of self-governing entities have continued to spring up in 
Somalia. These events prompted Gilkes (1994:6) to argue that Somali nationalism is 
segmentary, a situation which threatens pan-Somali nationalism and the ‘Greater Somalia” 
agenda. This study will engage these issues more broadly when it discusses the internal 
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factors in Somalia that promote the conflict and possible approaches to achieving sustainable 















3.0 Introduction  
Wars are defined as “armed conflicts, open armed clashes between two or more organized 
parties, with continuity between the clashes, in dispute about power over government and 
territory” (Smith 2004: 3). Smith makes a distinction between war and conflict. While all 
wars are conflicts, not all conflicts are wars. Wars are conflicts that have been escalated by 
resorting to the employment of arms, hence his use of “armed conflict”. He equally 
emphasizes that wars are fought between “organized groups” and are not simply an incident 
but “with continuity between the clashes”.  Sandole (1993: 6-7) argues that conflict may not 
always be dysfunctional and makes a distinction between what he terms the “manifest 
conflict process” (MCP) and “aggressive manifest conflict process” (AMCP). He states that 
MCP is “a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their 
perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal 
seeking capability of one another” and argues that conflict at this level is productive, relying 
on John Burton’s earlier formulation. Burton’s work, World Society (1972: 37-38) argued that 
conflict is an “essentially creative element in human relationships”.  He therefore posited that 
conflict should be “enjoyed” as it is “the means by which our social values of welfare, 
security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be achieved”. Sandole 
argues that conflict becomes dangerous when it transforms into aggression. An AMCP occurs 
when “two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually 
incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-valued 
symbols of one another, and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or 
otherwise forcibly eliminating one another” (Sandole 1993:7). This becomes an act of war.  
This definition distinguishes wars from acts of banditry and organized crime. While it may be 
true that the question of political “power” and control of “territory” are at the centre of many 
wars in most parts of the world, Smith’s opinion that wars are fought simply in pursuit of 
“power over government and territory” (Smith 2004: 3) ignores many other issues for which 
wars may be fought. Clausewitz defines war simply as “an act of force to compel our enemy 
to do our will”.  
 
There is no single definition of conflict. A disagreement, argument, quarrel, struggle, fight, 
war, clash, and differences all qualify to be termed conflict as all are forms of conflict with 
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various “levels of intensity and violence”(Allan 2006: 211). Conflict, therefore, is not simply 
“to strike another, to fight with an enemy or to do battle with an opposing force”; it is also to 
antagonize others or to have sharp disagreement with others. Conflict has become part of life 
and is not necessarily always dysfunctional.   
 
3.1 The nature and scope of war 
Wars have always been part of human society, with different trends over time. In the past, 
wars resulted in territorial conquest and annexation and the subjugation or even annihilation 
of peoples (Merom 2003: 11).
4
 Empires fought wars, nation-states have not ceased fighting, 
and states have continued to have their peace disturbed by violent internal conflicts. Two 
major wars - World War I and World War II - were fought in the 20
th
 century on an 
unprecedented global scale. World War II was more intense, encompassing and destructive 
than any previous war known to humans. There was also an epoch of revolutionary struggles 
in some parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s, 
with some stretching far beyond, where nationalist movements engaged in wars of 
independence and self-determination (Hubschle (2006: 9). From the end of the World War II 
until the late 1980s, almost every armed conflict -- whether internal or inter-state -- bore the 
hallmark of the East–West ideological struggle, “with US and Soviet Union fighting proxy 
wars in Africa, South-East Asia and Central America”, including war and the “threat of it” 
between Israel and the Arab states (s 2005: 1; Adedeji 1999:  10). The end of the Cold War 
did not bring peace as many new wars erupted in “Africa, the Balkans and other parts of the 
former communist world” (Richards 2005: 2). This trend contradicts popular opinion and 
negates the optimism that led to proclamations of the “End of an Era” and a “New World 
Order” - a new era of prosperity built on peace and a world characterized by “widespread 
respect for freedom, justice, and human rights”. In this new era, “force is rejected as a foreign 
policy tool and international disputes could be resolved peacefully rather than forcibly, 
perhaps aided by international law” (Hensel 2001:id). The re-emergence of many armed 
hostilities in the aftermath of the Cold War has generated the view that the Cold War placed 
“a lid on many local conflicts”, endemic hostilities and ancient hatreds which erupted with its 
cessation (Richards 2005: 8). However, such a conclusion merely serves to reduce the cause 
of wars to the “ancient hatred/enemy image” paradigm. 
                                                          
4
 An example is given by Gil Merom in his book How Democracies lose small wars, of the inhabitants of Island 
of Melos who refused to align with the Athenians in a war against the Spartans. The Athenians, who won the 
war, exterminated all the males on the Island and carted the remaining population into slavery.  
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It is also important to note that most post-Cold War conflicts were/are “primarily internal in 
nature featuring combat between communities within a state or between a community and the 
state itself rather than combat between states” (Holsti 1996:  25; Hensel 2001:  id). This 
seems to be the basis for the categorization of most post-Cold War conflict, particularly  in 
Africa and some other regions as ethnic conflicts.  Commenting on the 1990s Balkan wars, 
former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, quoted in Calhoum (1997: 61) concluded 
that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was caused by “ancient hatred”. Kaufman (1996: 35) 
made the same diagnosis and concluded that ethnic conflicts can only be resolved by 
forcefully separating ethnic populations. This is tantamount to ethnic cleansing. This kind of 
analysis is reductionist. Ted Robert Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory (1970:  46), which 
offers an explanation on the basis of the contrast between groups’ “expected and actual 
access to prosperity and power” also emphasizes ethnic factors which are merely a tool that 
accompanies economic and political factors. Studies of conflicts have shown that it is not the 
“most ethnically diverse countries in the world that are most prone to violent conflict” even 
though ethnicity is used by the elite to mobilize the population (Anderson 1991:  16). Smith 
(2000:  11) concludes that “it is not ethnic diversity as such that is a cause of armed conflict, 
but rather ethnic politics. It is the injection of ethnic difference into political loyalties, and the 
politicisation of ethnic identities, that is so dangerous.”
5
 Having said that, ethnic diversity 
may exacerbate conflict and increase the likelihood of serious escalation as it provides fertile 
ground for political mobilization. 
 
3.2 Typologies of Armed Conflicts/Wars 
Many scholars have attempted to categorize conflicts in terms of typology. In discussing a 
particular conflict, the knowledge of the typology of the conflict enables one to know the 
characterizations to look for. It also brings out the common features in most of the conflicts. 
Comparative analysis is easier to make. This is true of the Somali conflict. By the end of 
describing each type of conflict, it will be seen that the Somali conflict shares the feature of 
many of the types viz: Anti-regime war, ethno-nationalist, inter-ethnic (in this case inter-
clan), gang war, intrastate, and international.  Schnid (2000:  77-78) outlines what he calls 
“the typology of global conflicts”. He tries to categorize all contemporary armed conflict, 
indicating the frequency of occurrence of each type between 1985 and 1994 out of a total of 
                                                          
5
 See also Smith 1997, p.30. Smith argues that ethnic diversity does not in itself cause war; otherwise the most 
ethnically diverse states would have been the most war-prone states, which he observed not to be the case.  
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102 violent armed conflicts around the world. Agbu (2006:  139-140) notes that these 
typologies include as much as eight distinct forms as identified below: 
 
3.2.1 Type A: Anti-regime wars or Political and Ideological conflicts (19.6%) 
This type of war occurs between a state and an insurrection. It can take various forms, 
including liberation movements versus colonial powers; popular movements and/or social 
revolutionary movements versus an authoritarian state; and destabilizing or re-establishing a 
status ante versus revolutionary state (counter-revolutionary wars). Some destabilization 
conflicts have mutated to become dominantly ethno-nationalist (e.g. UNITA in the Angolan 
conflict). 
 
3.2.2 Type B: Ethno-nationalist conflicts (44.1%) 
Conflicts in this category are of various forms but are primarily intrastate conflicts (state 
versus nation); sometimes in the form of interstate conflicts. Ethno-nationalist conflicts are 
the most frequent type of contemporary armed conflicts and wars globally; such conflicts are 
generally of long duration, sometimes lasting for decades. 
 
3.2.3 Type C: Interstate conflicts (11.8%) 
These are state versus state wars. This was earlier regarded or seen as the “classical type” of 
warfare. Examples include the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the 11 day war between Mali and 
Burkina-Faso (December 1985), and the US invasion of Panama (December 1989).  
 
3.2.4 Type D: Decolonization wars (4.9%) 
These are wars against foreign state occupation (FSO) and are thus wars of independence. 
 
3.2.5 Type E: Inter-ethnic conflicts (13.7 %) 
These are wars between differentiated groups within a state. The issues involved in this type 
of conflict are usually sectarian (particular interests, clan conflicts, chauvinism, narrow 
nationalism) and state actors are not involved. In many instances, the political class in the 
ethnic groups involved in the conflict exploits the differences to advance their intra-class 
struggle for control of the state.    
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3.2.6 Type F: Gang wars (3.9%) 
These involve predominantly non-state actors (mixed with criminal elements), especially in 
situations of state collapse. The actors are usually village militia, demobilized soldiers or 
mercenaries, death squads, professional killers, mafia, or syndicates. 
 
3.2.7 Type G: Genocide (2.0%) 
This type of war is organised mass murder and crimes against humanity. It is characterized by 
the intention to exterminate a particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Mass 
murder is committed against a particular political (politicide) or social group (democide). It is 
usually difficult to categorize killings in conflicts relating to genocide because of the 
difficulty of categorizing genocide. One of the most contemporary genocides is the 1994 
Hutu massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda.  
 
3.2.8 Intrastate 
Another level of categorization of armed conflicts is the use of geography. Armed conflicts 
have been categorized as intrastate, interstate or international conflicts. Over the years, it has 
become more difficult to define what characterizes an intrastate conflict because of the nature 
and dimensions of such conflicts. Intrastate conflicts are also called internal conflicts or civil 
war. In terms of the ‘Correlates of War’ (COW), civil war has three distinguishing criteria. 
These include that a civil war is “any armed conflict that involves: (a) military action internal 
to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective 
resistance by both sides” (Small and Singer 1982: 210). Therefore, the main distinction 
between a civil and any other war is the fact that such conflict is internal to the territory of a 
sovereign state and the participation of the government of such state as a combatant. Civil 
war is further distinguished from other forms of internal armed conflict by the requirement 
that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated. In terms of the COW, the 
expectation is that the war has to exceed a certain threshold of deaths (typically more than 
1,000) before it qualifies as a civil war (Sambanis 2004: 816; Cramer 2006: 49; Small and 
Singer 1982: 210). 
 
While this definition of civil war seems relatively straightforward at first sight, it poses a 
number of serious problems. Scholars’ attempts to address the problems thrown up by the 
COW have resulted in the proliferation of divergent definitions of civil war. These 
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differences are problematic as the accurate distinction of civil wars becomes difficult. 
Sambanis (2004) tried to harmonize existing views by defining armed conflict as civil war if:  
 
1) The war takes place within the territory of an internationally recognized state with a 
population of more than 500,000;   
 
2) The parties are politically and militarily organized, and they have publicly stated 
political objectives;  
 
3) The government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant. If 
there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government 
internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a 
combatant;  
 
4) The main insurgent organization (s) must be locally represented and must recruit 
locally, though there may be additional external involvement and recruitment;  
 
5) The starting year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 
1,000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the 
war is considered as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 
three years reach 1,000;  
 
6) Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, 
with no three-year period having less than 500 deaths;  
 
7) Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance, 
measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party;  
 
8) The war ends if interrupted by a peace treaty, ceasefire or decisive military victory 
producing at least two years of peace (Sambanis 2004: 829ff). 
 
While this characterization is very encompassing, its claim that “the main insurgent 
organization (s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally, though there may be 
additional external involvement and recruitment” in a civil war raises the issue of the 
internationalization of internal conflicts which has become very common. Odermatt (2009: 2) 
argues that the distinction between internal and international armed conflict has broken down. 
He adds that such conflicts are best called “mixed conflicts” when foreign fighters, foreign 
military and financial assistance are involved. Neighbouring states also provide shelter which 
directly externalizes the conflict to the advantage of one party. Conflicts which may have 
started as an internal armed conflict involving other states and/or organization(s) outside its 
borders have become common. Dwan and Holmqvist (2004:  85) observe that the 
international dimensions of conflicts, even those fought by governments in their own 
territories, have seriously challenged the distinction between intrastate and interstate 
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conflicts. They conclude that, “in an increasingly globalized world, it is questionable whether 
any internal conflict can be devoid of international dimensions”. All conflicts, in this context, 
are ‘international’, even if they are not interstate wars (Dwan and Holmqvist 2004:  85). The 
strength of this argument lies in the fact that any form or level of foreign involvement in an 
internal conflict transforms or contaminates such conflict by way of strengthening or 
weakening either of the parties involved. 
 
3.2.9 Interstate Conflicts  
Interstate armed conflict is a war fought between two states in which their respective armed 
forces are engaged. This form of conflict usually occurs after diplomatic interventions fail. 
Vite (2009: 70-71) argues that interstate conflict may not always be declared. He points to 
Article 2(1) of the 1949 Geneva Convention which refers to interstate war as “all cases of 
declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them”.
6
 This means 
that an interstate conflict can also occur if a foreign power (State/ High Contracting Party) 
moves its troops into another territory in order to support an organization which is fighting its 
government. This provision also holds that a proxy war, in which a state intervenes in an 
intrastate conflict by giving reasonable support and guidance to the group fighting the 
government, can also qualify as interstate conflict depending on the level of control the 
intervening state has over the local organization in the conflict. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia holds that a state should be deemed to have become a 
party to an intrastate conflict if the “control of [such] a State over subordinate armed forces or 
militias or paramilitary unit may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the 
mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training)” (ICTY 1999)
7
. For 
a state to be deemed to have “overall control” of an armed group engaged in conflict with its 
government, it should be established that such foreign state “has a role in organizing, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, 
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group” (ICTY 2003).
8
 This 
                                                          
6
 This provision is also found in the Additional Protocol 1 Article 1 (3) of the International Humanitarian Law. 
7
 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Judgement (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, paragraph 137.  
8
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, paragraph 120, 
131 and 137. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v Naletilic, Case no. IT-98-34-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber), 31 March 
2003, paragraph 198.  
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places a serious burden on states’ claims against their neighbours’ involvement in their 
domestic conflicts. It has led to the development of the semantics of ‘meddling’ as opposed to 
‘intervention’ in discussing the involvement of foreign states in intrastate conflicts outside 
their territories.  
 
Interstate conflict is rare in the global conflict architecture. Interstate wars that readily come 
to mind are the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, with the US 
and its allies on one side, Iraq 2003, with the US and its allies on one side, Afghanistan 
(2003), and India and Pakistan (2003). In Africa, interstate conflicts occurred between Egypt 
and Libya in 1977, Somalia and Ethiopia from 1977-1978, Uganda and Tanzania between 
1978 and 1979, Mauritania and Senegal from 1989-1991, Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, 
Nigeria and Cameroon between 1991 and 1998, and Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008.  
 
3.2.10 International conflicts 
An interstate conflict automatically qualifies as an international conflict because it involves 
two or more states. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that 
an international armed conflict occurs “whenever there is a resort to armed forces between 
two states” (ICTY: 1999).
9
 This is the case where the motive of the states involved is to 
engage in hostilities and inflict harm on the enemy, rather than being an involuntary incursion 
into another state’s territory. Vite (2009: 72) observes that when one state invites another 
state to provide physical military assistance within its territory in pursuance of conflict with 
an armed group, this does not amount to international armed conflict. However, it should be 
noted that the Additional Protocol I of the law of international armed conflict adopted in 1977 
expands the concept of international armed conflict beyond interstate conflict. In terms of this 
Protocol, international armed conflict includes conflicts such as a government forces fighting 
with an armed group seeking self-determination. The Protocol highlights that the definition of 
international armed conflict in Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Convention includes “armed 
conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
                                                          
9
 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for interlocutory appeal on 
jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paragraph 70 
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of the United Nations” (UNO: 1977).
10
  This legitimizes the struggle for self-determination, 
with the organization(s) involved in such conflicts elevated to the status of a state; that is, the 
organization(s) stands for the yet to be established new order. 
 
3.3 Causes and theoretical explanations of war 
The causes of war are multi-layered and difficult to determine. Wars are caused by diverse 
socio-economic, political, and environmental factors which interact to provide favourable 
conditions for armed conflict. While some factors may underlie armed conflicts, others may 
aggravate it, with yet others triggering the violence. In an international conflict, “opposing 
interests and capabilities, significant change in the balance of power, individual perceptions 
and expectations, a disrupted structure of expectation, and will-to-conflict” can combine to 
set the stage for an armed conflict (Rummel 1995:  112). Contemporary intrastate wars, 
especially in Africa, have shown that the causes of war are not easy to identify without 
“comprehending and mastering the many factors and forces” which synergize to produce and 
sustain the conflicts (Adebayo 1999: 7). Three issues seem to have been very important in the 
development of contemporary internal armed conflicts. These include poor economic 
conditions, repressive political systems, and degradation of renewable resources (water 
scarcity, erosion, deforestation, etc.) (Smith 2000: 5). DFID’s report (2009: id21) titled, 
“Exploring the causes of armed conflict in Africa” notes that recent studies on conflicts in 
Africa suggest that “access to natural resources” (land and water) “is both a cause … and a 
factor sustaining” conflicts on this continent (DFID 2009:  id). It observes that studies on the 
relationship between armed conflicts and access to agricultural land in Rwanda, Burundi and 
eastern DRC show that “changes in land use and land access are significant factors in armed 
conflicts” (DFID 2009:  id). Limited access to land and/or unfair land distribution tend to lead 
to “social exclusion of the poor, landless” members of the social system, creating economic 
domination. In many instances, this leads to violent conflicts and social tension. Therefore, 
important factors in armed conflicts include, among others, “economic distribution struggles, 
the exclusion of certain groups from political power, and the ethno-politicization of social 
conflict fault lines” (ETH 2008: id). It should be noted that wars are fought between or 
among groups or states with divergent interests (Adebayo 1999: 11).   
 
  
                                                          
10
 See the UN Charter, Additional Protocol, Article 1 (4) 
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3.4 Conflicts in Africa 
 
Pervasive conflict throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa defies easy 
resolution due to a unique web of factors. Poor governance, ethnic rivalry, 
mismanagement of land and natural resources, declining economic 
conditions, and widespread poverty form a daunting bulwark against 
stability. In recent centuries, much of the western world rose above these 
destabilizing factors because of socio-political-economic stability gained 
from two trends: the spread of constitutional democracy and economic 
globalization. Two major occurrences: colonialism and cold war, 
prevented Sub-Saharan states from following these two trends. The 
disruption in sovereignty caused by colonialism, which was then followed 
by hastily formed governments during the cold war, spawned conditions of 
corruption, scarcity, and violent competition. These conditions make it 
difficult for African states to achieve lasting stability...  (Moe 2009: 1). 
           
Africa has experienced its fair share of conflict of various levels of intensity throughout its 
developmental history. Pre-colonial African societies witnessed one form of conflict or 
another. Most of the conflicts in Africa were intrastate conflicts with a few interstate cases. 
These conflicts were believed to be caused by various factors ranging from a show of 
supremacy, to expansionist motivations or economic quests (Adedeji 1999: 2). However, 
Afisi (2009: 59) argues that, “generally speaking, wars or conflicts in pre-colonial Africa 
were not recorded to have occurred on a large scale as it is seen in today’s Africa”. Pre-
colonial wars in Africa were also believed not to have been as destructive and without 
regulation and caution as has been witnessed since the advent of colonialism. Noting the 
intensity and the level of carnage witnessed in the Nigerian-Biafran war, Madiebo (1980: 18) 
stated that:   
Despite the fact that there were tribal wars fought in Africa before 
colonialism, Africans never celebrated war, unlike what obtained in 
Europe at the equivalent period. Even when wars were fought in Africa, 
the period, weapons, combatants, targets of the war, and even matters 
concerning asylum were regulated. Generally, wars were fought in the dry 
season and away from towns and villages. 
 
The frequent allusion to the colonial legacy as a source or cause of conflict in Africa is due to 
many scholars’ argument that Africa may have had the worst colonial experience in history. 
Afisi (2009: 59) argues that conflicts in Africa, even when they differ radically in all respects, 
share colonialism as their root. He adds that “nowhere does the colonial burden weigh 
heavier than in Africa. Thus, one of the legacies left by colonialism is undoubtedly large 
scale conflicts and bloodshed among native Africans”. According to Nwolize (2001: 16) and 
Afisi (2009: 60), wars were never celebrated in pre-colonial Africa. Indeed, the latter insists 
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that traditional African societies had very “effective and efficient” control over the waging of 
war which formed part of “traditional Africa’s code of honour which was based on the social 
values of the people”, and permeated all facets of human interaction from “commerce, 
through marriage, child up-bringing, and farming, to war making, conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution, as well as peacemaking, peace building and confidence 
building” (Afisi 2009:  60). 
 
Wars were fought when all mediation efforts failed. Wars were prepared for; emissaries were 
sent before a declaration of war because it was regarded an act of cowardice to take an enemy 
unaware.  In traditional African societies, children, the aged, women, and strangers were not 
attacked as this was also seen as cowardice. In some areas, warriors were assigned to protect 
children, the aged, and women in secluded areas of the villages, while in others they were 
moved to areas near the river or sea if it was feared that the war might reach the villages 
(Afisi 2009:  61). Basden (1996: 260) also argues that these wars were highly regulated, from 
the weapons permissible to the seasons in which wars could be fought. For example, he 
observes that among the Igbo in Eastern Nigeria, guns and poisoned arrows were forbidden in 
a fight between relations or villages of the same town. “Machetes, spears, bows and arrows, 
staves, and such like weapons were permitted, but at the same time [it was] not permissible to 
use them indiscriminately. There must be no fatal wounding” (Basden 1996: 260). 
 
Again, in the eastern part of Africa, wars were mainly fought during the dry season and not in 
the planting or harvesting seasons to avoid hunger and starvation, and were not allowed to 
last for too long (Afisi 2009: 61). Afisi (2009) observes that among the Yoruba in South 
Western Nigeria, the war general (Areona Kakanfo) was by law not allowed to wage a war 
that exceeded three months without authorization from the Alafin and his council, an 
authorization which was difficult to obtain. 
 
He adds that this situation changed drastically with Africa’s first violent contact with the 
Europeans in the 400 years (1450-1850) of transatlantic as well as the north and east African 
slavery (Afisi 2009:  62). Nwolize (2001) argues that the violence and dehumanizing methods 
used by the Europeans to acquire Africans as slaves were not only bizarre but also introduced 
rape, murder and torture which “cheapened and degraded human life to scales never known 
in Africa before” (Nwolize, 2001: 26; Afisi 2009:  62).  
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Scholars argue that the roots of violent conflict in Africa were deepened by the next epoch in 
the history of African society – colonialism. These scholars identify colonialism as the 
primary cause of many unending internal conflicts and wars in Africa (Agbu 2006:  103; 
Nnoli 1998:  216).   This historical epoch for Africa, a product of the 1884–1885 Berlin 
Conference of the major European states, resulted in the partitioning of the continent into 
colonies. Afisi (2009: 62) posits that with colonial armies in the various colonial territories in 
Africa, violence, vandalism, murder, torture, rape, death, looting and destruction were visited 
on Africans. African culture and social values were discredited while Africa’s political 
structure was dismantled. Most African states had to engage in nationalist struggles for 
independence; some of those conflicts-- in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, South 
Africa, Algeria, Kenya, Congo, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Namibia, Libya, and Tanganyika -- 
culminated in prolonged armed struggles (Guimaraes: 2001: 14). The manipulation of the 
African elite and ethnic groups and the overt involvement of the colonial and other imperial 
powers in these conflicts left many post-independent African states permanently divided and 
awash with arms, precipitating constant tension and conflict (Adekanye 1996: 11; Guimaraes 
2001: 32, 154). Agbu (2006) argues that colonialism laid the foundation for most post-
colonial conflicts in Africa. Even though colonialism has ended, “its embers are still very 
much staring us in the face, …that most of the countries that emerged at independence could 
be best described as petty states, extremely vulnerable to external pressures and internal 
disruptions” (Agbu 2006: 126). Agbu (2006) adds that the Organization of African Unity’s 
(OAU) 1964 adoption of the sanctity of the state boundaries drawn by the colonialists  has 
remained a “fundamental and perennial” source of conflict in Africa as the “socio-political 
and ethno-national marriages of inconvenience put in place by the colonial masters continues 
to witch-hunt African political stability to date” (Agbu 2006:  126-127).  Adekanye (2003: 
17) concurs and states that the “structural cum predispositional conditions” for conflicts in 
Africa include “the colonially imposed artificial boundaries”. Diallo (1986: 15-16) was 
emphatic that: ‘It was only after the introduction of slavery and colonialism into Africa …that 
traditional societies began to disintegrate, causing the code of honour to fall into disuse in 
war’ (quoted by Nwolise, 2003: 41). Nwolise (2003: 42) enumerates the “four pathogens that 
changed the character, chemistry and nature of Africa’s conflict-prevention, management and 
resolution” as “slavery, colonialism, foreign religion and [the] emergence of a new concept of 
state”.  
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Some scholars believe that post-colonial African state formation was predisposed to both the 
interstate and intrastate conflicts that were witnessed and are still being witnessed in many 
states. Osinubi and Osinubi (2006: 102) argued that colonialism brought people of diverse 
cultures into one state without being integrated; indeed, such differences were manipulated to 
ensure that the inhabitants of these states remained disunited. As Nwosu (1999) underscores, 
“it is thus not surprising that years after colonialism, these states remained lowly integrated” 
(quoted in Osinubi and Osinubi 2006: 102). Further, Nwosu maintains that the low level of 
integration has continued to “precipitate crises” in many African states, including “shooting 
wars, political and economic instability as well as social disequilibrium” (quoted in Osinubi 
and Osinubi 2006: 102). The discussion now turns to the role of ethnicity in conflicts in 
Africa.  
 
3.5 Ethnicity and conflicts in Africa 
Ethnicity has been a major focus of debates on conflicts in Africa. While some scholars 
regard ethnicity as a cause of conflict, some others see it as a mobilizing instrument in the 
advancement of other conflict motives. The various schools of thought on ethnicity in Africa 
agree that “divisive ethnicity” in Africa has its roots in colonialism. Agbu (2006: 101) states 
that the new concept of state and new system of government “played up ethnic awareness, 
sentiment and consciousness and subsequent rivalry and competition of all sorts…” Nnoli 
(1998:  216-217) agrees that:  
 
Colonialism unleashed deep seated socioeconomic and political upheavals 
which questioned people’s pre-colonial identities. In the process it gave 
rise to redefinition of the identities created and nurtured during pre-
colonial times… the ethnicity emanating from the contradictions among 
these colonial induced ethnic identities was fiercely exclusive, competitive 
and intolerant of ethnic minority views and feelings.   
 
 
Nnoli (1980: 5-6) defines ethnicity as “a social phenomenon associated with interaction 
among members of different ethnic groups”. He describes ethnic groups as social formations 
distinguishable by the communal character of their boundaries with the relevant communal 
factor being language, culture, or both. Stabbert and Welsh’s (1979:  133) broader definition 
posits, that, an ethnic group is “a group that is bounded off from other comparable groups or 
population categories in the society by a sense of difference which may consist in some 
combination of a real or mythical ancestry and a common culture and experience”. Smith’s 
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(1991: 12) taxonomy of attributes of an “ethnic community” includes “a collective proper 
name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating 
elements of common culture; association with a specific homeland; and a sense of solidarity 
for significant sectors of the population”. The utility value of ethnicity is determined by its 
application. As the consciousness of being oneself in relation to the specific ethnic group or 
what Agbu (2006:  101) calls “ethnic group for itself”, ethnicity generates postures that 
present fertile ground for conflict. Bah (2003: 6-8) states that interaction among ethnic groups 
inhabiting the same state is often characterized by competition for resources and the assertion 
of cultural identity. Bah (2003) adds that the attempt to include one’s group’s members while 
excluding other groups’ members, results in conflict. This occurs when ethnicity becomes 
“clientelistic”, in which case it becomes “a destructive force for the economic and social 
development of the state” (Bah 2003: 8). This state of affairs is characterized by the 
replacement of merit and need with ethnic favouritism in determining who benefits from state 
resources. The efficiency of the state is undermined, promoting “widespread corruption, 
prebendalism and a sense of injustice” which in itself is fertile ground for the outbreak of 
conflict (Bah 2003:  8; Agbu 2006:  102).           
 
Many scholars agree that ethnicity is not the root cause of conflict in Africa but rather a tool 
in conflict prosecution. According to Smith (2000: 11), ethnic diversity per se does not 
translate into armed conflict but rather, ethnic politics, and the manipulation of ethnic 
differences for political ends. Anderson (1991: 16) observes that the most violence prone 
states are not the most ethnically diverse, but agrees that ethnicity is a major factor in most 
conflict in Africa. For Osinubi and Osinubi (2006: 102), ethnicity is a weapon of 
manipulation for the state, “especially where what obtain is ‘the nation state’ and not ‘the 
national state’”.  The authors add that a major foundation for ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, for 
example, and indeed Africa in general, is the “scarcity of political resources” (Osinubi and 
Osinubi 2006:  102). Aapengnuo (2010: 1) observes that while the ethnic group forms the 
predominant means of social identity formation in Africa, most ethnic groups peacefully 
“coexist with high degrees of mixing through interethnic marriages, economic partnerships, 
and shared values” (Aapengnuo 2010:  1). He concludes that were this not the case, “nearly 
every village and province in Africa would be a cauldron of conflict”. Welsh (1996) 
subscribes to the instrumentalist school’s contention that ethnicity in Africa was invented for 
political purposes and contends that internal conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi 
and Sudan were the result of the failure of sub-Saharan African states to cope with ethnicity. 
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It is pertinent here to quickly observe that Somali conflict has not been seen as driven by 
ethnicity, but clannishness.” (Elmi and Barise 2006: 37; Salih and Wohlgemuth 1994:79). It is 
clear that conflicts in Africa prosecuted in the name of ethnicity have been shaped by other 
factors such as the role of foreign powers, the existing balance of power in the state and the 
potential for achieving change, the leaders’ goals and opportunities, and access to military 
supplies (Agbu 2006:  104). The proximate or trigger factors may be the collapse of state 
institutions, compromised elections which give politicians a ready platform to promote 
personal agendas and the availability of the means and resources to wage war. Each of these 
factors may become the basis for ethnic mobilization. This is so because, as Agbu (2006: 
105) argues, when structural power imbalances and asymmetries built into the systems usurp 
and dominate the rights and access of the minority, ethnic politics and mobilization can 
occur. While debates continue on the role of ethnicity in conflicts in Africa, it is clearly 
crucial in determining the nature of conflicts in African states. Osinubi and Osinubi (2006:  
102) observe that “ethnicity is what remains after all else is lost – that is a deprivation of the 
determinants that make individual socially, economically and politically. Ethnicity is an 
individual falling back onto identity, which provides him with a psychological safety net”.  
 
3.6 Causes of Conflicts in Africa 
The post-Cold War period has witnessed significant instability resulting from “extremely 
intense and internal conflicts” which swept through sub-Saharan Africa like wild fire (Toure, 
1999: 22; Adedeji 1999: 3). Writing in 1999, Adebayo Adedeji (1999:  4) remarked that 
entering the new millennium, “Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly devoured by warfare”. 
Quoting the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies’ (ACDSS) 1998 report, he 
highlighted that 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa or 38 percent of the continent’s countries 
were witnessing armed conflict while another 23 percent or 11 countries were facing 
“political crisis and turbulence” (Adedeji 1999: 4). Apart from ethnicity, several other factors 
have been singled out as contributing -- in one way or the other -- to conflicts in Africa. 
These include the Cold War and its legacy; divide and rule and the availability of weapons; 
territorial disputations (UNDP 2008:  6); structural violence in African states; environmental 
factors; democratization; loss of state capacity; corruption; poor governance; contest by elites 
for power ( UNDP 2008: 6); rising youth unemployment (David and Gange 2006/2007: 10); 
and the distribution of resources. Adedeji (1999: 5) maintains that civil wars in Africa are 
“violent reactions to the pervasive lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, the 
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complete disregard of the sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment and 
accountability and, generally, bad governance” (Adedeji 1999: 7). Toure argues that conflicts 
are the products of the fallout of “human relations” as “individuals or group of individuals 
have different values, needs and interests; and … most resources are not available in 
unlimited quantities and so access to them must be controlled and fought for” (Toure 1999: 
23).  For Stedman, the causes of conflicts in Africa are not peculiar to Africa. He argues that 
it is the same “basic problems” which cause conflicts among all other populations of the 
world that manifest in Africa. These include “the tugs and pulls of different identities, the 
distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair 
and just” (quoted in Onyike, 2003: 51). It is pertinent to observe that most conflicts in Africa 
have not been caused by a single factor. Rather, some factors form synergies to produce 
conflicts. Clearly, a myriad of factors cause, reinforce or drive conflicts in Africa; some of 
those will be further examined below in broad categorizations. 
 
3.6.1 The Cold War and Conflicts in Africa 
At “independence” the emergent African states were caught in the web of the Cold War 
rivalry which pitched the capitalist West against the socialist East. This caused a myriad of 
problems that not only distorted state building and development in these young states, but 
also escalated violent interstate conflicts while the Cold War lasted, and intensified intrastate 
conflicts in its aftermath (Agbu 2006:  127). The client state that emerged immediately after 
independence in many parts of Africa was a product of Cold War alliances. Agbu (2006:  
128) notes that many African governments were “maintained in power in return for their 
allegiance to one of the superpowers”. He adds that, “In countries like Somalia, Zaire and 
Sierra Leone, corrupt leaderships were propped up and sustained in power while the 
institutional basis of the state atrophied” (Agbu 2006:  128). The two superpowers, the US 
and the Soviet Union engaged in proxy wars that fuelled internal conflicts in Africa (David 
and Gagne 2006/2007:  5). Back in 1987, John Rogge’s study, Refugees: A Third World 
Dilemma, had contended that escalating conflict in the Horn of Africa was the consequence 
of the polemic activities of the US and Saudi Arabia on the one side and the USSR and Libya 
on the other (Rogge 1987:  5). As Osondu (2009: 44) observes, during the Cold War the two 
superpowers engaged in a debilitating competition over Somalia, wooing the Siad Barre 
government with massive military assistance in the form of arms and equipment as well as 
the training of military personnel. 
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Perhaps the most devastating consequence of the Cold War was the enormous flow of arms 
into Africa as the superpowers armed their client states in order to gain influence in various 
regions. This had two major conflict generating results. Firstly, because the superpowers 
were simply concerned with their individual strategic political and economic interests, 
principles like good governance, accountability, the rule of law, and transparent and equitable 
economic management in their allied African states were often overlooked. By the end of the 
Cold War, many African states were economically bankrupt, with a huge debt burden that 
was the result of gross mismanagement, including unsustainable military expenditure (Agbu 
2006: 128). This generated much social tension and conflict in many African states. 
Secondly, the arms acquired by many African states during the Cold War enabled dictatorial 
leadership to wage conflicts, as was the case with Siad Barre in Somalia. Furthermore, a good 
quantity of these arms ended up in the hands of rebel groups, leading to long and ferocious 
civil conflicts. Bryden (1999: 136) observes that the arms and equipment amassed by Siad 
Barre emboldened him throughout his dictatorship, eventually plunging Somalia into its 
human tragedy which has persisted. Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) add that much of these arms 
ended up in the hands of warlords and militias after the collapse of the Barre administration.  
 
3.6.2 Structural Violence 
Structural violence is basically the systematic ways in which structures within society shape 
social order in a way that harms or disadvantage individuals or groups of individuals within 
society. Agbu (2006: 129) maintains that structural violence is one of the causes of conflicts 
in Africa. Structural violence emanated from the institutionalized policy frameworks put in 
place by many states in response to economic problems that impacted negatively on citizens’ 
lives (Galtung 1985: 7; Okeke Uzodike 1996: 24). From the mid-1980s through the 1990s 
many African states found themselves with a crushing debt burden, which by 1995 had risen 
to an estimated and staggering amount of $313billion (Adekanye 1998: 173). In response, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank prescribed Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) and numerous other austerity conditionalities. These included a wage 
freeze, retrenchment of public workers, massive devaluation of the currency, trade 
liberalization, a cutback in social spending especially on health, education, and housing, a 
freeze on public employment, the removal of subsidies on products and programmes, and the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (Okeke Uzodike 1996: 22-23; Federici 2001: 5-6; 
Agbu 2006: 129). This resulted in massive structural violence. The liberalization of African 
economies, privatization of land tenure, and the abolition of restrictions on currency 
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exchange and commodity prices, led to the marginalization and fragmentation of the 
emerging local middle class (Galtung 1985: 7; Federici 2001: 6). Furthermore, expatriates 
were employed as technicians and managers in African enterprises (Federici 2001: 6). 
Structural violence generated a backlash as the austerity measures were resisted by the 
population with massive protests in Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and Ghana. The state responded 
by clamping down on labour and student unions and applying other repressive measures. This 
sharpened the conflict, leading to coups in Nigeria and Ghana, and armed conflict as was the 
case in Zaire (Okeke Uzodike 1996: 32-33; Federici 2001: 9Agbu 2006: 129). The structural 
realignment of most African states demanded by the creditor institutions resulted in the 
collapse of the social contract between the political leadership and the people; the sovereignty 
of the people was completely disregarded (Adedeji 1999: 5; Galtung 1985: 8; Federici 2001: 
6). The enormous suffering, poverty, disempowerment and unemployment following African 
governments’ commitment to SAPs increased the risk, and in real terms, the incidence of 
conflicts in Africa, especially in states where natural resources are the predominant source of 
income (David and Gange 2006/2007:  10). This analysis describes the Liberian and DRC 
conflicts; and in part explains what obtains in the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria.    
 
All that notwithstanding, the grinding impact of austerity measures -- particularly its severe 
deepening of citizen hardships due to the escalation of unemployment and poverty – and the 
associated public responses in the form of protests, riots and other politically destabilising 
activities, often result in the loss of legitimacy and authority by the ruling elites (Okeke 
Uzodike 1996: 32). The consequential high-handedness by the government (in an effort to re-
establish its authority) often serve not only to further exacerbate the erosion of public trust in 
the governors but also (and importantly) to weaken domestic political stability. Indeed, as 
Okeke Uzodike (1996: 31) has underscored, the evolution of the modern democratic tradition 
arose directly from such socio-economic struggles in which citizens become so fed up with 
the power, domination, and oppressive leadership of the ruling classes that they mount an 
opposition with the explicit goal of limiting and controlling their authority. As such, the 
burdens imposed by SAPs and borne largely by middle and lower classes create the 
unanticipated (albeit positive) outcome of contestations around political leadership as citizens 
demand accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and the right to participate 
meaningfully in their own governance. This is because “…liberalization tends to weaken the 
basis and legitimacy of state power…[given that] the democratic forces within civil society 
are typically in far better position to mount frontal attacks … on the existing power structure” 
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(OkekeUzodike, 1996: 31). In essence, the net effect of IMF or World Bank economic 
reforms is the tendency to unleash (unintentionally) democratic forces, which results 
(ultimately) in political liberalisation and democracy. 
 
3.6.3 Territorial Issues 
Another major factor which causes violent conflicts in Africa is territorial disputes. This is 
mostly true of interstate conflicts. A number of such wars have been fought between 
neighbouring African states since decolonization in the 1960s. These wars occur when 
borders are not clear and/or where they do not exist at all. The contest is fiercer when the area 
in dispute has high economic value such as good agricultural land or rich mineral deposits 
(UNDP 2008: 6). Furthermore, when the national borders of neighbouring states inherited at 
independence are so artificial that they negate pre-existing cultural boundaries, the possibility 
of interstate conflict is increased, especially where irredentism rears its head on either side of 
the border (Maio 2009: 26). Examples of conflicts in Africa over territory or borders include 
Egypt and Libya (a short border war from 21-23 July 1977) and Somalia and Ethiopia (1977-
1978). The latter is popularly known as the Ogaden War. It was initiated by Somalia in an 
attempt to recapture the Ogaden part of Ethiopia which it claims is part of Somalia. One 
major characteristic of this conflict was that the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet 
Union, overtly backed Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively. Another example of a border 
conflict occurred between Mauritania and Senegal from 1989 to 1991. This war began on the 
River Senegal border as a quarrel over grazing rights and lasted for two years. Further 
examples include Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998-2000); Nigeria and Cameroon (1991-1998); and 
Djibouti and Eritrea (2008).  
 
3.6.4 Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa 
Natural resources have recently emerged as a serious source of conflict in Africa. Several 
contemporary conflicts have been termed “resource conflicts” (De Koning (2008: 3). 
Environmental security emerged as a field of study in the 1980s. It is concerned with the 
study and explanation of the relationship between the natural environment and security 
challenges. This field of research has identified both environmental scarcity and abundance 
as causes of conflict, presented in three major perspectives: “environmental scarcity, resource 
abundance and political ecology” (De Koning 2008: 3).  The environmental scarcity 
perspective argues that declining reserves of renewable natural resources such as farm land, 
forests, fresh water and fisheries result in environmental degradation, increased demand and 
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unequal distribution of these natural resources. Homer-Dixon (1994: 7) observes that 
resource capture and ecological marginalization may ensue when such processes become 
severe. Resource capture occurs when powerful groups in a society take control of scarce and 
increasingly valuable resources with the less powerful being forced to the marginal areas. On 
the other hand, ecological marginalization takes place when environmental degradation 
causes populations to migrate to “ecologically fragile areas such as hillsides, tropical 
rainforests and areas at risk of desertification”. Both cases are capable of triggering violent 
conflict as was the case in Rwanda (De Koning 2008: 3; Homer-Dixon 1994: 7; Malone 
1996: 16). Magidu (2009: 9) observed that “unprecedented population pressure also leads to 
land scarcity and resource-use conflict among user groups and communities using land and 
water resources, some of which lead to social tension, escalate and take national dimensions 
such as the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi”.  
 
The “resource abundance” perspective which is also tagged the “resource curse” suggests a 
correlation between armed conflict and the presence of and dependence on non-renewable 
resources like oil, metals and gemstones. The civil wars in Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone and 
DRC are examples (De Koning 2008: 4). The direct relationship between “natural resources 
and the associated revenues” can provide groups with both the motive and the means to fight, 
and can thus instigate and prolong conflict (UN 2001). Furthermore, resource revenues 
negatively affect state stability in two other ways: economically, it can diminish a 
government’s incentive to embark on economic innovation and diversification, exposing the 
economy to commodity market shocks (Stephens 2003: 23; Sachs and Warner 2000:45; Ross 
1999: 306). Politically, De Koning (2008: 4) notes that resource revenues can undermine the 
“responsiveness of state institutions”. According to Ross (2004: 341), when accountability 
mechanisms are weak and it is easy to divert non-tax revenues from state budgets, this limits 
public sector (economic and social) expenditure and increases opportunities for corruption, 
thereby damaging government credibility. These factors have manifested in many internal 
conflicts in Africa such as the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria, forming the basis for the 
campaigns of resistance groups.    
 
The political ecology perspective is an alternative school of thought that locates the natural 
resource factor in violent conflicts within the social and political variables residing in 
“access, control and distribution of available resources and benefits” (De Koning 2008: 5). It 
examines how institutions and power relations in a resource-endowed state determine the 
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manner in which resources become assets for some and liabilities for others (Agnew and 
Corbridge 1995: 27). For example, in most post-colonial African states, absolute power over 
most natural resources is vested in the government which, in turn, decides how to appropriate 
and distribute the benefits. Maio (2009: 29) and Rothchild (1997: 4) observe that state 
building in the developing world has required policies that aim to assimilate minority groups, 
restrain their historical autonomy, and extract their resources, revenue, and labour for the use 
of the state. This has led to violent conflicts in Africa. The Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria is 
to a large extent about resource control.                
 
Ian Bannon’s preface to “Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: option and actions” 
(Bannon and Collier: 2003:  ix) posits that:  
  
Natural resources are never the sole sources of conflict ...they do not 
make conflict inevitable. But the presence of abundant primary 
commodities, especially in low-income countries, exacerbates the risk of 
conflict, and if conflict does break out, tends to prolong it and makes it 
harder to resolve (Bannon and Collier: 2003:  ix).  
 
 
Writing on the wars in Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, and the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria, Magidu (2009: 7) argues that the driving factor in all  these conflicts is the 
struggle for the control of natural resources. Apart from mineral resources, land and water 
have been linked to conflicts -- sometimes as triggers.  
    
3.6.5 State Capacity 
Adekanye (1998: 175) observes that loss of state capacity is a major cause of conflicts in 
Africa. He notes that most African states are experiencing regime breakdown, state collapse, 
and state failure. Lack of capacity refers to a failure on the part of the state to carry out its 
basic functions as well as other responsibilities often associated with a strong or effective 
state. For instance, the state is expected to create and maintain public order, organize and 
maintain the military, administer the state machinery, dispense justice, manage conflict and 
persons living within the territory, promote general welfare and increase the wealth of the 
state through development, reduce inequality, regulate external relations, and conduct war 
and peace. 
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State collapse leads to a group security dilemma. The post-Cold War period has been marked 
by many instances of state collapse. In Africa, Somalia, Liberia, and Congo experienced state 
failure. While Liberia and the DRC were able to recover, Somalia has descended into further 
anarchy. Zartman (1995: 1) observes that in “a situation where the structure, authority, law 
and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new”, the 
absence of state authority can give rise to a security dilemma which, in turn, can fuel violent 
conflict. Because the key to security is power, opposing groups are forced into a natural 
competition for power. By increasing their security, they threaten their neighbours that in turn 
seek to increase their security. This becomes a circle that leads to conflicts. In deeply divided 
societies, it leads groups to seek to take control of the state. Stephen Saideman (1996:  22-23) 
notes that 
 
If the state cannot protect the interest of all the ethnic groups, then each 
group will seek to control the state, decreasing the security of other groups 
and decreasing the ability of the state to provide security for any group. 
...Each group will consider their interests and actions to be limited and 
benign while those of the other groups are seen as irreconcilably hostile. 
 
The above scenario can lead a group to act in pre-emptive manner by initiating violence 
while the group that fears pre-emption has the incentive to strike first and negotiate later.    
 
3.6.6 Governance problems 
With the end of the Cold War and increased conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, a lack of 
democracy was commonly regarded as a major cause of conflict. Most international 
governments and agencies now shifted their priorities to promoting peace through 
democratization. The institutionalization of democratic governance is hinged on the need to 
make governments more accountable. As a major pillar of democratic governance, 
accountability will drastically reduce the likelihood of violent opposition and/or violent 
conflict (Collier and Rohner 2007: 2). Vorrath and Krebs (2009) state that democracy “is 
expected to bring about more accountable, legitimate and transparent government” and that, 
“since citizens are consulted on regular basis and institutionalized checks and balances are in 
place in the democratic regimes, the assumption is that the outbreak of violent conflict or war 
becomes less likely” (2009: 4).  
 
However, there is another side to that argument. Collier and Rohner (2007: 3) argue that 
accountability in a democratic society has the capacity to place limitations on government in 
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its use of effective security measures. Comparing the Stalin and Saddam Hussein 
administrations and the democratic regimes that succeeded them, Collier and Rohner (2007) 
argue that, the decrease in repression caused by the accountability effect of democratizing 
both societies led to more violence. They note that, “unconstrained by accountability, both 
Stalin and Saddam Hussein were able to maintain peace through intense repression despite 
manifest reason for popular grievance”.  They add that in low-income-societies, democracy 
does not decrease incentives for violent conflicts because “loot-seeking” becomes the 
incentive for violence instead of accountability (2007: 4).  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the political arena which democracy offers and the political 
competition it introduces become weapons for conflict generation, especially in young 
democracies or those with weak institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 2) argue that in 
such democracies, “politicians have incentives to resort to violent nationalist appeals, tarring 
their opponents as enemies of the nation in order to prevail in electoral competition”. 
Experience has shown that elites who feel that their positions are threatened are strongly 
motivated to manipulate and mobilize the population, thereby increasing the risk of violence 
(Vorrath, Krebs and Senn 2007: 9; Snyder 2000: 27). According to the US Institute of Peace 
(2010), democracy has not proven a solution to the problem of conflict. It argues that even in 
a multi-party democracy, the “majority can neglect the needs and desires of minorities, 
marginalize them, and thus contribute to the rise of separatist movements and even violent 
rebellions” (USIP 2010: 11). Nonetheless, it should be noted that public participation which 
is a key component of good governance has the potential to reduce conflict. This is due to the 
provision of legal public platforms and mechanisms to engage the political leadership in 
“peaceful debate” (USIP 2010: 11).  
 
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009: 98) observe that horizontal inequality caused by years of 
neglect and poor policy choices on the part of government can lead to conflict. The feeling of 
being relatively deprived in comparison with the general situation is sufficient to generate 
conflict. The Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria over the years – but especially from the 1990s 
through to 2008 --has been blamed for decades of human suffering and environmental 
degradation in the oil producing areas of the country (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009: 194). 
Increasing poverty and disease and the destruction of livelihoods as a result of pollution of 
both land and water received minimal attention from successive Nigerian governments, 
notwithstanding the huge income accruing from oil. Faced with the destruction of their 
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sources of livelihood, a lack of basic infrastructure and massive youth unemployment and 
economic despoliation, Niger Delta youth decided to embark on ‘illegal’ revenue generation 
activities (oil bunkering), followed by the launch of resistance movements against the 
national government and foreign oil companies (Agagu 2008: 60).  
 
Elsewhere, Maoist insurgency in Nepal has been blamed on the almost complete lack of 
development in the rural areas (Murshed and Gates 2005: 127). It can be argued that poverty 
and unemployment on their own do not necessarily lead to conflict because the poor and 
unemployed may lack of the resources, organization and a voice to mobilize such 
engagement. However, in a society where particular group interests are ignored, these 
conditions predispose such a society to conflict (Goodhand 2001: 4). Goodhand (2001) 
further argues that “political entrepreneurs” are usually quick to exploit such conditions. He 
adds that chronic poverty “may also be a significant factor in sustaining wars as crime and 
predation become the only viable livelihood strategy for the chronically poor” (Goodhand 
2001: 5).   
 
It is clear that sub-Saharan Africa presents a number of risk factors associated with the onset 
of violent conflicts. Indeed, Africa may be the world’s most conflict intensive region, with 
more than 26 of its states having experienced at least one period of civil war.  However, the 
perception that the continent is “doomed with inescapable violent conflict” is not correct. As 
Lindemann (2008: 1) notes, “more than half of Africa’s crisis-ridden states have managed to 
maintain political stability”.    
 
3.7 The Somali conflict 
Somalia presents a unique conflict experience in both Africa and the world. Not only has the 
country been at war since 1988/89, but also state collapse has persisted since the beginning of 
1991. The Republic of Somalia has never known peace since its birth. It struggled to manage 
the problems arising from the hasty unification of the North and South which were granted 
independence almost simultaneously by different colonizing nations (the North was colonized 
by Britain while Italy colonized and later administered the South). Ajulu (2004: 79) argues 
that the use of clan politics by Somali politicians’ in their contest for power -- and, hence, 
control of resources -- made the democratic order very fragile and vulnerable. The coming to 
power of Siad Barre in 1969 through a bloodless coup after the assassination of the civilian 
President restored some sanity in the political arena which had been torn apart by bickering, 
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corruption, and clan competition. However, this was short-lived as the Barre regime, in an 
attempt to consolidate its hold on power, became over-centralized and highly repressive. The 
state lacked coherence and any form of unity. Barre also resorted to empowering the 
members of his clan, the Darods, resulting in the marginalization of other clans. Having lost 
legitimacy among the major stakeholders, the Barre administration adopted divide-and-rule 
tactics, arming some clans against those considered the opposition. This politicized clan 
differences and led to the retreat of some clans and their military mobilization to contest 
power.  By the end of 1988, clan-based military opposition to Siad Barre had increased. This 
included the Somali National Movement (Ishaq clan), Somali Salvation Democratic 
Movement (Majerteen), United Somali Congress (Hawiye – Habargidir sub-clan) and Somali 
Patriotic Movement (Hawiye – Muddullod sub-clan) (Ajulu 2004: 77).   
 
The civil war that engulfed Somalia from 1988 was fought on many fronts. The different 
clans decided to form a coalition to remove Siad Barre from power and terminate his 
dictatorship. Vinci (2006) argues that, while the Somali civil war was supposed to have ended 
with the defeat of Barre and his military machine, the society was thrown into a deeper 
anarchy (Vinci 2006: 77). The level of bitterness and discord among the various clans, 
increased over the years; deepened by Siad Barre’s use of some against others. The depth of 
mutual resentments among clan groups became manifest immediately after Barre was 
defeated and removed from power. Reprisal killings targeted the Darod (Siad Barre's clan) 
and other sub-clans such as the Digil and the Marehan believed to have benefited inordinately 
from Barre’s rule and /or to have been used to oppress other clans.  It also became evident 
that the opposition forces that removed Barre had no common agenda on how to handle 
power once his government collapsed. Instead, a ferocious conflict ensued among the 
previously coalesced factions for the capture and control of the state. The factions further 
divided into sub-clans, balkanizing the country into territories governed by clan militias. Elmi 
and Barise (2006: 33) argue that it was this war among the clan factions -- rather than the 
fight to remove Siad Barre from government -- that led to state collapse in 1991. Ahmed and 
Green (1999: 119) concur and argue that following the debilitating inter-clan and intra-clan 
conflicts among the opposition after the fall of Siad Barre and the inability of any group/s to 
form an effective government, the state collapsed. This argument is predicated on the 
possibility of securing the state if the warring factions had come together to form an inclusive 
federal option. However, instead of a government of national unity, there was a struggle to 
capture the state. For example, while Farah Aideed was still pursuing Siad Barre’s soldiers 
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after sacking them from the capital, Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Muhammad set up a government 
in Mogadishu. This led to a bloody war between militia loyal to the two leaders, the splitting 
of Mogadishu into two, the further destruction of the city and the killing of an estimated 
14,000 people, both combatants and civilians (Cronwell 2004: 3).  
 
Cronwell (2004: 4) argues that Somali nationalism which suffered a major setback due to the 
secession of Somaliland could possibly have been redeemed if efforts had been made 
immediately after the fall of Siad Barre’s government to unify all who had suffered under the 
former administration. While Siad Barre’s administration was removed from office in 
Mogadishu on 1 January 1991, it was not until 18 May 1991 that the North declared 
independence. This could be because it had become obvious to the northerners that the 
Hawiye who were controlling the capital were not inclined to invite any other clan to form a 
government, but were rather fighting among themselves for control of the realms of power at 
the level of sub-clan (Lewis 2004: 489; Samatar 1990: 21). At this point it became 
“everybody to your clan” (Ahmed and Green 1999: 120). The Somali situation at this point in 
time is summarized by Lewis (1994) as follows:  
  
The general tendency was for every major Somali clan to form its own 
militia movement. Thus clans were becoming effectively self-governing 
entities throughout the Somali region as they carved out spheres of 
influence in a process which, with the abundance of modern weapons, 
frequently entailed savage battles with a high toll of civilian casualties 
(1994: 231). 
 
The continued fighting and lawlessness into which Somalia descended assumed another 
dimension when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged. This opened a new phase in the 
conflict, introducing a dimension that internationalized the conflict like never before (Osondu 
2009: 5, 66). With the collapse of all institutions of governance, a complete breakdown of 
law and order, and an increase in gang violence and insecurity even within clan enclaves, 
Islamic Courts sprang up within the clans around the middle of 1993 as independent bodies to 
render judicial, security and social services to the populace (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that, at the onset, the Islamic Courts were 
independent of one another with each Court’s activities, jurisdiction, and influence limited to 
its own clan territory where it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of basic Islamic 
laws. The Courts’ involvement in security and social services followed later. The increased 
prominence of the Islamic Courts in the Somali political landscape followed their unification 
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and militarization. By 2005, there were 11 unified Courts. They broke the control of the 
warlords, created a very strong military wing – the al-Shabaab – and began mobilizing for an 
Islamist Somalia. The ICG (2006: 10) observes that by the middle of 2006, the Islamic Courts 
Union had defeated the combined forces of the warlords and taken control of Mogadishu. 
With the exception of the city of Baioda which hosted the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), which was itself shielded by a very strong contingent of the Ethiopian army, the rest 
of southern Somalia had come under the control of the Islamic Courts Union by the middle of 
December 2006. The attempt by the Islamic Courts’ military machine to attack and take over 
Baioda and, by implication, sack the TFG was a major setback, especially given that 
Ethiopian soldiers were protecting the TFG. As such, the attack on Baioda effectively became 
an attack on Ethiopia; and by doing so the conflict not only brought Ethiopia fully into the 
war but also created and enabled the basis for the defeat of the Islamic Courts by the end of 
December 2006.  In turn, it seems that the defeat may have paved the way for the military 
wing of the Islamic Courts, al-Shabaab, to receive new recruits in the form of a sizeable 
number of foreign jihadists. Therefore, the defeat of the Islamists inaugurated an Islamist 
insurgency that has persisted until today.    
The ongoing conflict is not due to a lack of attempts to resolve it. There is compelling 
evidence that numerous factors have stymied various peace initiatives, sometimes, even 
before the conclusion of these processes. These factors include the disposition of the warring 
clan leaders. Cronwell (2004: 1) refers to such leaders as “men who wield the power of 
violent veto”. With Siad Barre out of the equation, each warring faction was interested in 
capturing the state and was never ready to concede to any other faction. As a result, most of 
the rounds of peace talks have been a zero sum game for each of the factions, control of the 
helm or nothing.  The survival of Somali society was not their priority (Cornwell 2004:  1). 
Furthermore, some leaders of factions lack power and a number of agreements collapsed after 
they were signed because some members of the factions refused to accept what their 
representatives at the talks had agreed to (Ajulu 2004:  74). The other factor which impacted 
the peace processes was the peacemakers’ lack of a clear mandate. For example, IGAD 
entered the peace process as a convener or facilitator. Its role was to assist the warring 
factions to negotiate and come up with an agreement. It had no power to enforce agreements 
reached at peace talks (Cronwell 2004: 2). Furthermore, in the case of the IGAD supervised 
talks, there was lack of political will and commitment on the part of the peacemakers 
themselves. The other dilemma IGAD faced is that of the seven states that were party to the 
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peace process, three -- Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia -- have sizable Somali populations 
living within their borders as part of their national population. This made it difficult for other 
parties to establish whether these countries are acting on the basis of the Somali peace 
process and regional stability which the organization aims to achieve, or their selfish national 
interests which certain decisions regarding Somalia may imply. Claims and counter claims 
regarding some of these states’ support and/or sponsorship of rival warring factions, 
jeopardized trust building. Some of these claims are examined later in this study when the 











This research study investigates the behaviour of four major external actors, three state actors 
and one non-state actor, who are either overtly or covertly involved in the conflict in Somalia. 
These behaviours have influenced the character and dynamics of the conflict over the years. 
Behaviours are at most times expressions of perceptions.  Understanding the motivation for 
such behaviours requires an examination of the various interests of external actors in order to 
understand and assess why they approach the Somali conflict in the way they do. In doing so, 
this study examines the analytical usefulness of a number of theories. These include the 
Realist Theory of International Relations, the Political Economy Framework, the 
Securitization Theory and the Enemy Image Framework of Analysis. 
4.1 The Realist Theory 
The importance of the Realist Theory of International Relations to this research study is 
acknowledged. In its classical sense, realism as an approach to International Relations 
presupposes an international environment that is competitive and conflictual (Waltz 1979: 
117). It recognises the state as a legitimate actor in the international environment without a 
government, offering a self-help system where the survival of the individual state is of 
paramount concern (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 9-10). This necessitates a selfish application of 
power in pursuit of national interests. The security of the state (national security) towers 
above every other consideration including moral considerations (Morgenthau 1948: 5; 
Donnelly 2000: 7). The likely political consequences determine the choice of a line of action 
against other options. War is acceptable as long as it guarantees the security of the state 
(Keohane 1986: 165). As Bull (1995: 185) puts it, “Anything is justifiable by the reason of 
the state”. Makinda (1998) argues that the realists’ interpretation of security is ‘primarily in 
terms of war, the survival of the state, and the role of military power in settling global 
disputes’ in what the author calls the ‘statist, militarist and zero sum game approach to 
security’ (quoted in Gilbert et al (2009: 266 - 267). This has also been termed ‘power 
politics’ (Donelan 1990: 26; Donnelly 2005: 29).   
 
One application of realism’s theoretical assumptions to the behaviour of the US in Somalia is 
that Washington was simply pursuing its strategic interests in Somalia and the region as a 
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whole. This explains the US switching support to the military dictatorship of Said Barre in 
1977 when it lost Ethiopia to the USSR following the emergence of a socialist military 
regime in Ethiopia which allied with the Soviet Union. It was also in pursuit of national 
security that the US allied with warlords inside Somalia in an attempt to track down wanted 
terrorists believed to be hiding inside the country. Again, following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, in 2002 the US established the Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA) with a base in Djibouti as a permanent counterterrorism military initiative to 
coordinate its military activities in the entire Horn of Africa, with specific attention to 
Somalia and the Arabian Peninsula. The Task Force has overtly supported Ethiopia’s and 
Kenya’s military expedition inside Somalia, while at the same time continuing to use drones 
to hunt down suspected al-Qaeda members inside Somalia (Gilbert et al 2009: 271). 
Ethiopia’s control of its Ogaden region remains contentious with the Somalis. The pan-
Somali stance of the defunct fundamentalist Islamist al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) and the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which replaced it, has not escaped Ethiopia’s attention. The 
chairman of the ICU council, the shura, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, was emphatic about 
Somali expectations in a 2006 interview with Newsweek Magazine: “Really, Ogaden is a 
Somali region and part of Somalia, and Somali governments have entered two wars with 
Ethiopia over it, and I hope that one day that region will be part of Somalia” (Nordland 2006 
in International Crisis Group 2007: 5). In the same year, Aweys was quoted as asserting in an 
interview with Radio Shabelle, based in Mogadishu, that “We will leave no stone unturned to 
integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with 
their ancestors in Somalia” (International Crisis Group 2007: 5; Osondu 2008: 67). Ethiopia 
therefore regards the emergence (through the barrel of the gun) of a fundamentalist Islamist 
government in Somalia, which is what the al- Shabaab says it is fighting for, as very 
dangerous and inimical to its own interests.  In its Africa Report No. 45, the International 
Crisis Group expressed Ethiopia’s concerns over the long-term implications of an Islamic 
government in Somalia, including the possibility of stimulating Islamic radicalism within 
Ethiopia.  It argued that the “Courts’ links to transnational terrorism” may have been a more 
important reason for Ethiopia’s “immediate consideration” of fighting the Courts inside 
Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 4).  Ethiopia’s military involvement inside 
Somalia from December 2006 to early 2009, and again since 2011 can therefore be regarded 
as a power game in pursuit of its national interests over and above Somalia’s domestic 
concerns.  Eritrea is equally playing its own power game.  It has been accused of supporting 
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the Islamists inside Somalia.  Eritrea fought two bloody wars with Ethiopia, both of which it 
lost. It wants to remain relevant in the region and be part of the eventual settlement in 
Somalia to cushion the overbearing influence of Ethiopia as the regional powerhouse.     
All in all, the Realist Theory of International Relations provides a useful analysis of the 
motives behind the behaviours of the various external state actors in the Somali conflict. 
However, the same cannot be said in investigating the motivation and behaviour of the 
international Islamist Jihad, which is an equally important external actor in the Somali 
conflict. The theory does not offer an effective analytical window for untangling the 
behaviour of an important non-state actor like al-Qaeda and the international Jihad. 
4.2 The Political Economy Framework 
The Political Economy Theoretical Framework lends itself to the discourse of the use of 
political processes in achieving economic outcomes or, put differently, how economic 
interests determine an actor’s policy options (Hettne 1995: 2).  In the 1970s and 1980s the 
interests of the US lay in securing a foothold in a very strategic area in the Horn of Africa 
from where it could oversee its economic activities in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and 
the proximate Middle East. Somalia meets the US’ geo-strategic needs. The country’s long 
coastline along the Indian Ocean and into the Mediterranean Sea through the Gulf of Aden is 
very strategic as it oversees shipping traffic to and from important oil wells in the Middle 
East, which supply about 60 percent of US crude oil imports.  Somalia’s coastline also 
straddles a crucial access route to the US military bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 
Ethiopia is interested in retaining the Somali territories it colonized. Its land-locked status 
makes Ethiopia desirous of “unlimited access to the Somali ports by signing agreements with 
clan chiefs on unequal terms.” As such, it has been acting in a manner that tends to 
destabilize actors inside Somalia, thereby sustaining the conflict (Elmi and Barise 2006: 42- 
43). This may also be Ethiopia’s primary interest in “insisting” on being part of any decision 
on the outcome of most of the Somali peace processes and who heads any government in 
Somalia.   
 
While the Political Economy approach helps to explain the economic and geostrategic 
interests of the US and Ethiopia, it does not convincingly explain Eritrea’s behaviour in terms 
of its economic interests in Somalia.  Furthermore, the interest and role of the international 
Jihad in Somalia cannot be clearly explained in terms of economic determinism. Somalia is 
not endowed with natural extractive resources which can attract competition between external 
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actors. The Political Economy Framework is therefore inadequate for assessing crucial 
aspects of the external dynamics of the conflict. 
4.3 Securitization Theory 
Securitization Theory is of great importance to this research study. This theory, which is also 
referred to as the Copenhagen School, is a social constructivist theory that seeks to explain 
security as a “speech act”, an act of labelling, whereby an actor declares an object threatened, 
then “claims a right to extraordinary measures” to ensure that the threatened object survives 
(Waever 2004: 12 – 13; Tuareck 2006: id).  Survival of the object becomes paramount for the 
actor to the effect that “normal” procedures, rules, and regulations are set aside.  
Securitization takes place when an actor perceives and declares a threatening situation against 
a “referent object” and is able to reasonably establish and/or “convince an audience (inter-
unit relations)” of a “legitimate need” to act in disregard of or “beyond otherwise binding 
rules and regulations” (Tuareck 2006: id).  This is a broad theory that moves away from the 
narrow state centrism and military conception of more traditional approaches to the study of 
security. It shifts the agenda towards a social construction of security, with securitization 
being a product of “a specific social process” (William 2003: 513). Securitization theory 
regards security as beyond state and military security. It takes into account threats to 
individuals and “sub-state groups” (human security) as well as and issues like the 
environment. William argues further that:  
Treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost 
indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of 
possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened 
(what are termed the “referent objects” of security) can be extended to 
include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the 
territorial state (2003:  13).  
 
In order to prevent abuse of the process of securitizing any issue, securitization is built 
around what the Copenhagen School terms “the conditions for a successful speech-act: the 
internal linguistic-grammatical and the external, contextual and social (Buzan et al 1998:  
32). While the internal linguistic-grammatical involves following the rules or conventional 
procedures of the act, the external, contextual and social is about the position from which the 
act can be made. It therefore follows that not every speech-act or social construction is 
security. Securitization, therefore, is the “casting of the issue as one of an ‘existential threat’ 
which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics 
(William 2003: 514). Buzan et al (1998: 26) clarify that “the distinguishing feature of 
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securitization is the specific rhetorical structure.  That quality is the staging of existential 
issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and 
presented as of supreme priority; thus by labelling it as security an agent claims the need for 
and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan 1998:  26). Therefore, “existential 
threats, emergency action and effects on inter unit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan 
1998:  26) are the component parts of successful securitization. “Securitization marks a 
decision, a ‘breaking of rules’ and the suspension of normal politics”
11
 (Tuareck 2006a: id; 
William 2003: 513). William (2003: 518) further argues that this decision is the bedrock of 
securitization, making it what he calls the “primary reality” of securitization, the launching 
into actual existence of the threat in cases of successful securitization or nonexistence in 
cases of failed securitization. The theory can be said to have strengthened the aspects of 
constructivist theories of International Relations which explore the role of argument, action 
and ethics (Risse 2000: 8)
12
. 
Taking the foregoing discussion into account, Securitization Theory is very helpful in our 
quest to assess and explain the behaviour of the external actors in the Somali conflict.  For 
example, the US’ securitization of the Somalia was long in coming. It had long perceived the 
environment of the failed state of Somalia as a “security threat”. Following global threats and 
attacks on US facilities and interests by Islamist terrorists, the US has succeeded in making a 
case for its securitizing stance. The environment of the collapsed state of Somalia has long 
been viewed as a terrorist staging ground. Somalia provided an enabling environment for the 
7 August 1998 terrorist attacks on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania in which 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans lost their lives, with over 
5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured (Kagwanja 2006: 76; Otenyo 2004: 78).  
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon inside the US, the US declared its global War on Terror, making a case for a 
“legitimate need” to revoke binding rules and regulations, and to take emergency action 
against terrorist and terrorist organizations anywhere in the world. On the heels of the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US declared Somalia a terrorist safe haven and placed 
Aden Hashi Ayro, the then leader of the al-Itihaad, who was trained in an al-Qaeda camp in 
Afghanistan, on its list of most wanted terrorists (Crisis Group 2007: 9). The November 2012 
terrorist attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa and an attempt on a passenger plane on 
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the runway at Mombasa International Airport, Kenya, for which al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility firmed the US’ resolve. The organization used Somali territory as a co-
ordination outpost and transit route; hid its operatives in Somalia before the attacks; crossed 
Somali borders into the countries where the attacks took place; and then hid the operatives in 
Somalia after the attacks (International Crisis Group 2005: 1). Another attack on the 
American embassy in Nairobi in 2003 which would have involved the use of a light aircraft 
was foiled by Kenyan security operatives (Dempsey 2006: 14; Menkhaus 2004: 71; 
International Crisis Group 2005: 9). The US has continued to present its involvement in 
Somalia as part of its current global security initiative.  It contends that the country is a safe 
haven for wanted terrorists and the constant growth of radical Islamists, and therefore an al-
Qaeda breeding ground (International Crisis Group 2005a: 11; Menkhaus 2004: 70; 
Menkhaus 2005: 42-43; Dempsey 2006: 14; International Crisis Group 2006: 9; International 
Crisis Group 2007: 4; Harper 2007; Quaranto 2008: 28). This explains the US’ covert and 
overt military involvement in Somalia since the end of the Cold War.   
At present there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters have moved into Somalia through its 
numerous porous entry ports to join forces with the Islamist fundamentalists who are fighting 
for control of the country. Furthermore all the other external actors that are involved in the 
Somali conflict – overtly or covertly – appear to have labelled the Somali environment an 
“existential threat”.  For Ethiopia, there are various dimensions to this perceived threat.  
Somalia’s irredentist posture since independence in 1960, the fear of the emergence of an 
unfriendly radical Islamist government in Mogadishu, and its implications on Ethiopia’s 
internal security and, more recently, the influence of radical Islamist activities on its minority 
Muslim population, have led Ethiopia to securitize the Somali conflict environment.  This has 
defined Ethiopia’s choices of action which changes periodically: supporting opposition 
groups during the regime of Siad Barre, aligning with some warlords against the others (Elmi 
and Barise 2006: 38), backing the moderate Transitional Federal Government, and engaging 
directly in the conflict in 2006 (Elmi and Barise 2006: 39; Ahmed and Green 2007: 116).  For 
Eritrea, a government in Mogadishu that is friendly with (or controlled by) Ethiopia is of 
grave security importance and concern.  Therefore, the securitization of the conflict is seen as 
necessary (International Crisis Group 2007: 4).  For its part, the global Jihad is threatened by 
the growing influence of the US and Ethiopia in the region. A Somali government that is 
friendly with the US and its western allies, and Ethiopia in the Horn, will jeopardize its 
operations and existence in the region. The Jihad therefore places great importance on the 
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maintenance of its foothold in the Horn of Africa and East Africa.  Therefore divergent 
definitions of the security threat and the extraordinary counteracting measures adopted by 
these external actors, with each ostensibly fighting for survival, characterize the Somali 
conflict.  The Securitization Theory is thus helpful in explaining the roles of the external 
actors in this conflict. It also provides insight into the delicate conflict architecture which the 
Somali conflict has presented.     
4.4 Enemy Image 
The Enemy Image theoretical framework of analysis is also very relevant to this study.  This 
framework provides a very useful analytical tool to investigate the mind-sets of external non-
state actors in the Somali conflict (the international Jihad network), as well as to analyze the 
perceptions of the external state actors in relation to their interactions which are sometimes 
contradictory.   Enemy imaging refers to the exaggerated representation of an enemy or 
adversary as “diabolical, aggressive, and untrustworthy … generated at the preconscious 
level through selective attention and memory, double standards, self-fulfilling prophesies, 
and ignorance” and occasioned by fear and distrust (Fabick 2007: 73; Frank and Melville 
2006: id).  While agreeing that enemy imaging was the hallmark of the West versus East 
Arms Race and the Cold War, Fabick regards the 11 September attack on America as 
“another global conflict paradigm shift …a new East/West conflict – between Western 
imperialism and Islamic extremism” (Fabick 2007:  75).  
 
Following the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (for which 
al-Qaeda claimed responsibility), the US not only strongly believed that the perpetrators were 
being protected by the elements of the hard-line Islamists, al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) but 
also began to view Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  This attitude and associated policy 
towards Somalia were extended following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, 
the rise of radical Islamic jihadist inside Somalia, and the adoption of Somalia as a battle 
front by the international al-Qaeda network.  Al-Qaeda is involved in the Somali conflict as 
part of its quest to confront the enemy - western imperialism - represented by the United 
States.  Enemy imaging is therefore at the centre of the current behaviours of both the US and 
al-Qaeda in the Somali conflict.  For the US, it is War on Terror but for al-Qaeda it is Jihad 
against the imperialist occupiers.  The behaviours of Ethiopia and Eritrea are equally 
sharpened by their imaging of the other as very dangerous and hostile.  These two countries 
are seen as fighting a proxy war in Somalia (Observatoire de L’Afrique 2010: 9). Kahssay 
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(2009: 32) concurs and observes that since the end of their border war of 1998 – 2000, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea “seem to opt for waging proxy wars against each other one of the main 
battlefields being Somalia”. This, he argues, partly explains why Eritrea supports the radical 
Islamists in Somalia even when it “seem[s] to have neither religious nor ideological affinity 
with the Islamist forces of Somalia” (Kahssay 2009: 32).  
On the basis of the above analyses, the Securitization and the Enemy Image theoretical 
frameworks are used to critically analyze and gauge the fundamental divergent interests of 
the external actors in the Somali conflict which shape their actions and options.  This 
integrated approach offers a versatile tool to examine the multiple interests and behaviours of 
external actors in the Somali conflict, and how these have influenced the dialectics of the 
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Chapter Five 
External actors and conflict transformation 
 
5.0 Introduction 
One of the features of global politics since the creation of the international system has been 
external actors’ involvement in others states’ internal conflicts. While this changes the 
dynamics of such conflicts, in some cases it also determines their outcome. Tandon (1987: 
47) observes that the systemic contradictions which generate internal conflicts are often 
manipulated by larger interests outside the state to exacerbate the conflict.  Hironaka (2005: 
2) argues that the Cold War and historical contexts which tended to encourage interstate 
military intervention in the internal conflicts of other states since the end of the World War II 
aggravate conflicts in weak states. While most civil wars are rooted in “local issues and 
conditions”, external actors’ activities play a crucial role in escalating and perpetuating such 
conflicts. Taking into account the long duration of contemporary internal conflicts, very few 
groups in internal conflicts can conduct such wars without external assistance (Hironaka 
2005: 3). 
 
From the 19th to the middle of the 20th centuries, most interventions were initiated by a 
single great power or a coalition of great powers in support of one side in the civil conflict. 
This resulted in short conflicts and decisive victories. However, from the second half of the 
20th century and with the advent of the Cold War, two-sided interventions by different states 
became more common. The involvement of two super powers in the same internal conflict, 
each on the side of either the government or the opposition forces, became a common 
occurrence. This, for example, was the case in the civil wars in Angola, Nicaragua, 
Philippines, and Columbia. There was also increased involvement of neighbouring states, 
former colonial powers and regionally powerful states in other states’ internal conflict. The 
ECOMOG’s involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone; French intervention in Guinea Bissau 
and, more recently, in Mali; South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique and Angola; 
Ugandan and Rwandan involvements in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); 
Ethiopian involvement in Somalia; and the current AMISOM presence in Somalia, are some 
examples. Interventions by former colonial powers and international forces are mainly 
motivated by the desire to rescue a government in power from defeat by opposition forces. 
This kind of intervention has saved many weak states from being overrun by very strong 
opposition forces. For example, the 11 January military intervention in Mali by French troops 
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under “Operation Serval” saved the government from being sacked by the Tuarag rebels who 
were already pushing towards the capital, Bamako.          
 
Ann Hironaka’s book Neverending Wars: International Community, Weak States, and the 
Perpetuation of Civil Wars observes that external actors’ involvement in contemporary 
internal conflicts directly contributes to the length and complexity of such conflicts (Hironaka 
2005: 19-20). While acknowledging that interstate involvement in civil wars has been “a 
feature of global politics since the creation of the international system”, she argues that post-
World War II states are weak and that this has led to a change in the type of interventions that 
occur in contemporary civil wars. At the top of the list of the changes is “the increase in 
interventions that occur on both sides of the conflict” (Hironaka 2005: 25). Hironaka posits 
that interventions prior to World War II were primarily actions by a great power or a coalition 
of great powers, mostly intervening on one side. This has changed in post-World War II 
interventions where it has become common for “both the state and the opposition group to 
benefit from international support and intervention, creating civil war fuelled by extra-
national resources” (Hironaka 2005: 26). This seems to be the experience in most conflicts in 
Africa.  Adedeji (1999: 3) comments that the “growing tendency for neighbouring countries 
to intervene directly in their neighbours’ internal conflicts” has exacerbated conflict in sub-
Saharan Africa. Writing on the impact of external actors’ support for domestic actors in the 
Angolan civil war, Kambwa et al observe that “the downside of this support was that the 
movements were morally obliged to act in accordance with the interests of their respective 
guardians.” This, they observe, “exacerbated the enmity already existing between the 
Angolan nationalist forces” (Kambwa et al 1999: 67). 
 
5.1 External Actors and Conflict Dynamics 
Because some of the wars in which interventions are experienced occur in weak states, these 
interventions sometimes result in the supply of funds, personnel and equipment to the 
opposition which may not be available to the state. This changes the dynamics of the conflict 
in favour of a hitherto weaker opposition. A clear example of the latter is India’s intervention 
in the Sri Lankan civil war where the interveners’ contingent was far larger than the Sri 
Lankan military (Tillema 1991). Again, the sizeable assistance received in the 1948 civil 
conflict by the Costa Rican opposition rebel army from Nicaragua and Honduras, was more 
than what the state could muster. The outcome was a very short war of about six months and 
a victory for the opposition, leading to the sacking of the newly sworn-in President Rafael 
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Guardia and the ascension of the opposition leader, José Figueres Ferrer, as the president 
(Hironaka 2005: 142-143; Walker 1999).  In Congo, near insignificant rebel forces led by 
Laurent Kabila that could hardly control a regional base inside Congo were able, with the 
assistance of Uganda and Rwanda, to overrun the Congolese army from the countryside to 
the capital, Kinshasa, and overthrow the all-powerful Mobutu (Cunningham 2010: 116). Prior 
to this, the Kinshasa government did not regard Kabila’s forces as a serious threat. The entry 
of a strong external actor into an internal conflict can quickly change the dynamics of the 
conflict and turn the tide against a reputedly strong government army. In the case of Zaire, 
Ugandan and Rwandan support for the rebels was so overwhelming that the conflict, albeit 
only the first phase, ended in victory for the opposition rebel forces within just a year.  
 
When a resource rich state is locked in conflict with an insurgent that receives much 
assistance in the form of funds and materials, such conflicts tend to drag on for a very long 
time in what Hironaka (2005: 143) terms a “war with infinite resources”. Since civil wars are 
very expensive to conduct, a rebel group tends to continue the conflict as long as the external 
actors are willing to support it with the resources it needs. Such conflicts can only end when 
the interveners are tired or negotiate a settlement. This was the case with the Angolan civil 
war. The intervening actors, South Africa and Cuba, were made to sign an agreement to 
withdraw their support for the UNITA Rebels and the government forces, respectively 
(Cunningham 2010: 117). Only after this agreement was signed at the UN in 1988 was it 
possible to bring the Angolan government and UNITA rebels to sign an internal peace 
agreement in 1991. The long civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador were not prolonged by 
internal contradictions in these two states; rather the Cold War logic of the US and Soviet 
Union kept them going for such long periods (Hansen 1987: 49). 
 
External actors sometimes become involved in internal conflicts in other states only to find 
that the conflict is continuing longer than projected.  Continued participation may become 
political baggage for the intervening government back home. In such situations, the 
intervener makes an effort to achieve a quicker, negotiated resolution to the conflict or may 
withdraw in order to save itself on the home front. Both Britain and France have had to 
withdraw their soldiers from Afghanistan following domestic political developments which 
threatened political gains or simply in order to fulfil campaign promises. When internal 
conflict drags on for too long, both sides become fatigued, including the intervening forces. 
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This may start to affect the internal politics of the intervening state to the extent that they 
either withdraw support or scale it down.  
 
5.2 Reasons for interventions 
Many reasons have been advanced for why external actors intervene in other states’ internal 
conflicts. Each conflict has its own peculiar circumstances and environment that produce 
such conflict. As such, the motivation for external actors’ involvement in other states’ 
internal conflict are varied. Some are easily discernible, while others are hidden. Having said 
that, the reasons for interventions can include any of the following:  
1) The need to prevent internal conflict from spilling over into other states;  
2) National security imperatives (independent agenda);  
3) The need to support a state ally;  
4) The need to defend a democratic system; and  
5) Simple opportunism.  
I will now examine and contextualize each of the five motives. 
 
5.2.1 To prevent an internal conflict from spilling over into the region 
Some interventions have been launched to stop an internal conflict from spreading to 
neighbouring states. This form of intervention is usually motivated by the fear that the 
national interests of the intervening states could be seriously threatened. Civil conflicts can 
impose undesirable impact on surrounding states and, sometimes, can even trigger conflicts 
within or among the neighbour states. Powerful states with interests in a particular region 
sometimes intervene in other states’ internal conflicts if they threaten to spill over into other 
neighbouring states. The intervening states may not actually have any direct interest in the 
state that is experiencing conflict but could be concerned that other states where they have 
vital interests  may be unduly affected. In 1947, US President Harry Truman argued in favour 
of US intervention in the civil war in Greece on the basis of the negative implications for 
American interests in the region – especially Turkey -- should the conflict spread to 
neighbouring states. Truman argued at the time that:  
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the 
survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave 
importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall 
under the control of an armed minority, the knock-on effect 
upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. 
Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire 
Middle East” (quoted in Kathman 2011: 847-848).  
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National interests, therefore, are one of the driving forces or motivation for interventions in 
internal conflicts. This notion has been used to justify most US involvement in other states’ 
internal conflicts. It is expressed in the US 2006 National Security Strategy as follows: “even 
if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely 
to be affected over time” (Kathman 2011: 848; Bush 2006: 14).  
 
5.2.2 To check own internal insurgency  
Another motivation for involvement in an internal conflict in another state is when such 
conflict presents the intervening state with an opportunity to advance its own interests or deal 
with brewing internal insurgency or ongoing internal conflict. There have been cases where 
the intervening state becomes involved in another state’s internal conflict solely in order to 
deal with its own domestic problems. For example, a state may involve itself in internal 
conflict in another state in order to pursue its agenda against a domestic insurgent group 
which may be using the territory of the neighbouring state in conflict to attack its territory. 
Cunningham refers to such interventions as, “interventions with independent agenda” 
(Cunningham 2010: 116). The agenda is independent in that it is clearly outside the basic 
goals of the warring parties; and the intervening state is solely interested in an outcome that 
addresses its goal regardless of which domestic party wins the conflict. External actors with 
an independent agenda usually side with the insurgents opposing the government. For 
example, it was clear that South Africa’s interest in the conflict in Angola and Mozambique 
during the anti-Apartheid struggle period was its domestic issues. South Africa became 
overtly involved with UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique simply because the 
anti-apartheid movements, the ANC and SWAPO were harboured by these neighbouring 
states that were used to launch coordinated actions against the apartheid government inside 
the country. Rwanda and Uganda’s independent agendas in their involvement in the civil war 
in Congo from 1996 to 2002 illustrate how strongly the independent agenda of an intervening 
party or parties can drive a domestic conflict. Both Uganda and Rwanda allied with the 
Congolese insurgent group led by Laurent Kabila in the Congolese civil war that ousted 
Mobutu Sesse Seku in 1997. Once it became obvious to Uganda and Rwanda that their 
former ally, President Kabila, was not ready to disarm the Ugandan and Rwandan insurgent 
groups fighting their countries from within Congolese territory, they switched alliances, 
backing new insurgent groups against Kabila’s government from 1998 to 2002 (Cunningham 
2010: 117). Of vital interest in this scenario is the fact that the Ugandan and Rwandan 
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agendas did not change in both their alliance with Kabila in the initial conflict against 
Mobutu and their later alliance with other insurgents against Kabila in the subsequent and 
longer conflict. Both countries were interested in addressing their domestic conflict which 
involved domestic insurgents operating from Congolese territory. They were clearly not 
interested in who won the war in Congo. US intervention in Afghanistan had its own agenda, 
built on its national interests, which were later to be defined more in terms of its global war 
on terror than any interest in settling the internal conflict. This explains why, in 2001, the US 
moved against the Taliban government in Kabul who were US allies and beneficiaries in the 
1980s, in order to attack the Soviet-led Afghan government. Clearly, any settlement in 
Afghanistan that does not encompass the anti-terrorism agenda is unlikely to receive 
American support.     
 
5.2.3 To support a weak state 
Some interventions in internal conflict have been motivated by the desire to support weak and 
beleaguered states that are at the risk of being overrun by insurgent forces. In most cases of 
this nature, a troubled state requests a friendly government or governments to assist it 
militarily to defeat or at least repel insurgents. France has variously intervened in internal 
conflicts in Gabon, Mali and Ivory Coast on the basis of this consideration. Britain intervened 
in the 1965-1976 conflict in Oman at the invitation of the Kingdom of Oman. Furthermore, 
Russia and Uzbekistan intervened in the Tajikistan conflict of 1992-1998, Guinea and 
Senegal intervened in the Guinea Bissau civil war of 1998-1999, Zimbabwe acted in 
Mozambique from 1976 to 1992 and Zaire fought in Uganda in 1990 for this reason. In this 
kind of scenario, the interveners tend to adopt the agenda of their hosts in the conflict 
(Cunningham 2010: 120). 
 
5.2.4 Aggression and opportunism 
An external state actor’s involvement in internal conflict on the side of an insurgent group 
fighting a state is often an expression of aggression. While the reasons for why individual 
states choose to fund some groups against an enemy state may vary, they are sometimes 
motivated by a number of factors including: 
1) The desire to overthrow an unfriendly government; 
2) Concerns about regional policy disputations and disagreements; and 
3) An opportunity to secure advantage over a disputed territory. 
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Undoubtedly, it is not uncommon for states to sponsor insurgents with the explicit aim to 
destabilize unfriendly neighbouring or even distant states in the hope of weakening their 
enemies or gaining some form of advantage. Funding and supporting rebel activities 
including civil war in a rival state, therefore, is a foreign policy decision that is informed by 
the desire to weaken such a state or impose a setback on a rival as was common between the 
cold warriors. Supporting the above argument, Salehyan (2011) outlining the findings of his 
research, posits that states are not usually disposed to supporting insurgent groups in other 
states, even where they may have some measure of sympathy for the group’s cause. He 
explains that insurgent groups receive supports from other states that are in disputes with 
their own state (Salehyan 2011: 712). For example, South Africa took a foreign policy 
decision during the 1970s and 1980s to weaken and destabilize all neighbouring states with 
vigorous anti-apartheid agendas; hence, its robust support for rebel groups in Mozambique 
and Angola. In the 1980s and 1990s, Iraq and Iran backed each other’s rebel groups as part of 
their policies with regard to their dispute over territory. Similarly, Ethiopia and Sudan backed 
rebel forces opposed to each other’s government during the 1990s and beyond. Traditional 
enemies, Uganda and Sudan, are also known to be in the habit of prodding insurgencies 
fighting the other state as a way of subverting each other (Salehyan et al 2011: 713; 
Cunningham 2010: 120; Salehyan 2008: 56).   
 
In essence then, the involvement of external actors in Somalia seems linked to their varying 
interests. While Ethiopia and the United States seek to ensure the presence of a friendly (and 
ostensibly malleable) government in Somalia, Eritrea and Al-Qaeda seem keen to ensure that 
the country is hostile to the interests of Ethiopia (for Eritrea) and the United States (for Al-
Qaeda) – more or less. The net effect is that Somalian territory has been reduced to a battle 
ground where these actors play out their hostilities towards identified enemy states.   
 
5.3 Implications of intervention 
The major implication of external intervention in internal conflicts is that it changes the 
dynamics of the conflict. This ranges from the manner in which the conflict is conducted to 
its duration and eventual outcome. Salehyan et al (2011: 710) argue that most civil wars 
where external actor(s) are involved last longer, causing more fatalities in most cases. It is 
important to note, however, that the opposite can be the case in some cases of intervention. 
When an external actor’s involvement that is one-sided and decisive, the intervention can 
hasten the end of a conflict either by securing a victory for the stronger side or by 
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encouraging a negotiated settlement. Hironaka (2005: 142) argues that “when an 
overwhelming force is marshalled on one side of the conflict, wars end rapidly. The opposing 
side is either quickly defeated or give up without a fight, facing insurmountable odds”. 
Therefore, the nature of external actors’ involvement and the strength of such actor(s) 
determine the impact of involvement. For instance, a civil conflict that has strong external 
actors on both sides tends to last much longer, is more ferocious and results in higher 
casualties. This is because both sides in the conflict have ‘infinite’ financial and material 
resources which would not have been available to them without the external actors’ largesse 
(Hartung 1994: 198; Regan 2000:28). This was the case with most Cold War conflicts in 
Africa and Latin America where the US and the Soviet Union acted in support of opposing 
groups. The civil war in Sri Lanka, which lasted for about three decades and in which the 
rebel Tamil Tigers received huge support from an external state and non-state actors, showed 
clearly that when funds and arms are not in short supply to a party in an internal conflict, it 
can well last ad infinitum (Smith 1999: 21). The group engaged in the conflict has sufficient 
resources to continue the war. It is equally possible that in some cases the continuation of the 
conflict presents a surer financial security than ending the conflict. When this is the case, the 
group that is so placed rejects and/or obstructs every attempt at a negotiated settlement 
(Hironaka 2005: 142; Uyangoda 1999: 158). The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka is one of such 
rebel groups. Over the years, the Tamil Tigers did everything they could to scuttle the 
resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict.  
 
Furthermore, when an external actor with an independent agenda is brought into an internal 
conflict, especially on the side of an insurgent group, the war tends to last longer because the 
issues in contention expand beyond domestic issues to include those of the external actor(s) 
(Salehyan et al 2011: 710). Another consequence of external intervention in domestic conflict 
is that when the conflict is protracted, most state resources may have to be committed to the 
conflict and an impoverished state could emerge from the war. The risk involved in this 
scenario is that the intervener is forced by circumstances to continue its involvement by way 
of assisting financially (and even militarily) the weakened government as failure to do so may 
lead to the quick collapse of the government, thereby making nonsense of the initial 
involvement. The US involvement in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s was a prime 
example of that.  The Americans went from a few advisers to dozens of specialist forces.  
Within a few years, however, the Americans committed huge amounts of resources in terms 
of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of troops to the cause. By 1969, American troop 
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commitment in Vietnam eclipsed half a million soldiers at about 550,000 troops. By the time 
the US pulled its forces (in defeat) due to the unwillingness of Americans to sustain the war, 
more than 58,000 Americans had perished in the war with much more wounded, and over 
200 billion dollars spent. 
 
An intervener may find itself in a situation where it may need to continue backing the weak 
state militarily against future revolts or insurgencies that seek to exploit its weakness after the 
initial war has ended. Abandonment of a weak ally after assisting such ally to win a civil 
conflict may result in the government becoming despotic, repressing opposition, and creating 
a situation in which the opposition rallies to overthrow the government. This kind of fallout 
casts the intervener in the role of an enemy and its interests may be compromised by the new 
government. The US’ experience in Iran is a clear example. Following the 1953 coup, which 
US intelligence was accused of masterminding, that sacked the democratically elected 
Mohammed Mossadegh, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was literally installed by the US as the 
Shah of Iran. The serious structural weaknesses inherent in the Shah’s government drove it to 
become highly repressive in an attempt to hold on to power. Coupled with growing poverty 
and high levels of corruption among the ruling elite, this triggered a popular uprising that 
eventually overthrew the Shah in 1978. Massive US weaponry and logistics support could not 
stop the revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The Shah was overthrown and US embassy 
officials in Tehran were taken hostage. Tehran has maintained an anti US stance that has 
continued since then to threaten US interests in the region and beyond (Hironaka 2005: 147; 
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Chapter Six 




This chapter provides a descriptive presentation of the responses to the interview questions 
which were administered in the field. It focuses on the four major external actors (the 
Quartet) in Somalia under investigation: the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the International Jihadi 
Network. While a number of top career diplomats of the three state actors availed themselves 
for interview, it was only possible to access a senior level representative of the International 
Islamist Network whose interview was held on 15 May 2012. The US was represented by a 
very senior official on Somalia whose office is located in the US Embassy in Kenya. This 
interview was held on 8 May 2012. Very high-ranking Ethiopian Official in the Ethiopian 
Embassy in Kenya was also interviewed on 10 May 2012 while the interview of a High-
Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya was held on 11 May 2012.  
 
In this section, the feedback from the actors under study and other respondents is used to 
assess the influence and role of Al-Qaeda. The presentation is made in terms of the themes 
covered in the interviews. The actors’ perceptions are presented not only from their own 
perspective, but also from the perspective of the other actors, the Somali government, 
Somalis living in the Diaspora, academics, diplomats, NGOs, and fieldworkers inside 
Somalia. The discussion then moves to the self-assessment of the target actors’ interests and 
roles in the Somali conflict, juxtaposing these perceptions with those of other target actors 
and the selected respondents. To further validate the findings of the structured interviews, the 
researcher employs the focus group discussions research tool. The two focus groups of 10 
and 8 respectively were randomly selected among different categories of Somalis that the 
researcher considered relevant. The group of 10 participants were selected from the Mayfair 
district of Johannesburg in South Africa. This Johannesburg group was made up of four (4) 
members of the leadership of the Association of Somalis in South Africa (ASSA, LASSA1-
4), 2 former clan elders in Somalia (FCESA 1&2), 2 women who worked under Siad Barre 
and saw the conflict up to 2001 (SWSA 1&2) and 2 former militia fighters FMFSA 1&2). 
The second group was composed of eight (8) participants randomly drawn from the Somali 
refugees in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Five (5) were members of the Somali camp 
leadership (SCLK 1-5) and three (3) were former militia fighters (FMFK 1-3). For the 
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purpose of presentation of the data from the focus group discussions, the two groups were 
merged as the same set of discussion questions was used in their separate interactions. In this 
way, this will enable us to gain an informed opinion of the interests and roles of the actors 
under study. Also, it is hoped that the role of actor perspectives in shaping the Somali war 
will become clearer. 
     
6.1 The external actors’ perceptions of their interests 
This section presents the self-perceptions and assessment of each of the three state actors (of 
the quartet) under study – the US, Ethiopia and Eritrea – of their interests and roles in 
Somalia and in the conflict. These positions are as presented by career diplomats from the 
three states. Every effort is made to present these perceptions accurately. 
 
6.1.1 The United States 
The United States sees itself as an actor in Somalia. It identifies its interests in the country as 
humanitarian development and providing essential skills and ensuring internal security to 
help stabilize a country which has been in conflict for more than 20 years. The driver of this 
interest is the observation by the US that Al-Qaeda is furthering the Somali conflict. In 
pursuit of these interests, the US is the largest provider of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. 
It has also provided developmental assistance, including technological and administrative 
support. Importantly, the US is also involved at the diplomatic level in trying to find a 
regional solution to the ongoing conflict in the country. The US government recognizes that 
there is need for regional solution to the conflict involving not only Somalia’s neighbours, 
but also Somalia itself. Therefore, its effort is focussed on supporting regional efforts to find 
a practical solution to the conflict and assisting the stabilization of Somalia. This includes 
security support through the African Union Mission to the Somali Army to stabilize their 
national border.     
   
6.1.2 Ethiopia  
Ethiopia makes no pretences concerning its interests and role in Somalia, including the long 
border it shares with its neighbour. At approximately 1,600km, this is Somalia’s longest 
border with any other country.  Also of significance is the fact that the number of Somali 
Ogaden living in Ethiopia is almost equal to half Somalia’s current population.  Therefore, 
“Whatever is happening there [in Somalia], has got a direct impact here [in Ethiopia]” (High-
Ranking Ethiopian Official in Kenya:  2012). Ethiopia defines it interests in terms of national 
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security, recounting the wars it has fought with Somalia, and the latter’s 1964 and 1978 
invasions of Ethiopia. The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 compounded Ethiopia’s 
problems. For more than 22 years, there has been no effective Somalian government to 
address security concerns between the two countries and in the region. Therefore, Ethiopia 
defines its involvement in the Somali conflict as motivated by the need to bring Somalia back 
to statehood. It is pushing for a Somalian government that will be friendly and open to 
address Ethiopia’s security concerns as well as those of other neighbours. Ethiopia has 
supported the fight against the radical Islamists over the years (currently the Al-Shabaab) as it 
desires an approachable government in Mogadishu, thereby safeguarding itself from 
irredentist conflict and the escalation of internal insurgency.   
  
6.1.3 Eritrea  
The High-Ranking Eritrea official in Kenya (2012) stated that the country is not involved in 
Somalia other than as a member of the IGAD; it attends scheduled meetings where issues 
relating to Somalia are discussed. Eritrea insists that it simply desires the resuscitation of a 
united, truly independent Somali state. It denied any meddling in Somalia whatsoever.  
 
6.1.4 International Islamist Network 
The International Islamist Network does not deny involvement in Somalia. The al-Qaeda sees 
its role in Somalia as a mandate to protect a Moslem state from the onslaught of the West 
repented by the US and its local allies in the region with special focus on Ethiopia. It believes 
that a strong US presence in Somalia would undercut its intended influence in the Horn of 
Africa and East Africa. Al-Qaeda is, therefore, committed to the emergence of a strict Islamic 
state in Somalia that will guarantee the protection of Islam from the “corrupt western 
practices” (Islamist Contact 2012). 
 
6.2 The Quartet as they see one another 
This section reports on the responses of each of the actors regarding their perceptions of one 
another’s interests and roles.  The aim is to expose contrasts and possible mistrust between 
and among these actors in order to shed some light on their policy issues, conflicting 
interests, and roles in the Somali conflict.  
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6.2.1 United States 
Ethiopia sees the US’ interest in Somalia as that of safeguarding its national security and the 
security of its citizens around the world against terrorist attacks. It agrees that US 
involvement in the conflict in Somalia is part of its broader Global War on Terror, part of 
which is to hunt down terrorists who are poised to harm the US, wherever they may be. In 
this regard the US is also believed to be interested in the stability of Somalia as this would 
reduce the opportunity for terrorists to be trained or sheltered in that country. The US is 
identifying and hunting down al-Qaeda elements hiding in Somalia. 
 
For its part, Eritrea feels that the US is protecting its economic interest in Somalia. It argues 
that US’ physical presence in the country, specifically in Puntland, is informed by the 
availability of minerals such as uranium. It argues that the US uses other African countries to 
advance its interests in Somalia. The High-Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya (2012) stated 
that, “If they are going to attack any African country, they will not send their personnel; they 
use other African countries to do their dirty jobs. That is what is happening in Somalia”. This 
statement is based on the US’ direct intervention in Somalia in 1993, which cost the lives of 
some of its marines. Eritrea concludes that the US government is using Ethiopia to do certain 
dirty jobs inside Somalia. The International Islamist Network sees the interest of the US in 
Somalia as part of the United States’ global agenda of destroying Islam. It believes that the 
US wants to have a foothold in Somalia in order to use such presence to advance its anti-
Islam agenda in the Horn of Africa and East Africa.   
  
6.2.2 Ethiopia  
Eritrea regards Ethiopia as the major external actor in Somalia. According to Eritrea, 
Ethiopia’s interference in the Somali conflict is motivated by purely selfish reasons. This 
assertion was justified with the argument that Somalia and Ethiopia have been enemies for 
the past century due to issues related to their common border. They have fought two notable 
interstate wars. According to a High-Ranking Eritrean official in Kenya (interviewed May 
2012), Ethiopia does not want to see a united Somalia as this would threaten Ethiopia and its 
interests in the region.  Furthermore, they [the Ethiopians] believe that a country at war 
within will find it difficult to pursue conflict with an external enemy. For this reason, 
Ethiopia adopts all possible manoeuvres to ensure that the conflict in Somalia continues, even 
stationing its military forces inside Somalia to maintain a weak administration while the 
conflict continues.  
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The Islamists sees Ethiopia as a crony of the US in the region. The Islamists argue that 
Ethiopia is being used by the US to accomplish its goal of destroying Islam. The Islamists 
further argued that a key Ethiopian interest in Somalia is to see the emergence of a 
government in Somalia which is controlled by “infidels who they can order about” (Islamist 
Contact 2012). He cited many instances where governments established to run the affairs of 
Somalia since the state collapse have been sabotaged by Ethiopia in preference to alternative 
arrangements with some individuals who are not “true Moslems” (Islamist Contact 2012).  
 
The US sees Ethiopia as an important actor in Somali conflict. It justifies Ethiopian 
involvement in the conflict as a Somali neighbour who has a lot at stake in the developments 
in Somalia. It observes that the two countries had not been best of friends even before the 
conflict in Somalia and the eventual state collapse. The US believes that Ethiopia is justified 
to take actions to defend itself against the many cross border attacks by Islamists and the 
domestication of insurgency influenced by the presence of al-Qaeda operatives inside 
Somalia.  
 
6.2.3 Eritrea  
Ethiopia feels that Eritrea’s involvement in Somalia is sheer meddlesomeness. It insists that 
Eritrea is playing a negative role in the Somali conflict and that Eritrea is intervening in this 
conflict simply to destabilize it. Ethiopia justifies this conclusion by arguing that Eritrea’s 
involvement is completely unwarranted for two reasons. Eritrea does not share borders with 
Somalia; and has no community of Somalis living within its borders. Furthermore, the two 
countries [Eritrea and Somalia] have no kinship ties. Ethiopia also points out that the distance 
between Eritrea and Somalia is more than1, 000 miles [about 1, 600 kilometres]. The High-
Ranking Ethiopian Official in Kenya (May 2012) stated that Eritrea intends to use the conflict 
in Somalia as an opportunity to support attacks on Ethiopia. The ambassador pointed out that 
Eritrea has recently trained militant groups in Eritrea and sent them into Somalia to engage in 
battle. Another High-Ranking Ethiopian official in Kenya (May 2012) argues that Eritrea 
intends to use the conflict in Somalia as an opportunity to support attacks on Ethiopia. The 
official pointed out that Eritrea has recently trained militant groups within its borders and sent 
them into Somalia to engage in battle.  
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For the International Islamist Network, Eritrea is not as involved in the conflict in Somalia as 
Ethiopia. It argues that Eritrea has not been taking sides with any particular actor in the 
conflict. This position is contradicted by a tacit acceptance that Eritrea accommodated a 
minimal number of “Somali fighters when Ethiopian soldiers entered Somalia in 2006 to 
2008” (Islamist Contact 2012).  By contrast the Islamists, the US sees Eritrea as a major actor 
in the Somali conflict. It believes that its key interest in the conflict is the presence of its 
enemy neighbour, Ethiopia, in the conflict.   
 
6.2.4 International Islamist Network (al-Qaeda) 
The US does not hide its interest in the role of Al-Qaeda in Somalia. It argues that it is simply 
in Somalia because of its discovery that Al-Qaeda is establishing itself in the country. The US 
fears that Al-Qaeda is involving itself in the conflict in Somalia to establish a base for its 
terrorist activities against the US. Ethiopia also noted that the international terrorist network 
has long been interested in Somalia and that Al-Qaeda has become a very important actor in 
the conflict in the country. Al-Qaeda’s activities are executed through its local affiliate, the 
al-Shabaab, which arose from the radicalization of the Islamic Courts Union. There is a link 
between Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular, the Maghreb and the Afghanistan Taliban with 
elements in Somalia. The major aim of the International Islamist Network in Somalia is to 
secure a radicalized Islamist enclave like that achieved by the Taliban of Afghanistan. 
Somalia is attractive due to its strategic location; it can easily serve as a drop-in and hideaway 
for Arabian Peninsula and Maghreb Jihadists.  
 
Ethiopia argues that in order to create this foothold in Somalia, the international terrorist 
network is training, arming and physically aligning with the local Jihadists in Somalia, the al-
Shabaab, to take over the government and declare a radical Islamic state. The complete 
integration of the Somali al-Shabaab into the mainstream Al-Qaeda is illustrated by the 
changing of the al-Shabaab flag into Al-Qaeda black in 2006/2007 and its adoption of pan-
Islamism. 
 
In contrast, Eritrea is of the opinion that al-Shabaab’s role in the conflict in Somalia is not 
significant and that they can still be persuaded to drop their tactic of conducting war through 
the use of the imams and clan elders. As a High-Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya (May 
2012) puts it, “This al-Shabaab, they are minority; of course they can put timed bomb here 
and there, but we can stop them; we can convince them using the clans”. 





6.3 The Quartet as they are seen by others 
Having examined the interests of the actors under study from their own and other actors’ 
perspective, the discussion turns to feedback from other independent respondents. We report 
on other respondents’ perceptions in order to present a balanced commentary on each of the 
actors under study.  
 
6.3.1 The United States 
A High-Ranking Somali official on Somalia (May 2012) acknowledged US involvement in 
the Somali conflict. According to him, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 
Somalia sees the US as an ally in the effort to bring about peace and stability in Somalia and 
the region. He added that the US is welcomed by all peace loving Somalis. Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia (May 2013), who is involved in the coordination of IGAD 
Counterterrorism in Somalia, noted that the US’ interests in Somalia include security and 
economic concerns. These include the need to ensure that the environment of the failed state 
of Somalia does not allow al-Qaeda to exploit the situation in its global campaign against the 
West and especially the US. He suggested that this informs US interventions in Somalia, 
including the ill-fated 1993 Operation Restore Hope, the 2006 contractor alliance with the 
warlords and the current drone diplomacy that is on-going. Apart from security interests, he 
pointed to the US’ economic and global influence and interests. He argued that one of the 
reasons for the ongoing US involvement in Somalia was the need to limit the influence of 
other powers like Russia, China and India, who could move in and carve roles for themselves, 
thereby threatening US influence in Somalia and the region at large. This becomes more 
important when one considers that Somalia has oil deposits in commercial quantities.  
 
Somali Diaspora I (2012) argues that Somalia’s strategic position as a result of having the 
longest Indian Ocean coastline and its coastline with the Gulf of Aden as a gateway to the 
Arab states informs the US’ interests in the country. By becoming involved in Somalia, the 
US can protect its strategic military interests in the region and the Arab states as well as 
monitor trade along the coastline. Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) notes that American 
involvement in Somalia takes both direct and indirect forms. In the case of the former, it uses 
direct bombardments, targeting radical elements but sometimes killing and injuring innocent 
community members. A Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012) traced the active 
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involvement of the US in the conflict to its overt intervention in 1993 in pursuit of radical 
elements inside Somalia. In his opinion, the US’ main interest is to restore Somalia to 
normalcy. He stated that the failure of the 1993 invasion was due to inadequate planning and 
its independent execution. The Senior AMISOM Commander (2012) posited that there seems 
to be a synergy between the internal Somali conflict and the US’ counterterrorism initiatives 
that are driving the conflict. He noted that the US has decided to take the war against 
terrorism to wherever terrorists are suspected to be operating rather than wait for them to 
attack its citizens or their homeland; this is the driving interest of the US in the conflict in 
Somalia. 
 
The Somali Diaspora II (2012) insists that the US’ interest dates back to the pre-conflict 
period and has been vital in the politics of Somalia. The Cold War anti-communist buffer 
which the US set up with the Siad Barre regime, the stockpiles of weapons, and the dictatorial 
pursuits of Barre, which drove many into insurgency, cannot be separated from the current 
conflict.  He argued that the current US role in the Somali conflict is a continuation of its 
policy of remaining relevant in Somali matters. Kenyan Senior Academic II (2012) stated 
that, the US’ concern in Somalia is terrorism. The US is known to target territories capable of 
becoming breeding grounds or shelters for terrorists. Somalia is considered a terrorist shelter. 
Thus, the US is seeking to counter not only the activities of radical Islamist elements but also 
the activities of pirates, which threaten international shipping activities and commerce and 
other marine-related activities. Unless checked, Somali piracy has the potential to block 
ocean trade routes on the Indian Ocean off the Somali coast and through the Suez Canal -- the 
gateway to the Arabian Peninsula. Kenyan Senior Academic I (2012) also stated that its War 
on Terror motivates the US to remain involved in the conflict in Somalia.  It has been proven 
that some terrorists have made Somalia their home and are grooming others. Therefore, 
according the High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (2012), the US provides strategic 
support for surveillance and other logistics. 
 
6.3.2 Ethiopia  
The Somali TFG sees Ethiopia’s role in the Somali conflict as that of helping Somalia defeat 
al-Shabaab. A High-Ranking Somali Official to Kenya (May 2012) stated that Ethiopia is 
fighting al-Shabaab extremists inside Somalia on the legal invitation of the Somali 
government and with the approval of the sub-regional organization, the IGAD, the African 
Union; and the UN. He felt that Ethiopia is genuinely interested in Somalia’s stability. On the 
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other hand, Somali Diaspora I (2012) is of the opinion that the conflict in Somalia is being 
exploited by Ethiopia to solve the pressing problem of domestic unemployment. Tens of 
thousands of unemployed Ethiopian youths have been recruited to fight in Somalia; they are 
paid with financial assistance from the US. According to Somali Diaspora I (2012), Ethiopia 
is also playing a regional power game in Somalia, as a stable Somali state is a threat to 
Ethiopia’s dominance in the region due to the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in 
Somalia, and the country’s enormous agricultural (livestock) trade potential and significant 
marine resources. For a High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (May 2012), 
Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia has served to perpetuate the Somali conflict by extending 
its war with Eritrea to that country. A High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in 
Somalia (May 2012) observed that Ethiopia has always had an interest in ensuring that an 
ally is in charge in Mogadishu.  Historically, the quest for the unity of all the Somalis 
scattered in the different countries of the region, including Ethiopia, and the age-long 
agitation of the Ethiopian Ogaden region for self-determination has remained high on the 
Ethiopian security agenda. This has sharpened its response to events in the region in general 
and in Somalia in particular. High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia 
reasoned that in Ethiopia’s assessment, an unfriendly government in Somalia can be used to 
counter the regional balance of power by other unfriendly countries like Eritrea. He observed 
that the pressure from the Ogaden National Liberation Front and other insurgent groups 
outside Ethiopia’s borders that are currently supported by Eritrea will be strengthened by an 
unfriendly government in Somalia. For Ethiopia, security, therefore, means controlling the 
space and the events in that space. High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia 
concluded that this has defined Ethiopia’s direct involvement in the Somali conflict and its 
efforts to establish some form of administrative governance in the country. This explains the 
many instances of Ethiopia’s rejection and scuttling of transitional administrations set up by 
other regional state to help Somalia recover. Elaborating, High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia argued that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) may had been able to 
stabilize Somalia based on the broad support it received, were it not for Ethiopia’s fears that a 
government led by such a radical group could easily mobilize Somalis and support insurgents 
as well as internal dissent in Ethiopia. The case of the first TNG led by President Abdul 
Kasim which was elected in Arta without Ethiopia’s support clearly illustrates the extent to 
which Ethiopia will go to ensure that it is not side-lined in the choice of who administers 
Somalia. Ethiopia frustrated every effort to make that regime function until it fizzled out. 
Somali Diaspora II (May 2012) stated that Ethiopia has always supported an administration 
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in Somalia that will take orders from it no matter how corrupt such persons may be. He 
pointed to Ethiopia’s alliance with the “corrupt, incompetent and discredited” warlords to 
fight and defeat the Islamic Courts. Today, Ethiopia is supporting these corrupt warlords to 
head the Somali government even though it knows that they are not interested in peace and 
stability in the country.  
 
 High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (May 2012) noted that Ethiopia is partly 
motivated by economic interests in its involvement in Somalia.  Ethiopia requires access to 
neighbouring states’ ports and Somalia’s ports lent these services in the past. High-Ranking 
Djiboutian IGAD Representative also pointed to the terrorist attacks which Ethiopia suffered 
in the past. He observed that this firmed Ethiopia’s resolve to prevent any recurrence. While 
Ethiopia is not worried about Islam, High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative argued 
that it sees Islamists as promoting terrorism; hence its role in Somalia fighting against the al-
Shabaab. Furthermore, he argued that the conflict in Somalia has offered Ethiopia and Eritrea 
a further platform to continue their unresolved border war with each supporting the enemy’s 
opponent in the conflict. While noting that Ethiopia has historically had problems with 
Somalia, Senior AMISOM Commander (May 2012) highlighted that it fought a proxy war in 
Somalia with Eritrea especially at the height of the ICU confrontation with the TFG, 
2005/2006. Senior AMISOM Commander observed that while Ethiopia overtly fought on the 
side of the TFG, Eritrea fought covertly on the side of the Islamic Courts Union. Senior 
AMISOM Commander argued that, ever since the battle with the Islamic Courts, there has 
been clear convergence between US’ and Ethiopia’s interests in Somalia, driven primarily by 
counterterrorism initiatives against the possibility of Somalia sliding irretrievably into a 
terrorist hub. 
 
The High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (May 2012) explained that Ethiopia’s overt 
intervention in Somali conflict is informed by its survival instinct, arguing that no state would  
allow the growth of a lawless environment in a neighbour due to economic and security 
implications. As Somalia steadily became an enclave of lawlessness, Ethiopia had to act fast 
and decisively to avoid the contagion effect. The Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) argued 
that Ethiopia’s security interest in the Somali conflict is multidimensional. He is of the 
opinion that apart from the fear of having a hostile state neighbour in the event of the 
emergence of an unfriendly government in Somalia, the continued conflict exposes Ethiopia 
to the internal security risks that may result from the influx of refugees, some of whom may 
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be used to destabilize Ethiopia internally. This interest and the general regional security 
architecture was part of Ethiopia’s calculation in becoming involved in the Somali conflict. 
Ethiopia has since insisted on being part of any arrangement on who forms the government in 
Somalia. The Senior Kenyan Academic I (May 2012) refers to Ethiopia as a “forceful 
neighbour” with clear and historical interests in the Somali conflict. According to him, these 
include a longstanding conflict relationship, a common border and a common community.  
Stating that Ethiopia had been a very visible actor in the conflict for the past seven years or 
so, he reasoned that Ethiopia had to play a decisive role in Somalia affairs in order to protect 
its own territory. This has manifested in Ethiopia’s insistence on being involved in processes 
geared at shaping a stable polity in Somalia as well as determining who leads the country. 
 
6.3.3 Eritrea  
A High-Ranking Somali Official in Kenya (May 2012) stated that Eritrea is involved in the 
Somali conflict in a “negative way”. He claimed that Eritrea is supporting fundamentalist 
organizations in the conflict. He referred to the UN sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2008 for 
supporting the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab and other militia in the Somali conflict. Somali 
Diaspora I (2012) stated that Eritrea and Somalia had been on good terms for a long time. He 
argued that Eritrea’s involvement is due to its interest in stability in Somalia. From Eritrea’s 
perspective, Ethiopia is a common enemy of both Eritrea and Somalia. Somali Diaspora I 
recalled the role Siad Barre’s regime played in Eritrea’s war of independence with Ethiopia 
and the subsequent border dispute. Eritrea thus feels obligated to support Somalis to defeat 
Ethiopia that has invaded and occupied Somalia. The High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia (May 2012) argued that the reasons for Eretria’s involvement in 
Somali conflict are obvious. Eritrea is indirectly engaging in a war with Ethiopia by getting 
involved in Somalia. He observed that, having lost in the border war to Ethiopia, Eretria sees 
an opportunity in the Somali conflict to continue the war on new ground. He reasoned that 
this explains Eritrea’s support for factions that are opposed to Ethiopia, including the al-
Shabaab Islamist group. Furthermore, the High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in 
Somalia observed that Eritrea’s involvement became clearer from 2006 when Ethiopia 
directly intervened to flush out the Islamic Courts Union; the latter has remained inside 
Somali to continue fighting the al-Shabaab Islamists for control of Somalia. The High-
Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (May 2012) suggested that Eritrea’s involvement 
in the Somali conflict is an extension of the historical rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
following the latter’s struggle for independence from the former. He argued that Eritrea 
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entered the conflict to whittle down Ethiopia’s influence in the region by aligning itself with 
Ethiopia’s enemies. Senior AMISOM Commander (May 2012) concurred with this point of 
view and argued that Eritrea was drawn into the conflict because an enemy state, Ethiopia, is 
directly involved in the conflict. He emphasized that Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict was 
heightened during the Islamic Courts Union’s open confrontation with Ethiopia inside 
Somali.  
 
While the High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (May 2012) noted that Eritrea has denied 
that it supports the militant al-Shabaab, he argued that, considering its relationship with 
Ethiopia, it is highly probable that Eritrea is committed to the conflict as a proxy war with 
Ethiopia. While the territorial disagreement persists, Eritrea is still technically at war with 
Ethiopia, and has therefore become involved to settle scores with Ethiopia. The Director of 
the Institute of Diplomacy at the University of Nairobi agreed that Eritrea’s interest in the 
conflict should be understood in terms of its relationship with Ethiopia and boils down to 
“whomever can make Ethiopia unhappy is my friend”.  The Senior Kenyan Academic II 
(May 2012) argued that Eritrea’s support for al-Shabaab undermines the possibility of 
achieving a peaceful settlement in Somalia. He noted that Eritrea is providing bases and 
logistics for the regrouping of the radical elements that were defeated in Somalia, but have 
launched a comeback against the TFG which is supported by Ethiopia. 
 
6.3.4 International Islamist Network (al-Qaeda) 
The High-Ranking Somali Official to Kenya (May 2012) stated that foreign fighters and the 
local Islamist fundamentalist group, al-Shabaab are jointly fighting inside Somalia. He 
argued that al-Shabaab leaders’ speeches, its mode of operation and assertions made by al-
Qaeda’s top leadership show that al-Shabaab is part of the global Islamist network operating 
in Somalia. Extremist Islamists want to impose strict Islamic rule in Somalia and use Somalia 
as a stepping stone to the entire Horn of Africa and East Africa. The High-Ranking Official 
argued that the foreign fighters and al-Shabaab inside Somalia have tried unsuccessfully to 
take power in the country by taking advantage of the vacuum created by the struggle between 
the warlords and the elite over who heads the government since 1999. However, Somali 
Diaspora I (May 2012) argued that al-Qaeda’s only interest in Somalia is as a safe passage 
and hiding place. He cited the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 when al-Ittihad was 
a radical group inside Somalia, to buttress his argument. He insisted that al-Shabaab is a 
creation of the West; it would be difficult to convince any Somali that there is a jihad taking 
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place inside Somalia. He was of the opinion that al-Shabaab links to al-Qaeda are 
questionable despite new al-Qaeda leader, Al Zwahiri’s statement that al- Shabaab is a wing 
of al-Qaeda in Somalia. He argued that Faisal Abdul, a wanted al-Qaeda terrorist who was 
killed in a US air attack in Mogadishu and other al-Qaeda members sought refuge in Somalia 
because there is no functioning government, but they did not interfere in the Somali conflict. 
Somali Diaspora I said that al-Shabaab’s role in Somalia is detrimental to peace because they 
kill fellow Somalis instead of targeting those they believe to be their enemies, Ethiopia and 
the West. He further argued that al-Shabaab has made the resolution of the conflict very 
difficult as it has refused to allow other Somalis a stake in efforts to reach a constitutional 
arrangement that will embrace all citizens. For High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative 
(May 2012), the Somali environment simply provides al-Qaeda with a safe haven. 
  
In terms of the International Jihad Network as an actor in the Somali conflict, High-Ranking 
Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (May 2012) argued that al-Qaeda’s presence 
predated the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Dar es Salaam which al-Qaeda 
basically organized from Somalia. He noted that “training was done in Somalia, weapons 
were procured trough Somalia, and everything was done through Somalia”. He stated that 
this was also the case with the 2003 attack in Kenya. According to the High-Ranking Kenyan 
IGAD Representative in Somalia, al-Qaeda’s involvement in the Somali conflict has 
manifested in its use of Somalia as a base, sending in jihadists, training local Somali Islamist 
elements, and providing arms and funding. Turning to al-Qaeda’s interests in Somalia, the 
High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia stated that al-Qaeda wants to create 
a new base outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. Somalia’s position along the coast and close to 
al-Qaeda hubs in Yemen and Maghreb make the country very attractive. The High-Ranking 
Djiboutian IGAD Representative (May 2012) observed that the International Islamist 
Network is a factor in the conflict. Apart from fighting alongside the Somali al-Shabaab 
Islamist group, it has played an active role in training and sensitising the indigenous Somali 
people on how to take up arms and join the conflict. In terms of the Network’s interest in 
Somalia, the High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative was of the opinion that it is 
driven by Islamist expansionism even if this comes about through violent activities. The 
Senior AMISOM Commander (May 2012) observed that al-Qaeda is an active participant in 
the conflict in Somalia. He noted that the Somali jihadists, like many other jihadists globally, 
have drawn inspiration from events in Afghanistan. Indeed, some of the Somali jihadists 
presently operating as members of al-Shabaab were mujahedeen in Afghanistan. The Senior 
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AMISOM Commander contended that al-Qaeda’s role began with the radicalization and 
motivation of local Islamists to establish a foothold. Thereafter, al-Qaeda formally announced 
its alliance with al-Shabaab. The Senior AMISOM Commander argued that proof of al-
Qaeda’s long involvement in the Somali conflict lies in the fact that since al-Shabaab’s 
emergence from the Islamic Courts Union, it has insisted that it owes its inspiration and 
allegiance to al-Qaeda. He concluded that al-Qaeda has trained al-Shabaab to propagate jihad 
and Islamist Agimrating with al-Shabaab. He maintained that al-Qaeda is not simply an actor, 
but a major actor. In his opinion, the International Islamist Network seeks to convert Somalia 
into an Islamic state with the strictest form of Islamic law.  
 
The Somali Diaspora II (May 2013) stated that it is well-known in Somalia that foreign 
Islamists support the Somali Islamist fighters. They provide weapons and also participate in 
the conflict. He argued that their interest is the furtherance of the terror network by 
establishing a strong base in Somalia. The Senior Kenyan Academic II (May 2012) argued 
that al-Shabaab’s methods and modus operandus show that it has very close affinity with al-
Qaeda, earlier denials to this effect notwithstanding. The tracking down and killing of an al-
Qaeda leader inside Somalia points to the fact that foreign jihadi elements are fighting 
alongside al-Shabaab. On al-Qaeda’s interest in Somalia, the Senior Kenyan Academic II 
suggested that the group simply wants to take advantage of the vacuum created by the 
protracted conflict in Somalia to establish a foothold in the region. He argued that having 
used Somalia to successfully lunch terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and again 
in Kenya in 2002, al-Qaeda values Somali terrain and decided to set up a base in the country. 
This explains its radicalizing activities and participation in the conflict. The Senior Kenyan 
Academic I (May 2012) observed that al-Qaeda views Somalia as a safe haven because it is a 
lawless state and is provides strategic links with the Middle East.  
 
Table 6.1 Focus Groups responses on the two discussion questions of the involvement 




Response to discussion questions 
 Are the United 
States, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and al-Qaeda 
major actors in 
Somali conflict? 





 United States and 
Ethiopia are the 
major actors in 
 The US is in Somalia for economic interest. It 
has come to Somalia because of oil which is 
discovered in Somalia. They are also 






 Eritrea is only 
marginally involved 
because of the 
presence of Ethiopia. 
 al-Qaeda is not 
involved in Somalia. 
al-Shabaab is not al-
Qaeda 
 
interested in the fish that is obtained in very 
large quantity in the Somali coast. 
 Ethiopia has been an enemy of the Somali 
people. It has been deeply involved in the 
conflict with the interest of keeping Somalia 
in war for as long as possible. Ethiopia wants 
to keep Somalia permanently divided. 
 Eritrea’s interest in the Somali conflict is to 
help Somalia against enemy Ethiopia. 
 The Islamists are conscious that Somalia is 
an Islamic country and they want to 
maintain Islam against America and Ethiopia 





 The United States, 
Ethiopia, and Eritrea 
are major actors in 
the Somali conflict. 
There are radical 
Islamists involved in 
Somali conflict, but 
the al-Qaeda is not 
there. 
 American interest in Somalia is both 
economic and security. America is interested 
in the oil discovered in the Puntland region 
of Somalia and the fish in the ocean. It is also 
interested in controlling the Somalia 
because it is a gate to east Africa where 
America has interest in tourism. 
 Ethiopia’s interest in Somali conflict is to 
keep Somalia in perpetual disunity or at 
worst outcome, make sure that it is involved 
in the decision on who governs Somalia. 
Ethiopia is afraid of losing the Somali 
Ogaden region which it has continued to 
claim as part of Ethiopia.  
 Eritrea is in the Somali conflict because of 
the involvement of its enemy, Ethiopia. Its 
interest is to frustrate Ethiopia’s plans of 
determining what happens in the region.  
 -Radical Islamists are involved in the conflict 
in Somalia and not al-Qaeda. They want to 





 US, Ethiopia, Eritrea 
and the International 
Islamic Jihad or al-
Qaeda are all 
involved in the war 
in Somalia. 
 The interest of the US in Somalia conflict has 
been the strategic location of Somalia. If it 
has a foothold in Somalia, it is sure of both 
the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Strategic 
security seems to be very much in the mind 
of the US. The presence of some radical 
Islamists who are suspected of involvement 
in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. 
 Ethiopia is cautious not to allow the rising of 
a unified and powerful state in Somalia 
which will threaten its claim to the Somali 
Ogaden region in Ethiopia. It also does not 
want a challenge to its claim of a regional 
power. 
 Eritrea’s interest is to spoil whatever that is 
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Ethiopia’s project in Somalia. Eritrea wants a 
government in Somalia that will be 
unfriendly with Ethiopia.  
 The al-Qaeda in Somalia is interested in 
establishing a very radical brand of Islam in 
Somalia. It also wants to use Somalia as a 
gateway to the heart of Africa with the ease 





 United States of 
America, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and the al-
Qaeda are all fully 
involved in the 
conflict as major 
actors.  
 Apart from Eritrea, 
all the other actors 
have been involved 
in Somalia even 
before the post-Siad 
Barre wars. 
 Somalia is well positioned to guarantee the 
US balanced security in Africa and Gulf 
states. It was suggested that some of the 
terrorists wanted by the US are holed-up 
inside Somalia. 
 Ethiopia’s continued claim to the Ogaden 
region may only be possible with the 
continued conflict in Somalia. a divided 
Somalia cannot begin to fight Ethiopia to 
reclaim the region.  
 Eritrea is in the Somali conflict to fight 
Ethiopia.  
 al-Qaeda involvement in Somali conflict is 
aimed at converting Somalia to a very strict 
Islamic state. It is also interested in the 






 The US is a major 




Network are also 
fully involved in the 
conflict. 
 The United States is interested in the 
positioning of Somalia along the Indian 
ocean and at the mouth of the 
Mediterranean Sea which leads into the 
Middle East where the US has a lot of 
economic and military investments. America 
also fears the development of a terrorist hub 
inside Somalis which will threaten its 
interests in East Africa.  
 Ethiopia does not want Somalia to settle in 
peace so that Ethiopia will continue to keep 
the Somali Ogaden region inside Ethiopia. It 
wants to maintain its position as the regional 
power, a position that can be threatened by 
a thriving Somali state with its size and 
population. 
 Eritrea’s interest is to disorganize whatever 
Ethiopia’s plan is. It wants to see a very 
strong Somalia that will rival Ethiopia in the 
region and possibly keep Ethiopia in 
constant check. 
 International Islamic Network or al-Qaeda 
wants to foist the extreme brand of Islam on 
Somalia. It also wants to check America’s 
influence in the region.   
Source: The Research 2013 
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6.4 Discussion  
Understanding the interests and roles of the external actors under study is very important in 
determining the drivers of the conflict in Somalia. It is difficult to do so from the self-
assessment of the actors. While Ethiopia declares its interests in clear terms, the US 
emphasizes its humanitarian and social interests and engagements and Eritrea completely 
denies involvement. We discuss each actor in terms of its self-assessment, the assessment of 
the other actors and the feedback from the respondents. 
 
6.4.1 The United States 
The US portrays its security interest in Somalia as though it were secondary. It tries to project 
its humanitarian and development initiatives as its reason for involvement. This infers that the 
plight of the Somalis is the US’ main priority. However, the opposite seems to be true. The 
records of American involvement in Somalia show that US humanitarian assistance has been 
preceded by military involvement, both overt and covert.  
 
The US’ interests in Somalia became securitized with its military misadventure in the country 
in 1992 under the UN’s (UNOSOM I & II) operation. In October 1993, the US attempted to 
hunt down Islamist extremists, including Farah Aideed, a warlord believed to have links with 
al-Qaeda. The assault ended in a humiliating defeat for US forces following the massacre and 
‘exhibition’ of its marines on the streets of Mogadishu. Even though the US pulled out of 
Somalia in 1995, it remained concerned about the activities of the Somali radical Islamist 
organization, al-Ittihaad, that it believes carried out the operation with training and logistical 
support from al-Qaeda (International Crisis Group 2002: 5). 
 
US security concerns over Somalia were heightened by the August 1998 terrorist attacks on 
its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. An intelligence report that found that Somalia served as 
a shield and transit for the attackers rekindled US interest in events in the country. The 
Kenyan and Tanzanian attacks were followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US soil.  Its 
foreign policy thrust became driven by counterterrorism initiatives encapsulated within the 
Global War on Terror project. Africa and the Horn of Africa, with special attention to 
Somalia, feature prominently in the post-9/11 US counterterrorism architecture. Kinfe (2005) 
argues that, “United States policy for Africa since September 2001 has been one of 
supporting security forces and intelligence establishments to hunt down terrorists and 
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eliminate the threat of terrorism”. On 23 September 2001, 12 days after the 9/11 attacks, al-
Itihaad was named an al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia and was therefore designated a terrorist 
organization; its assets were frozen. This was followed by the freezing of the assets of a 
Somali telecom and remittance company, al-Barakaat on suspicion of being used to channel 
funds to terrorists as well as the placement of Hassan Aweys, the former leader of al-Ittihaad, 
on the US’ most wanted list (Quaranto 2008: 36-37; Crisis Group 2005: 9; Menkhaus 2004: 
67). Since then, the US has not relented in its efforts to hunt down wanted terrorists believed 
to be holed-up inside Somalia (Cooke and Henek 2007: 4; Menkhaus 2004: 68). Other US 
activities in Somalia point clearly to the primacy of their security interest in Somalia.  These 
include the establishment of the Combined Joined Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
in Camp Lemonire, Djibouti in 2002, with “lily pads” in Kenya and Uganda to detect, disrupt 
and defeat terrorist groups that operate in the Horn of Africa (Quaranto 2008: 38). The CJTF-
HOA aims to cover the entire “air space and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, 
Djibouti and Ethiopia, in Africa, and Yemen, in the Arabian Peninsula” (Quaranto 2008: 38; 
Ploch 2007: 7).  
 
The US is also alleged to have funded the emergence and activities of the warlords’ alliance, 
the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), with responsibility 
for surveillance and the arrest of those who the US suspected were terrorists inside Somalia 
in 2005. This group’s activities were the primary mobilizing factor for the radical Islamic 
Courts Union in the June 2006 battle and capture of Mogadishu. The US also overtly 
supported Ethiopian military involvement in Somalia, including the 2006 full military 
operation inside Somalia at the invitation of the TFG against the Islamic Courts Union. In 
consequence, the US has invested hugely in building the security capacity of Somalia’s 
neighbouring states, especially their capacity to combat terrorism and ensure regional security 
(Quaranto 2008: 38; International Crisis Group 2007: 7; Shinn 2004: 41). Washington is also 
hugely involved in the funding of the current African Union military operations in Somalia 
(AMISOM) whose mandate is to dislodge the al-Shabaab Islamists from the country to pave 
the way for a durable peace process (Senior AMISOM Commander 2012). Further proof that 
security is the US’ primary concern is the fact that it has conducted direct airstrikes inside 
Somalia targeting terrorists on its wanted list from the CJTF-HOA Djibouti base. Some of 
these drone strikes have yielded positive results for the US, but have been condemned by the 
Islamists and sometimes sections of Somali society following the alleged killings of innocent 
people, including women and children. 
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While the intention is not to deny that the US is involved in human security initiatives in 
Somalia, its primary interest, as illustrated by its behaviour is security concerns. It was only 
in late 2006 that the US improved on its national strategy to combat terrorism to include 
social dimension, “diminishing or eliminating the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 
exploit” (US Department of State 2006. 1). Notwithstanding US claims, its official 
disposition towards Somalia remains that of “a front line of the war on terror” (Quaranto 
2008:35). The US approaches the local conflict in Somalia from a counterterrorism 
perspective. This may not be out of place, considering the August 1998 attacks on the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the November 2002 attacks on a hotel and airport in 
Mombasa, Kenya. This is particularly so given that all those attacks are strongly believed to 
have been carried out taking advantage of the Somali environment, coupled with the activities 
of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the recent statement by the current al-Qaeda leader, al-Zwahiri 
acknowledging al-Shabaab to be part of the global al-Qaeda network.  
 
6.4.2 Ethiopia  
Ethiopia’s self-assessment of its interests and roles in Somalia align with those of the study 
respondents and many other analysts cited in this study. These interests are based on 
Ethiopia’s national security concerns in terms of the internal and external implications of the 
outcome of Somali conflict.  However, while the primacy of this security imperative seems 
obvious considering the history of the relationship between the countries, Ethiopia’s domestic 
challenges and regional security needs, Ethiopia’s economic interest is equally crucial in its 
stance on the conflict in Somalia. A friendly government in Somalia would no doubt be of 
great economic value to Ethiopia. Ethiopia needs unhindered access to Somali ports to export 
and import goods and services. However, Ethiopia does not acknowledge this crucial factor 
as part of its interest in Somalia.  
 
Eritrea’s argument that Ethiopia desires a continued fragmented Somalia is open to debate 
(High-Ranking Eritrea Official in Kenya 2012). It seems more conceivable that Ethiopia 
would prefer a strong and friendly Somali state to a strong or weak and hostile one. A 
fragmented and lawless Somali environment would most likely overstretch Ethiopia’s 
military and economic capacity and may dispose it to heightened internal dissent. Ethiopia’s 
“hurried” plan to withdraw from Somalia in early 2008 is a sign that it might not want to 
remain physically involved in Somalia longer than is healthy for its domestic wellbeing. A 
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strong and friendly Somali state would seem more acceptable to Ethiopia in dealing with its 
insurgent groups, some of which already operate from Eritrea. At worst, Ethiopia would opt 
for a weak and friendly Somalia (Moller 2009: 21).    
 
6.4.3 Eritrea   
Eritrea argues that it has no interest in Somalia and is not involved in the conflict in that 
country. It insists that its only involvement is through the IGAD to which Somalia also 
belongs, which seeks a solution to the conflict in the country. However, the two other state 
actors, the representative of the transitional government and most other respondents argued 
that Eritrea is directly involved in the conflict. 
 
Ethiopia maintains that Eritrea is involved in the Somali conflict in order to destabilize it. It 
cites Eritrea’s training of the armed groups that are fighting the Transitional Government in 
Somalia as proof. Ethiopia points out that Eritrea shares no border, communities or kinship 
with Somalia, and is more than 1,609 kilometres from the country; therefore, it should not be 
involved (High-Ranking Ethiopian Official in Kenya 2012).  The representative of the TFG 
in Somalia referred to Eritrea’s involvement in Somali conflict as negative as it supports 
“groups of fundamentalist organizations” with connections to al-Qaeda such as al-Shabaab 
(High-Ranking Somali Official in Kenya: 2012). The President of the Somali Association in 
South Africa, Somali Diaspora I (2012) agreed that Eritrea is involved in the conflict. 
However, he came to Eritrea’s defence, arguing that it seeks to help stabilize Somalia. 
Ethiopia is a common enemy to Eritrea and Somalia, and Eritrea is engaged in Somalia to 
help “defeat Ethiopia that has invaded and occupied Somalia under pretext” (Somali Diaspora 
I 2012).  
 
Most of the other respondents, the High-Ranking Ethiopian Official, the High-Ranking 
Djiboutian IGAD Representative, High-Ranking Somali official in Kenya and the Senior 
AMISOM Commander,  agreed that Eritrea is engaged in a proxy war in Somalia. The High-
Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) stated that Eritrea’s sole reason for 
becoming involved in the Somali conflict is to fight Ethiopia as another phase of the border 
war.  He argued that Eritrea’s war tactic is support for all opposition to Ethiopia, including al-
Shabaab. The High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012) concurred and argued 
that Eritrea entered the conflict to counter Ethiopia’s regional influence by aligning itself 
with Ethiopia’s enemies. According to a senior AMISOM Commander (2012), the spectacle 
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of an enemy state, Ethiopia, physically fighting inside Somalia was an invitation to Eritrea to 
enter on the opposite side of the conflict. He drew attention to the fact that Eritrea’s 
involvement became visible when Ethiopia became overtly involved, physically fighting 
inside Somalia against the Islamists. Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012), Senior Kenyan 
Academic I (2012) and a High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (2012) also subscribed to the 
proxy war argument, with the high-ranking US Official on Somalia pointing out that Eritrea 
and Ethiopia are still technically at war.   
    
From the foregoing, it seems that Eritrea’s involvement and interests in the Somali conflict 
are not in doubt in the minds of other observers. It should be noted that the UN indicted and 
sanctioned Eritrea for its role in the conflict (Moller 2009: 22). Furthermore, there is a 
consensus that Eritrea is involved in the conflict because of Ethiopia. In fact, Moller (2009: 
1) argues that it seems to be the “hostile relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia which is 
driving Eritrean behaviour vis-à-vis Somalia” as it really has nothing else at stake in this 
conflict. He maintains firmly that there is no other way to explain Eritrea’s support for the 
Islamist fundamentalists fighting in Somalia when one considers that Eritrea is predominantly 
Christian and is fighting internal Islamist insurgency of its own -- the Eritrean Islamic Jihadi 
Movement (EJIM) (High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia 2012; Moller 
2009: 22). Therefore, the Eritrean involvement in the Somali conflict is aimed primarily at 
proving to Ethiopia that it can muster some influence of its own within the horn region. Its 
involvement is therefore best understood in terms of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. 
 
6.4.4 International Islamist Network 
Al-Qaeda’s interest and role in the Somali conflict has been the subject of debate for some 
time. While it was speculated in the news reports that it was involved, unfolding events and 
statements by al-Qaeda’s top leadership provided concrete evidence of such involvement. 
Suspicions that al-Qaeda had a presence or at least influence in Somalia emerged following 
the ill-fated US mission to arrest Mohammed Farah Aideed in a Mogadishu suburb on 3 
October 1993.  The US suffered a humiliating defeat, losing 18 of its marines in a well-
coordinated counter operation by Aideed’s militia, who not only overpowered and killed the 
marines but also exhibited their dead bodies on the streets of the capital. Al-Qaeda leader, 
Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for the operation. The dexterity and precision of the 
operation also prompted the US to believe that al-Qaeda had a hand in it, possibly in 
collaboration with al-Etihad (AIAI), the radical Islamist organization formed in 1984 under 
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the leadership of Sheikh Aweys. The debate on whether or not al-Qaeda had established itself 
in Somalia continued. The Somali conflict did not receive direct attention between 1995 and 
2005, notwithstanding the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
for which the terrorists were alleged to have used Somalia as a transit and shield, the 11 
September 2001 attack on the US and the 2002 hotel and airport attacks in Mombasa, Kenya.   
 
The threat from al-Qaeda became more prominent with the 2006 sweeping assault launched 
by the Islamic Courts Union in which they defeated the combined forces of the warlords who 
had formed the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT) which the 
US and Ethiopia backed as a domestic counterterrorism initiative. Ethiopia entered the 
conflict following an invitation from the Somali TFG. In the battle against Ethiopia and 
subsequent conflicts, the role of al-Qaeda seemed more convincing following the 
employment of sophisticated guerrilla tactics including suicide bombings which are the 
hallmark of al-Qaeda attacks. Prior to this, al-Qaeda’s role was more by way of training, 
arming and physically aligning with the domestic Jihadists in Somalia. In February 2012, al-
Qaeda’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, put all doubts to rest when he acknowledged al-
Shabaab as an al-Qaeda group: "I give you good news today that will make the faithful happy 




The argument that Somalia, as a failed state, is not attractive to al-Qaeda as it is too open to 
guarantee safety for terrorists may not hold water.  Several reasons have been put forward to 
explain al-Qaeda’s attraction to Somalia and its involvement in the on-going conflict. These 
include strategic, security and ideological interests. It is argued that al-Qaeda has been 
interested in Somalia since the late 1980s during the years of the Islamist al-Ittihad, on the 
verge of the first phase of the current conflict (Ethiopian Ambassador 2012; Moller 2009; 
13). The majority of the respondents agreed that al-Qaeda’s primary interest is to develop a 
terrorist hub in Somalia (High-Ranking Ethiopian Official in Kenya 2012; High-Ranking 
Somali Official in Kenya 2012; High-Ranking US Official on Somalia 2012; High-Ranking 
Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia 2012; High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD 
Representative 2012; High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative 2012; High-Ranking US 
Official on Somalia 2012; Senior Kenyan Academic II 2012: Senior Kenyan Academic I 
                                                          
13
 Brian Ross, Rym Momtaz, and Lee Ferran, “Match Made in Terror: African Jihadi Group Joins Al Qaeda”, ABC 
News, 9 February 2012. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-allied-somali-terror-group-al-
shabaab/story?id=15548647. Accessed 17 March 2015. 
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2012). It wants to create a radicalized Islamist territory similar to the Taliban Afghanistan 
from where it can spread its ideology (Ethiopian Ambassador 2012). Somalia is strategically 
located as it offers a long coastline off the Indian Ocean and is close to the Arabian 
Peninsula. A foothold in Somalia would enable al-Qaeda to complete its triangle between the 
Maghreb in North Africa, the Arab Peninsula (Yemen) and Somalia in the Horn of Africa. An 
al-Qaeda hub in Somalia will also make it easy for the organization to penetrate the deeper 
parts of East and central Africa (High-Ranking Somali Official in Kenya 2012). The use of 
Somalia as a transit and safe-haven for the both the 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks on Kenya 
and Tanzania by al-Qaeda illustrates the role Somalia can play as a terrorist hub.  
 
Somali Diaspora I’s (2012) argument that al-Qaeda’s interests in Somalia lie primarily in the 
fact that Somalia is a transit point and safe-haven, does not appear to be supported by events 
on the ground. In fact, there is evidence that al-Qaeda is operating inside Somalia and is 
involved in the internal conflict. In 2006, after the Islamic Courts Union captured the town of 
Kismayo, the Courts leader, Sheikh Hassan Hersi, was quoted as follows when addressing the 
faithful: “Brothers in Islam, we came from Mogadishu and we have thousands of fighters, 
some are Somalis and others are from the Muslim world. If Christian-led America brought its 
infidels, we now call our Muslim holy fighters to come [and] join us” (Ross, D. and Roggio, 
B 2006). A June 2006 audio tape statement, which declared the war in Somalia a global jihad 
and claimed to be from Osama bin Laden declared: “We will continue, God willing, to fight 
you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan, until we 
waste all your money and kill your men and you return to your country in defeat as we 
defeated you before in Somalia”. Bin Laden also reacted sharply to the UN plan for an 
African Union Peacekeeping Mission in July 2006: “We warn all the countries in the world 
from accepting a US proposal to send international forces to Somalia. We swear to God that 
we will fight their soldiers in Somalia and we reserve the right to punish them on their lands 
and every accessible place at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner” (Ross and 
Roggio 2006: i.d).  
 
Furthermore, a 1 July 2006 web message, also ascribed to bin Laden not only declared al-
Qaeda’s readiness to fight “in defence of Somalia” but also called on all Somalis to “rise to 
the occasion of building Somalia into an Islamic state” (Tadesse 2001: i.d). From 2006, 
Jihadists affiliated to al-Qaeda were believed to have entered Somalia in large numbers from 
countries such as Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran and Turkey, and that they 
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became involved in the conflict (Quaranto 2008: 27; Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 
65; International Crisis Group: 2007: 4; Ross and Roggio 2006).  In the February 2007 Social 
Science Research Council report, Harper noted that al-Shabaab was being adopted across the 
world by radical Islamist organization as “fellow Jihadists”. She drew attention to a January 
2007 internet audio recording by al-Zwahiri in which he called on Muslims to “join Somalis 
in launching ambushes, land mines, raids and suicidal combats against the crusader invading 
Ethiopian forces and to consume them as lions eat their prey” (Harper 2007). As if in 
response to this call, the Somali Islamist-led opposition was formed in Eritrea with the sole 
aim of pushing the Ethiopian troops out of Somalia. A ferocious insurgency period was to 
follow; it is believed that foreign jihadists joined comeback battles and coordinated suicide 
attacks in many regions in south and central Somalia (Osondu 2009:  48; Quaranto 2008: 59; 
International Crisis Group 2007: 4). Earlier in 2002, the US Congressional Research Service 
report to Congress noted the capture of foreign fighters, Afghans, and Arabs inside Somalia 
by the Ethiopian military (Congressional Research Service 2002: 2). The argument that 
foreign Jihadists are involved in the Somali conflict is also supported by a case involving an 
American Muslim convert, Daniel Maldonado, captured by the Kenyan military, who stated 
that he travelled from Egypt to Somalia in December 2006, received training in the use of 
firearms and explosives, and fought on the side of Islamic Courts Union to install an Islamic 
state (New York Times 20 March 2007: 16).  Al-Qaeda, therefore, has multiple interests in the 
Somali conflict, including establishing a foothold in the country, promoting the radical 
Salafist type of Islam, and exploiting Somalia’s strategic location to reach the wider African 
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Chapter Seven 
Internal factors exploited by external actors in the Somali conflict 
 
7.0 Introduction 
External actors’ involvement in internal conflicts is often defined by certain internal factors. 
These factors are very important as other extraneous factors usually hinge around them in 
explaining the dynamics of internal conflicts. Some internal factors can help a state withstand 
the vagaries of external influences, while others are easily manipulated by external actors to 
pursue an independent and/or selfish agenda quite different from the issues being contested 
by the warring domestic parties. This chapter presents the responses from the interviews with 
both the external actors under study and other respondents, including the representative of the 
administration in Somalia and other Somalis on the internal factors which, together with the 
actors’ roles drive the Somali conflict. These are categorized as historical, natural, socio-
economic, political and individual factors.   
7.1 The collapsed state 
A High-Ranking Somali Official in Kenya (2012) argued that the primary internal factor that 
exposes Somalia to competing internal and external interests is the collapse of the Somali 
state, the continued absence of a government that exercises legitimate authority over the 
entire country. In discussing state failure and collapse emphasis is usually on governance and 
economic, legal and social institutions as being of primary importance for a territory to retain 
its “stateness”. Dorff (1999: 63) defined a failed state as that which has lost the “ability to 
perform the basic functions of governance” and that which has lost legitimacy, where 
political institutions cannot execute the “basic functions of legitimate governance. Susan Rice 
(2003) also argues that any state in which the central government is unable to “maintain 
control over its territory and provide basic services to its citizens”, is a failed state (Rice 
2003: 2).  Among Dempsey’s  security characterization of state failure are  “the disintegration 
and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative 
structures responsible for overseeing these forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that 
supports their effective operation” (Dempsey 2006: v).  According to Rotberg (2002: 130) a 
state is said to have failed where the local justice system collapses and security services 
criminalized. Drawing a line between state failure and state collapse, Rorberg argues that the 
state collapse is an “extreme failure” in which the “structure, authority (legitimate power), 
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law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new”  
(Rotberg 2005: 10). Rotberg (2002:1). The state, therefore, can be said to have failed or 
collapsed when it has suffered institutional collapse, giving rise to the break-down of law and 
order, collapse of the rule of law and moderating influence of any sort, even with the territory 
intact such as the case of Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
The High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (2012);  the High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD 
Representative  (2012); the Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012); and the Senior Kenyan 
Academic II (2012) all agreed that the absence of the state renders the Somali territory 
lawless, exposing it to the manipulations of external actors with ulterior motives and making 
genuine peace processes almost impossible. The defeat of President Siad Barre by a coalition 
of warlords led to bitter conflict among the warlords for supremacy and control of the Somali 
state. In course of the war, the Somali state suffered a collapse as none of the warlords 
emerged victorious. The collapse of the state and the attendant disappearance of a functioning 
government give the Somali conflict its peculiar character. There is no authoritative body to 
provide services and control. Basic governance functions can no longer be performed and the 
state has lost its legitimacy (Dorff 1999: 63). Statehood encompasses governance and 
functioning social, economic, and legal institutions (Quaranto 2008: 8). The failure of the 
Somali state has resulted in the “loss of control over the territory” and the inability to provide 
basic services (Rice 2003: 2) to Somalis. The country has experienced the “disintegration and 
criminalization of public security services” (Dempsey 2006: v), and the governance structure, 
legitimate power, law and political order have fallen apart (Rotberg 2005: 10; Rotberg 2002: 
130; Zartman 1995: 1). 
Without a legitimate central government, Somalia degenerated into many entities of what 
Menkhaus (1998: 220) described as “fluid localized polities” each representing the interests 
of the leadership. The different formations include “clan elders, professionals, militia leaders, 
businessmen, traditional Muslim clerics, Islamic fundamentalists and women associations” 
(Menkhaus 1998: 220). These polities became centres of power, with each operating 
independently. The clan spirit was expressed without reservation and the divisions in Somali 
society grew deeper. Lawlessness is a major reason for the conflict. 
The absence of a legitimate government exposes Somalia to the vagaries of external actors. 
The competing domestic actors become pawns in their hands. Just as the internal actors are 
divided, so the external actors line up behind them and the conflict escalates. The role that the 
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sustained flow of weapons into Somalia plays in the conflict cannot be overemphasized. The 
collapse of all security apparatuses exposes the country’s borders and ports to free traffic in 
people and goods, including weapons (Otenyo 2004: 78). The rise of extremist Islamism, 
which has become a major factor in this conflict, can be directly traced to the collapse of state 
social institutions which cater for citizens’ welfare as well as moderate their values. The 
Senior African Union Military Operation in Somalia Commander (2012) argued that:  
The big lesson which needs to be learned in Somalia is that nature does not allow a 
vacuum. There has been a huge vacuum in Somalia for a long time that Osama bin 
Laden capitalized on. Let us not forget that bin Laden was just in the neighbourhood 
in Sudan and working with al-Ittihaad in Somalia. He planted the seeds and they took 
time to grow, and what we have seen today is the fruits, the al-Shabaab, an affiliate of 
al-Qaeda fighting inside Somalia.   
The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union as a legal and social services institution aimed to 
fill the gap in service delivery and to maintain social order. It then transferred its attention to 
security, with Islamists setting up a militia wing and eventual total radicalization. As early as 
2002, the US State Department raised alarm over the absence of the Somali state and the 
danger it posed, especially with regard to security. It observed that, without a central 
government, Somalia “represents a potential breeding ground as well as safe haven for 
terrorist networks”, pointing to the growing influence of al-Ittihaad within Somalia and it 
suspected links with al-Qaeda (US State Department 2002).  The absence of the state not only 
explains Somalia’s descent into anarchy, but the difficulty in reconstituting the state. This is 
due to the fact that the set of values which the state embodies, the pull towards the collective, 
which channels individuals’ perceptions and attitudes towards survival and social cohesion, is 
lost in the absence of the state. A taste of survival in disunity makes reconciliation more 
difficult (High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative: 2012). The lack of central control 
and the enduring militia struggle for control are fertile grounds for externally influenced 
positions by the parties in the conflict. 
7. 2 The colonial legacy 
The High-Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya (2012) and Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012) 
argued that the conflict in Somalia has its roots in the country’s past. They explained that the 
seeds of disunity were planted with the establishment of multiple colonial centres of power 
and governments. With disunity embedded, it has remained a persistent problem that is 
exploited by the various actors in the conflict. Salih and Wohlgemuth (1994:79) maintain that 
“the Somali crisis is rooted in the Somali colonial past and post-colonial mismanagement of 
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state and society”. In the same vein, Laitin and Samatar (1987: 53) state that “many of the 
problems faced by the post-colonial Somali society were set in motion by the peculiar 
character of colonial occupation of Somalia and by the nature of resistance that the 
occupation provoked”.  
Somali’s different colonial “masters” included Britain, France and Italy. Ethiopia also had a 
concession of its own colonial portion of Somalia.  The homogeneity of Somalian society 
was thus dismembered (Laitin and Samatar 1987:53). This has imposed long-lasting and 
negative effects on the political, economic, and social experiences, including the intractability 
of the on-going conflict. While Britain and France operated at the periphery and Italy got 
involved in southern Somaliland, Ethiopia was deep inside Somalia expanding into pasture 
lands and even despoiling, especially the Ogaadeen, Somalis. The French territory eventually 
became Djibouti.  
High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) argued that colonial politics 
in the British and Italian Somalilands was highly divisive, encouraging the perpetuation of 
clannism. High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative points out that, in line with “divide 
and rule” tactics, colonial administrations encouraged the formation of political parties along 
clan lines, especially when such parties would have the capacity to counter the activities of 
pro-independence political organizations. For example, in their desire to regain southern 
Somaliland from British military control in 1948, the Italians supported the Hizbia Digale 
Mirifle (HDM) party to break away from the Somali Youth League (SYL). The HDM then 
organised other smaller, clan-based parties under the auspices of ‘Somali Conference’, and 
disrupted the ‘Four Power Commission’ of 1948 which was in Southern Somalia to ascertain 
the possibility of the withdrawal of the British military administration by 1950. In the 
confrontation that followed, the SYL was pitched against a coalition of HDM and other pro-
Italian clan-based parties together with Italian settlers (Sarmatar 1988: 57).  
British Somaliland (Northern Somalia) and Italian Somaliland (Southern Somalia) forged the 
Somali Republic in July 1960, about one month and two months, respectively after 
independence for the North (British Somaliland) and the South (Italian Somaliland). Southern 
Somalia (Italian Somaliland) gained independence in May 1960 while Northern Somalia 
(British Somaliland) became independent in June 1960. The Somali Republic was the child of 
the elites in both the North and South and was never popular with the majority of northerners; 
in fact, the referendum for unity failed in the North. From the beginning, therefore, the 
104 | P a g e  
 
foundation of independent Somalia exhibited clear weaknesses. The differences in the 
colonial and decolonization experience of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, and the 
hasty unification process of the two predisposed the young state to internal conflict from the 
inception. Both the North and the South suffered serious internal conflicts.  As previously 
noted, the bases for unification were not sorted out properly before it occurred; hence the 
coexistence of different systems, institutions, policies, tax systems and laws, customs and 
even educational systems. 
These differences persisted. The North and the South have never regarded each other as 
belonging to the same dispensation. The conflict is equally the basis of the elites’ struggle for 
power in the Republic. Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012) concludes that the current conflict 
in Somalia exposes the formation of the Somali Republic as a marriage of strange bedfellows. 
He argues that this has been one of the reasons for the difficulty in resolving the conflict, as 
divisions planted during the colonial occupation have refused to fizzle out even with the 
North going its own way. Self-governance and divisibility options for entities within Somalia 
along distinct colonial lines, even in Italian Somaliland, therefore remain on the agenda 
usually thrown on the table in the course of peace processes. Exemplifying this, the current 
Somali Transitional Federal Constitution provides for the formation of federal states on the 
basis of mutual agreement and understanding to forge a unified state. As if in the spirit of the 
new constitution, the Upper Juba, Lower Juba and Gedo territories came together to declare 
the Federal State of Jubaland without the involvement of the government in Mogadishu, and 
allegedly without proper consultation with all domestic stakeholders. It is likely that other 
territories will follow suit. It is feared that the Interim Federal Government may likely lose 
control with each federal state asserting autonomy.   
7. 3 The availability of the unemployed young population 
The large population of young unemployed people inside Somalia has become readily 
available for recruitment and mobilization by the Islamists and warlords who have external 
patrons (High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia: 2012). Seen through this 
prism, the Somali conflict becomes an aggressive action occasioned by frustration, and young 
people become individuals whose goals in life are blocked by social circumstances. The 
situation in Somalia creates a permissive psychological disposition to the conflict. 
Commenting on the terrorist dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, Abraham Kinfe (2005: i. 
d) observes that “poverty, oppression and hopelessness” motivate people to “die with those 
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whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense.” Belonging to either a militia, 
especially those controlled by the warlords, or being a member of the al-Shabaab guarantees 
a young person some authority in the community and access to basic needs through the funds 
that external actors channel into this conflict-ridden society (International Crisis Group 2006: 
14). This contributes significantly in driving the conflict.  
7. 4 The Clan System 
There is a near universal consensus amongst most of the senior officials interviewed that 
another major factor around which Somali politics has revolved since its inception is the clan 
(kinship) social formation. For instance, High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative 
(2012), High-Ranking Commander African Union Monitoring Operation in Somalia (2012), 
High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012), Senior Kenyan Academic II 
(2012), Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012), and the High-Ranking Ethiopian Official in 
Kenya (2012) all argued that strong attachment to lineage is a major factor that has defined 
the conflict in Somalia. From the beginning of the conflict, it has been expressed along clan 
lines. The clan is a traditional system that is not centralised; it evokes an ‘intractable force of 
segmentary lineage identity’ (Lewis 2004:489). This form of identity is very important to the 
Somali as it forms the basis of his/her life and relationships. Laitin and Samatar (1987:30) 
argue that for the Somali, clan identity is more important than ‘national’ identity. The loyalty 
of the Somali is hierarchical, starting with the self; and moving to the immediate family; the 
immediate lineage; the sub-clan; the clan family; and, lastly, the nation. The basis of the clan 
system is segmentation which is both “centripetal and centrifugal” at the same time. While it 
pulls “the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of kinship affinity and cultural solidarity”, the 
system also pitches them against one another in pursuit of clan interests (Laitin and Samatar 
1987: 30). Laitin and Samatar (1987: 34) suggest that conflict is inherent in a system whereby 
two lineages that are “genealogically equidistant” but from the same ancestor are rivals in 
matters that concern only the two, but quickly become allies to challenge another lineage that 
is not from the same ancestor. This presents a society that is so integrated that its members 
regard one another as siblings, cousins, and kin, but that is also so “riven with clannish 
fission and factionalism that political instability is the society’s normative characteristic” 
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 36). This state of affairs guarantees “institutionalized instability” 
(Samatar 1990: 21) in the polity. It is in this light that we can appreciate and assess the extent 
to which this single factor has contributed to the intractable conflict in Somalia. 
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The early foundation of the Somali state exacerbated clannishness. Pre-independence 
political parties were organized along clan identity lines. For example, of the 21 parties that 
contested the 1954 municipal election in the former Italian Somaliland, only the Somali 
Youth League (SYL) tended to have membership from other clans, although it was still seen 
as a Sannaale clan party (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 65). Clans also formed opposition 
alliances; during the 1956 general election in the South, six small clan parties joined together 
to form the Somali Democratic Party (SDP) to enable them to oppose the Sannaale clan, the 
Digil and Rahanwayn clans in the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the Hizbia Digale Mirifle 
(HDM), respectively. In the North, most of the members of the first legislative council of 
1957 were nominated, resulting in the elevation of the “traditional clannish cleavages 
encouraged by the colonial administration” (Samatar 1988:46). He further observed that this 
clannish influence in the legislature outweighed that of the parties, all of which “drew their 
strength from particular clan families and lineage segments” (Samatar 1988: 48).  Attempt to 
build a modern Somali state on the basis of clan convergence have proved destructive as clan 
formation remains a ready tool to galvanize support for political advantage, even in the 
conflict.  The report of the 15 January 1994 International Conference on “Somalia: A State 
and Society in Turmoil” quoted in Salih and Wohlgemuth (1994:79) stated that, “the 
contradictions between the state’s drive towards modernisation and civil society based on 
clan and kinship have not been democratically resolved”. While the battle to overthrow Siad 
Barre involved a coalition of clan groups, the ferocious armed conflict which ensued after the 
fall of Barre became an inter-group and intra-group struggle for control of the government 
machinery. It was this war that eventually led to the collapse of the state when none of the 
groups could take state control (Ahmed and Green 1999: 119). The conflict soon degenerated 
into clan militia struggles, with each clan controlling a section of Somalia. As Lewis (1994: 
231) observes:  
In 1991/92, reactively influenced by the example of the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United 
Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the general 
tendency was for every major Somali clan to form its own militia 
movement. Thus clans were becoming effectively self-governing entities 
throughout the Somali region as they carved out spheres of influence in a 
process which, with the abundance of modern weapons, frequently entailed 
savage battles with a high toll of civilian casualties. 
The severity of the conflict, and the damage and losses inflicted on Somali society, was 
magnified by the factionalization of most of the groups to the levels of sub-clans. Yoh (2003: 
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89) maintains that the chaos that erupted after the defeat of Siad Barre that resulted from the 
struggle for control among clans and sub-clans has persisted and has rendered Somalia 
ungovernable. Indeed, High-Ranking Commander African Union Monitoring Operation in 
Somalia (2012) argued that the clan has remained a major driving force in the conflict, as 
well as a serious divisive factor in attempts to resolve it. He added that the bottom line of clan 
formation is the individual, citing the popular saying in Somalia: “I and my clan against the 
world; I and my brother against the clan; then I against my brother”.  
High-Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya (2012) suggested that clan grandstanding in the 
Somali conflict has enabled external actors to gain easy access. He argued that external actors 
seek to control clans and use them to advance their independent interests. Even the 
humanitarian NGOs operate among clans, distributing food and medicines. Furthermore, the 
Islamic Courts Union began by operating at clan level; they intervened to keep the peace in 
the area. Today, this has grown into the dreaded al-Shabaab. 
 7. 6 Competition for power 
According to Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012), Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012), High-
Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) and High-Ranking Djiboutian 
IGAD Representative (2012) the Somalia state would not have collapsed after the fall of Siad 
Barre but for the selfish struggle for power among the warlords who had hitherto formed an 
alliance to defeat him. According Yoh (2003: 89), the war of attrition among the warlords 
was responsible for the collapse of the Somali state. However, it should be noted that Somalia 
lacked unity and cohesion from the beginning as a result of the competition for power and 
resource control among the different clans. This struggle was the result of the over-
centralization control of power and resources by the government (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33). 
Political elites and groups realized that capturing central political power would automatically 
place them in a position to dispense national resources. This engendered conflict in post-
independence Somalia and beyond. The political elites see the clan as a viable platform to 
gain political control of the state, and thus access to resources. At first, the conflict seemed to 
take the form of a struggle between the northern political elite and their southern 
counterparts, with the north complaining of marginalization following the capture of the 
offices of the president and prime minister as well as control of the majority of parliamentary 
and cabinet positions (Samatar 1988: 62). The clan element injected into this struggle was 
purely to the advantage of the elites, considering that these same elites were quick to break 
the clan base into sub-clan opposition groups and form alliances across clan in pursuit of their 
108 | P a g e  
 
own interests. The immediate post-independence struggle between Sheikh Ali Jamaale and 
President Usmaan, both of whom were from the Hawiye sub-clan of the Daarod clan is an 
example of this struggle for power very early in the life of the republic (Laitin and Samatar 
1987: 73). Jamaale allied with deputies from the Isaaq clan, who were already complaining 
that the president’s Daarood clan was usurping power. Again, the power tussle between 
President Usmaan and the premier, Shermaarke led to the latter being removed by the 
president in 1964 and replaced with Abdirizaaq Haaji Husseen. This exacerbated political 
tension in the polity and led to a stalemate which made it impossible for the new premier, 
Abdirizaaq, to form a government for six months. The power struggle came to a head in 1967 
when the former prime minister, Shermaarke defeated Usmaan in the presidential election. 
President Shermaarke then appointed Mahammad Igaal, a northern Somali politician and a 
strong critic of Usmaan, the former president. Igaal had left the ruling SYL party and the 
cabinet in 1962 to help form the Somali National Congress (SNC) which engaged both the 
Somali Youth League (SYL) and President Usmaan in a running battle (Laitin and Samatar 
1987:74). In the post-Siad Barre conflict, the bitterest battle was also an intra-clan war 
between Mohamed Ali Mahdi and Farah Aideed, both of whom belong to the Hawiye clan. It 
argued that it was the battle between these two actors for control of the state after Barre was 
sacked that brought the Somali state to its knees (Elmi and Barise 2006: 37; Samatar 1988: 
63). 
 
By 1969, when Siad Barre returned to power, Somalia was on the brink of collapse following 
the assassination of the president. Barre’s return staved off or at the very least postponed the 
looming open conflict and provided a semblance of national philosophy, cohesion, and 
direction. However, as time progressed, the Barre administration started to lose the 
confidence of the people and alienate the political class following the government’s gradual 
resort to the promotion of clan interests (Ajulu 2004: 77; WSP 2001: 9; Laitin and Samatar 
1987: 79). Following their alleged marginalization, the political elites went back and 
reorganized their opposition groups. This time, these groups decided to come together to fight 
Siad Barre. The groups/parties that coalesced included the Somalia National Congress (SNC), 
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somalia National Movement (SNM), and 
United Somali Congress (USC) (Adam 1992: 18). The unified opposition was able to defeat 
Siad Barre early in 1991. The fall of Barre was to be followed by internecine conflict among 
the actors as each struggled to take control of the government machinery. High-ranking 
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Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) maintained that while the actors were 
fighting Siad Barre as a coalition, each was busy strategizing how to out-manoeuvre the 
others and gain power. As none of the warring groups was able to take control of the state, it 
collapsed and all governance apparatus has been consumed in the struggle (Vinci 2006: 77; 
Ahmed and Green 1999: 119). Therefore, competition for power and control may be said to 
be responsible for the collapse of the Somali state and has continued to be a major factor in 
the inability to establish a legitimate government in Somalia. High-ranking Djiboutian IGAD 
Representative (2012) concluded that the major problem facing Somalia is that “too many 
powerful Somali actors are interested in occupying the prime leadership position and no one 
wants to be the second in command”. He reasoned that this has made it impossible for any 
individual elected or appointed to office to exercise legitimate control because all the other 
actors continue to challenge his/her legitimacy, using the fault lines of clan and religious 
tendencies as weapons. This has been the experience with the various transitional executives 
and parliaments that emerged over the years in the course of the various peace processes. 
They all collapsed or became non-functional owing to opposition by rival actors. This bitter 
struggle to dominate has thus reduced Somali politics and peace processes to a “zero sum” 
game (Dersso 2009: 9). This point will be revisited during the discussion on the way forward 
in the Somali peace process.   
7. 7 Secessionist agenda 
Somalia remains a deeply divided society. Somali Diaspora I (2012) argued that the 
declaration of independence by Somaliland immediately after Siad Barre was overthrown 
was long in coming. He noted that the northern political elite and indeed the North as a whole 
lost interest in the greater Somalia project following the huge losses it incurred in the national 
presidential and parliamentary elections. He observed that both the presidency and the office 
of the prime minister were won by the South with a very large majority in parliament. In 
support of this argument High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) and 
High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) pointed to the inherent disunity in the 
early Somali independent polity occasioned by colonial divisions and territorial pride in the 
different regions. Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) also observed that the northern Somali 
political elite and the region as a whole consider themselves to be of superior standing, 
having been colonized by Britain that is believed to have better standing in the international 
arena. This he argued, formed the basis on which the northerners rejected the merger of the 
two territories and for the political ambitions of the few northern elite. Even after the merger, 
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the North massively rejected the ratification of a new constitution setting the rules and 
guidelines for the governance of the new republic. In rejecting the constitution with a more 
than 50 percent no vote in the 1961 constitutional referendum, the North argued that the 
document was a southern Somalia product foisted on the North to confer legitimacy on the 
process. They also challenged the “winner-takes-all” majoritarian form of the constitution 
and the sweeping powers it vested in the president, fearing that the South, with their superior 
numbers against the North would not take long to marginalize the North at national level. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, this proved to be the case as the South took control of both the 
executive and parliament. Somali Diaspora I (2012) and High-ranking Djiboutian IGAD 
Representative (2012) argued that after the election which side-lined the northern political 
elites, it became obvious that their commitment to the republic had waned. That may explain 
the speed of the declaration of the independence of the “Republic of Somaliland” 
immediately Siad Barre was defeated. Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012) observed that it was 
“as if the north had been waiting for an opportunity to quit the marriage”.      
While Somaliland’s secession from the republic dealt a crucial blow to the Somalian dream 
of overcoming their challenges, the establishment of the new “republic” complicates the 
already dire situation in (southern) Somalia. While the international community has refused 
to recognize Somaliland as an independent state, since declaring its autonomy, it has 
achieved stability, peaceful elections and transition, as well as remarkable economic growth. 
In the process, it has become obvious to other entities that peace and progress are achievable 
in the context of a self-governing entity. Senior Kenyan Academic I argues that this 
realization as well as clan legitimacy motivated the Puntlanders to declare their autonomy 
from Somaliland not long after the declaration of independence by Somaliland. Since then, 
many entities which make up the Republic of Somalia have expressed the desire for self-
governance. It is on this basis that Jhazbhay (2003:78) argues that the political entity 
“Somalia” was rendered non-existent with the declaration of independence by Somaliland 
and the subsequent autonomy of the Puntland. The self-governance option has remained a 
contentious and polarizing factor among the various actors in Somalia, including the external 
actors and the international community. Attention continues to shift from the consistent failed 
attempt to reconstitute the Somali state to the possibility of supporting the stabilization of the 
various entities who now agree on the terms of Somali state reconstitution. This issue will be 
revisited during the analysis of the various options being canvassed as solutions to the 
intractable Somali conflict.   
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7. 8 Enclave opportunities  
High-ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012) and High-ranking Ugandan IGAD 
Representative (2012) argued that, of all the factors driving the Somali conflict, major 
domestic actors’ opportunities to create enclaves of control play the most significant role. 
After the sacking of Siad Barre by the coalition of warlords in early 1991, the warlords 
engaged one another in a ferocious battle for control of state power. The whole Somalia, 
except the former British Somaliland which immediately declared independence, was 
balkanized into clan territories under the control of warlords and their militias. Each warlord 
exercises territorial jurisdiction within his enclave, setting the rules which govern the 
territory. High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012), Little (2003: 52) and Reno 
(1998: 3) observed that each warlord collects taxes in the territory under his control, and 
employs the services of a pool of poor and unemployed youths, organized into a militia. The 
organized militias are heavily armed and have the responsibility to protect their warlord and 
the enclave against any encroachment by other warlords. They also render security services to 
businesses and NGOs operating within their enclaves at some charge (Little 2003: 151; 
Menkhaus 2000:191). The revenue collected is mainly used to procure weapons. In most 
cases, the warlords have rendered the clan elders inactive, establishing their own structures 
which enable them control the enclaves and collect revenue. It is also important to note that 
in many cases it has been difficult for a single actor to permanently maintain an enclave. 
There are independent militia who are usually engaged for security with pay. Therefore it can 
be argued that there is no legitimate monopoly of power. It is on this note that Quaranto 
(2008: 9) argues that control of an enclave cannot be taken to replace the legitimate exercise 
of a power monopoly. 
High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) argued that because of the huge 
resources, privileges and authority control of a clan enclave offers the warlords, they have an 
interest in sustaining the current stateless dispensation. He added that these warlords can 
unite to fight a common enemy, only to go back to their territory of control in what Little 
(2003: 153) calls a territorial “economy of plunder and violence”. An example of this form of 
alliance is the 2005/2006 coalition of the warlords, the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and 
Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), which fought the common threat posed by the rising popularity 
and the spread of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in the various regions, especially when the 
Courts took control of the capital, Mogadishu, and its surroundings. Once the war ended with 
the defeat of the ICU/al-Shabaab following the involvement of Ethiopian soldiers, each 
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warlord retired to his enclave and most continued to sabotage every attempt to establish a 
government at the centre. This behaviour of these actors can be understood in light of their 
calculation that the establishment of a national government in Mogadishu with the capacity to 
exercise full control over the entire country will threaten their economic base.   
7. 9 Sectarian application of Islam 
High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) argued that even though 
Somalia is known to be a mono-religious nation, the manner in which religion has been used 
in the nation’s politics has contributed a great deal to the conflict. Somalia is one of the few 
countries in Africa that is almost completely Islamic. However, instead of serving as a 
unifying factor, Islam has been one of the major factors driving the conflict. The sectarian 
posturing of adherents has divided the population into extremists and moderates, Salafis and 
Sufis, and the like. High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012), High-Ranking 
Ethiopia Official in Kenya (2012) and High-Ranking Commander African Union Monitoring 
Operation in Somalia (2012) agreed that religion has played a negative role in Somalia. The 
tension between the radical form of Islam and the more moderate brand has existed in 
Somalia for a long time. Somalis are predominantly Muslims of the Sunni sect. While 




 centuries, Islamism became 
very noticeable in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the emergence of the Waxda al-
Shabaab al-Islaami and the Jama’at al-Ahl al-Islaami, both of which were inspired by the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Islamism was already acquiring some prominence in Somalia by 1969 
when Siad Barre took power, halted their spread, removed them from positions of influence 
in the affairs of the state, and secularized and centralized the state. Because the Barre 
administration barred religion in state affairs, Islamism was driven underground. The ousting 
of Siad Barre launched the Islamists back into prominence, having grown considerably 
underground during the years of the Barre administration.  
The International Crisis Group (2006: 9) observes that Muslims in Somalia are “a diverse 
community characterized more by competition and contradiction than cooperation”. Even the 
Somali Islamists cannot be spoken of as one body. As diverse as the Islamic movements are, 
so are Islamist organizations in Somalia. To understand the nature of the impact of Islamists 
in Somalia, it is necessary to understand the Islamic movements which they represent, their 
religious philosophy, traditions, and approach to social issues. This will in turn help us to 
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understand the constant tension that exists among these organizations in their contest for 
political control in Somalia.  
There are five strands of Islamists in Somalia, clustered into three major strands on the basis 
of their inclinations. These three strands have been involved in the evolving Somali conflict. 
They are the Harakaat al-Islah and Majma' 'Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, the Jama'at 
al-Tabligh and the Salafiyya Jadiida, and the Salafi-Jihadists. The second cluster of 
organizations is made up of the likes of Harakaat al-Islah and Majma' 'Ulimadda Islaamka ee 
Soomaaliya.  
The Harakaat al-Islah and the Majma' 'Ulimadda the Islaamka ee Soomaaliya form a group of 
Islamic organizations of notable men drawn from the highest levels of Islamic and secular 
scholars, and businessmen. While the Harakaat al-Islah boasts of a membership drawn from 
internationally acclaimed academics and businessmen such as the then President of 
Mogadishu University, Dr. Ali Sheikh, the organization’s chairman, the Majma' 'Ulimadda 
Islaamka ee Soomaaliya’s membership consists of the cream of respectable Islamic scholars. 
At the early stage of the “marriage” of these organizations, they tended to disagree. The 
Harakaat was regarded as being influenced by the Western imperialism because it emphasizes 
democratic ideals, while the Majma’ is a stronger advocate of the sharia system. However as 
events unfold, the two organizations have forged consensus on the need to situate Islam 
within the framework of the contemporary democratic system  
The next strand is made up of the Jama'at al-Tabligh and the Salafiyya Jadiida. These are 
non-political missionary Islamic organizations. They concentrate on missionary activities and 
conversions as well as recovering backsliders. This strand of organizations is completely 
opposed to political and ideological extremism. The Somalia of their choice remains a broad-
based, responsive, and democratic government which incorporates the Islamic ethos of 
“tolerance, moderation and respect for variations in religious observances” (International 
Crisis Group 2005: 17-18; Boukhar 2006: i. d). It is due to their missionary efforts that 
Sheikh Ali Wajis, a former leader of the most radical jihadi organization in Somalia, al-
Ittihaad, abandoned the organization for the Salafiyya movement where he took up a 
prominent position. Ali Wajis’ newfound passionate posturing against the violent option of 
the al-Ittihaad in favour of the rational application of Islamic rules of warfare and giving due 
consideration to existing social realities was a huge setback to the jihadi movement in 
Somalia (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13-14).  
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The Salafi-Jihadists conclude the list. This strand encompasses radical extremist Islamist 
organizations such as the al-Ittihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), the al-Shabaab and other small 
extremist Islamist organizations. These organizations advocate the adoption of the strictest 
form of sharia law for an Islamic government in Somalia. They pursue a violent, armed 
campaign against the West and all those considered enemies of Islam in Somalia. This group 
hates Ethiopia with passion, seeing it as the regional agent of the West. It has waged war 
against Ethiopia and every Somali is seen as being used by the enemy against Somalia. The 
al-Ittihaad is suspected of having links with al-Qaeda while al-Qaeda has confirmed that al-
Shabaab is its affiliate in Somalia (International Crisis Group 2002: ii; International Crisis 
Group 2005: 16).  
One of the reasons for conflict in the post-Siad Barre era is the different persuasions of the 
Islamic faith; one is either a moderate or an extremist. High-ranking Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia (2012) maintained that although the majority of Somalis are Sufis 
and the extremist jihadi Islamists have not been able to gain much ground in the country, the 
stakes remain high between the Jihadi Islamists and the moderates. This makes it easy for 
external actors to queue behind the internal actors in contest. Since the emergence of the 
Transitional National Government (TNG) at the Arta Conference in 2000 and opposition by 
some warlords, no leadership has emerged without the other side kicking against it with the 
support of powerful external backing. Therefore, even though the overwhelming majority of 
Somalis are Muslims, Islam has been applied in such a sectarian manner that it remains a 
major driving factor in the protracted Somali conflict (International Crisis Group 2006: 9-10). 
This issue will be discussed again when we review how the conflict has mutated over the 
years.   
7. 10 Grievances  
High-Ranking US Official on Somalia (2012) and High-Ranking US Official on Somalia 
(2012) argued that existing local grievances also play a major role in the Somali conflict. 
High-ranking US Official on Somalia (2012) stressed that both in the conflict itself and the 
various past and on-going peace efforts, local actors readily exploit existing domestic 
grievances to advance their personal ambitions. Somali society has been deeply affected by 
both traditional inter-clan and intra-clan contestations. Furthermore, the divergent traditions 
of Britain and Italy, and post-colonial attempts to forge a Somali nation, left Somalis further 
divided. Bitter rivalries, alliances, sell-outs, and marginalization deepened these divisions. 
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The war for supremacy in the post-Barre years also caused significant animosities which have 
contributed to driving the conflict and made reconciliation elusive.  
Table 7.1 Focus Groups responses on the discussion on the internal factors which combine 
with the activities of the external actors to shape and/or drive the conflict   
 
Category of Participants 
Response to discussion questions 
 Are there internal factors which combine with the activities of 
the external actors to shape and/or drive the conflict? 
Leadership of the 
Association of Somalis 
in South Africa 
 The Somali society is not unified so the external actors are able 
to apply divide and rule. The north and south are suspecting 
each other.  
 There are greedy warlords who were ready to work with the 
external actors for pay. 
Former Somali Clan 
Elders 
 The government of Siad Barre side-lined the clan heads who 
represent the people, making it easy for external actors to 
manipulate the internal actors. 
 The greed of the warlords became a loophole which external 
actors manipulate at will. 
 The disagreement between the northern politicians and their 
southern counterparts on how Somalia should be organized 
remained a tool for the manipulation of events in Somalia.  
Somali Women 
formerly in government 
 Northern Somalia never believed in a united Somalia.  
 Some southern politicians are not wise to share power with 
those from the north. –Disagreement among the politicians on 
how to share power leads to fights. 
 
Former Somali Militia 
Fighters 
 Greed and struggle for power have characterized the life of the 
Somali political class. 
 The neglect of Somali traditional institutions like the clan elders 
made the control of the Somali society very difficult. 
 The over-centralization of power at the centre raised its 
competitiveness. 
Somali Camp Leaders in 
Kenya 
 The warlords are struggling for power, using their clan bases. 
 Poverty has rendered most Somalis so hungry that they easily 
fall for enticement. 
 Somali traditional social system was pushed aside. 
 Unemployed young men litter everywhere in Somalia and are 
ready instruments in the hands of the warring parties. 
 The rise of very radical brand of Islam divides the Muslims.  
 The political class is involved in clan politics. 
Source: The Researcher 2013 
 
Somali independence brought together a people who shared no common sense of a nation. 
For a Somali, the clan is his/her primary identity and as such he/she pledges loyalty to the 
clan. The Somali, therefore, prefers to be identified as Hawiye, Dir, Darood, Isaaq, 
Majaretan, etc. Because most Somalis were either pastoralists or small holder farmers, land 
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was greatly valued.  Somali Diaspora II (2012) observed that the 1970s and 1980s land tenure 
laws which took land away from the rural farmers for nationalization and redistribution ended 
up placing this land in the hands of few rich politicians and businesspersons. Local farmers 
not only lost their land, but their cautious confidence in the republic.   
The region of Somaliland or the Isaaq have always seen themselves as not only having been 
denied access to power but opportunities in the Republic of Somalia. They also perceive 
themselves as targets for subjugation in the Republic. This region has not forgotten the 
government programme of the early 1980s in which, in an attempt to weaken or neutralize the 
Isaaq, the Siad Barre administration decided to resettle all the refugees from the ill-fated 
Ogaden war with Ethiopia among the Isaaq. Local farmers’ resistance to further confiscation 
of their land for the refugees resulted in a conflict which eventually engulfed the entire 
country and consumed the state. 
Clearly, the key points raised in the focus groups reflect in general the views articulated by 
experts and the senior officials of the various governments directly or indirectly involved in 
the Somali conflict. For instance, the experts, actors, and observers all agree that the Somalis 
are a people divided not only by their close affinities to their clans but also their regional and 
varied colonial legacies. They also agree that the warlords have posed the greatest problems 
to Somali unity due to their personal greed and desire for power; and that external actors have 
used the huge seams in Somalia to force themselves on the country by using malleable 
internal players in pursuit of their varied interests. In essence, then, all the factors discussed 










The impact of external actors on the dynamics of the Somali conflict  
  
8.0 Introduction 
The Somali conflict is not completely driven by internal factors and not prosecuted entirely 
by internal actors. Significant involvement, interventions, and varying forms of alliances of 
external and internal actors combined to escalate and sustain the conflict at one time or 
another.  Much as the conflict has festered due to domestic factors, including the seeming 
irreconcilable goals of the internal actors, external actors’ activities in pursuit of their 
divergent interests have proved to be a major factor driving the conflict. Our focus in this 
chapter remains the US, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the external state actors while al-Qaeda and 
the International Jihad is the external non-state actor under review. This chapter presents a 
table of the responses from the focus group discussion on how the external actors under 
review fix themselves in the Somali conflict. It then examines the various alliances and 
realignments of internal actors, and the extent of the external actors’ involvement in the 
conflict. It then assesses the extent to which the alliances and counter-alliances among the 
external and internal actors has continued to drive the Somali conflict, transforming it from 
one stage to another. This task depends heavily on the information from the data collected 
from the respondents and the relevant literature. 
 
As Table 8.1 shows, respondents from the focus groups are clear that despite the huge impact 
the internal squabbles have on the Somali conflict, the activities and manoeuvrings of the 
external actors serve not only to feed disorder by working with disparate internal actors but 
also to create conditions that perpetuate the conflict. Members of the focus groups were 
united in their opinions that by targeting parochial interests -- most of which have little (if 
anything) to do with Somalia -- each of the external actors is a contributor to the extension 
and/or perpetuation of the conflict. They do this by picking and working with internal 
partners/warlords who are more consumed by greed and the need to acquire power than they 
are keen to protect the interests of the people of Somalia.  
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Table 8.1 The role of external actors in the Somali conflict 
 
Category of Participants 
Response to discussion questions 
How are the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the al-Qaeda involved in the 
Somali conflict? 
Leadership of 
Association of Somalis 
in South Africa 
 The United States bombs Somalia, gives money to different 
warlords to fight against one another, finances the military 
operations of Ethiopia and other countries activities against 
Somali people.  
 Ethiopia sponsors opposing groups inside Somalia, brings its 
military to occupy and kill Somalis, works against any peace 
process which will bring enduring peace to Somalia.  
 Eritrea is in the Somali conflict because Ethiopia is there. Eritrea 
is not fighting any war in Somalia. 
 The Islamists are defending Islam in Somalia against the US and 
Ethiopia. 
Former Somali Clan 
Elders 
 America has used its army. It continues to use planes to bomb 
settlements it calls terrorist hideouts. America through 
Ethiopia, uses money to buy some greedy warlords to abduct 
some people America calls terrorists inside Somalia. It was the 
US that sponsored Ethiopia’s military invasion and occupation 
of Somalia 2006 to 2009.  
 Ethiopia teams up with some warlords against others. It 
supplies weapons to the groups it supports. Ethiopia 
sometimes endeavours and factionalizes existing groups in 
order to weaken them. It moved its army into Somalia in 2006 
and occupied Somalia until the end of 2009. Ethiopia is 
currently frustrating all efforts to have a working government in 
Somalia by insisting on candidates it supports. 
 Eritrea is in the Somali conflict to check Ethiopia. It usually 
supports any group which opposes Ethiopia. Eritrea, for 
example, opened its borders and accommodated the radical 
Islamist group, al-Shabaab in its 2006 battle with Ethiopian 
army which launched an offensive against them inside Somalia. 
It also assists the Islamists in weapons acquisition both as a 
route and as shield following the UN embargo on the sale of 
arms to warring factions. 
 
Somali Women 
formerly in government 
 The weapons supplied by the US before the conflict started 
were used by the warlords. After the fall of Siad Barre, the US 
directly intervened in the conflict. It uses direct bombing, 
support of warlords, support of Ethiopia’s agenda.  
 Ethiopia sponsors factional Somali warlords. It fights the Islamic 
Courts Union and al-Shabaab directly inside Somalia. Ethiopia 
blocks any settlement proposal of the conflict that seems not to 
favour its interest.  
 Eritrea is simply fighting the Ethiopians inside Somalia. They 
provide bases and training for the enemy of Ethiopia, the 
Islamist al-Shabaab. Eritrea backs Somali factions that are 
opposed to Ethiopia even at the peace talks.  
 The al-Qaeda joined forces with the Somali local Islamists – the 
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Islamic Courts Union/al-Shabaab in the conflict. al-Qaeda 
provides training, arms and funds for the Islamists to prosecute 
the war. It also recruits foreign jihadist from across the globe to 
engage in the conflict. 
Former Somali Militia 
Fighters 
 The US had fought inside Somalia before. Today, it uses 
sophisticated combat aircrafts to bomb targets inside Somalia. 
It also supports Ethiopia in every move Ethiopia makes against 
Somalia by providing funds and other logistics. It sponsors 
warlords inside Somalia to apprehend those it suspects as 
terrorists. 
 Ethiopia is fighting inside Somalia. It sponsors opposing groups 
to continue fighting. It provides them with weapons and trains 
its allies both in Ethiopia and inside Somalia. 
 Eritrea shelters the Islamist and help in securing their supplies 
of weapons from many countries in the Gulf. It helps with the 
training of the newly recruited members of the al-Shabaab 
Islamist fighters. Eritrea opposes all peace processes that 
tended to give advantage to groups supported by Ethiopia. 
 The al-Qaeda is involved in the Somali conflict by mobilizing 
international support from all over the world for the Islamists in 
Somalia. It also conducts recruitment from across the Islamic 
world and training them in the art of insurgency. It also directly 
engages in fighting in Somalia. 
Somali Camp Leaders in 
Kenya 
 The US engages in both overt and covert activities in the 
conflict. It fought with its marines in 1993, has continued to 
bomb targets inside Somalia, uses some warlords against 
targeted individuals and sponsors other countries that fight 
Somalis inside Somalia like Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya.  
 Ethiopia gets involved in cross-border raids, invades and has 
occupied Somalia for more than three years, sponsors 
factionalizations of Somali groups, and works against any peace 
process that does not favour it.  
 Eritrea supports any group that opposes Ethiopia. It provides 
training camps for the al-Shabaab Islamists on retreat from the 
fire-power of the Ethiopians in 2006. It also allows its facilities 
to serve as conduits to supply weapons to the Islamists inside 
Somalia and other groups against Ethiopia.  
 The al-Qaeda mobilizes both human and material support for 
the Somali Islamists – al-Shabaab. It mobilizes, recruits and 
trains jihadists from around the globe to fight alongside the 
Somali Islamists who also receive the same training. Al-Qaeda 
also engages in direct combat in Somalia.    
Source: The Researcher 2013 
 
8.1 Alliances and the transformation of conflict dynamics in Somali 
The major point of departure in the Somali conflict has been the alignment of internal actors 
with external actors. This introduced complexities to the conflict as each external actor had 
its own agenda. The alliances between Somali moderate/conservative internal actors, Ethiopia 
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and the US have remained a counterpoint to the alliance between the radical Islamists inside 
Somalia, Eritrea and the International Islamist Network operating within and outside the 
region. The conflict has been greatly defined by the actions and responses of the external 
actors, whose positions on the conflict tend to dictate the behaviour of their internal allies in 
Somalia. A careful study of each external actor’s engagement with the Somali actors justifies 
this assertion. 
 






Source: The Researcher 2014 
 
 
8.1.1 Ethiopia, alliances and the transformation of the Somali conflict 
Ethiopia’s involvement in Somali affairs dates back to pre-independence Somali history. 
Ethiopia was one of the nations among which the Somali territory was shared for 
colonization. The three others, Britain, France, and Italy, were Europeans. The Ogaden region 
of Somalia, which was Ethiopian colonial territory has remained part of Ethiopia till today 
and is an area that is claimed by most other Somalis as part of the greater Somalia. Ethiopia’s 
1977-1978 Ogaden war with Somalia has greatly shaped its attitude towards Somalia. 
Coupled with the continued irredentist desire for a greater Somalia among many Somalis, this 
has raised the stakes for Ethiopia’s interest in internal events in Somalia (High-Ranking 
Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia 2012; Senior Kenyan Academic II 2012; High-
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Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative  2012). Therefore, Ethiopia made its involvement in 
the conflict in Somalia clear even before the collapse of the Somali state (Senior AMISOM 
Commander 2012). 
 
The formation of the Isaaq-based Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1982, which engaged 
in insurgent activities against the Somali government, received tacit support from Ethiopia 
(Somali Diaspora I 2012). The majority of the insurgents that fled the government reprisal 
attack on the Isaaq clan in 1988 -- following the escalation of the insurgency into a full scale 
war -- were harboured by Ethiopia. According to Somali Diaspora II (2012), Ethiopia offered 
a base for remobilization for the 1989-1991 coalition battle led by the SNM against Siad 
Barre. This eventually led to Barre’s ousting and the state collapse that followed (Bradbury 
and Healy 2010:  10).  
 
Following the fall of Siad Barre and the collapse of the Somali state, Ethiopia tended to 
become more active in dictating the pace and direction of events in Somalia. According to 
Abdul (2012), “the conflict in Somalia would have been long settled if not for the divisive 
selfish interest of Ethiopia”. He argued that Ethiopia uses divide and rule tactics “with the 
backing of the US to keep Somali actors wide apart” to the detriment of peace in Somalia 
(Abdul 2012)
14
. He cited the 1998 backing of Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf in forming the 
Puntland Federal State as a self-governing autonomous region inside Somali in order to 
destabilize the Transitional National Government (TNG) which emerged from the Djibouti 
Conference without Ethiopia’s support. The Bay and Bakool regional administration 
established in 1999 by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was also backed by Ethiopia 
(Abdul 2012; Somali Diaspora I 2012; Bradbury and Healy 2010: 12). According to the 
Eritrean Ambassador (2012), Ethiopia’s scheming continues to accentuate the Somali 
conflict, causing constant shifts and deepening the wounds which, in turn, make resolution 
and reconciliation more difficult.  
 
Indeed, some Somalis blame all of Somalia’s woes, including the collapse of the Somali state 
and the intractable nature of the Somali conflict, on Ethiopia’s traditional conflict with the 
country. Afyare Abdi Elmi (2010: 93) maintains that, “as a consequence of the wars and 
sustained hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Somali state collapsed …” and “several 
                                                          
14
 Abdul is a sympathizer of the Somali Islamists. He is a Somali living in Kenya. For him the solution to Somali 
crisis is for all external actors to leave Somalis alone to solve their problems. 
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Ethiopian-client Somali factions became prominent in Somali politics”. He lists General 
Mohamed Farah Aideed of the United Somali Congress, Abdullahi Yusuf of the SSDF, 
Ahmed Omar Jes of Somali Patriotic Movement, and Abduahman Ahmed Ali of Somali 
National Movement, all of whom controlled certain Somali territories between 1991 and 
1995. Ethiopia’s shifting support for different warlords, especially those seen as destabilisers 
at different stages in the Somali conflict tends to support the general feeling in Somalia that 
Ethiopia’s self-interests have been of paramount importance in its forays into Somalia – not 
the resolution of the conflict. Citing a few examples, Elmi and Barise (2006: 42) observe that: 
 
When Ali Mahdi was chosen to head an interim government in 1992, 
Ethiopia supported his main rival, General Aideed. When Aideed became 
stronger and created his own administration in 1994, Ethiopia supported 
Ali Mahdi and his group. When all Somali groups signed the Cairo 
Accord, Ethiopia recruited Abdullahi Yusuf and Adan Abdullahi Nur. 
When Somalis formed the TNG, Ethiopia organized all the opposition, 
helped them create the SRRC (Somali Restoration and Reconciliation 
Committee) and provided military aid to subvert the TNG.  
 
Elmi (2010: 96) stated that Ethiopia contributed significantly to the collapse of the Somali 
state by either creating or supporting the internal factions that destroyed the state. He added 
that Ethiopia has also perpetuated the Somali conflict by “undermining legitimate peace 
processes and imposing its own solutions on the Somali people” (Elmi 2010: 96). Ethiopia’s 
role in the formation of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, 
(ARPCT) in late 2005, for the purpose of US counterterrorism, and the supervisory role it 
played in the group’s activities, followed the same pattern. This group of warlords was 
formed when the Islamic Courts Union was enjoying its highest popularity among the 
Somalis as a result of the level of security and order it maintained for the first time since the 
state collapsed. The alliance of discredited warlords, tasked to “snatch and grab” all 
suspected local jihadist/terrorists, intensified the conflict. The Islamic Courts Union gained 
popular support from other militia groups and many Somalis and moved very fast to take 
control of 70 percent of southern Somalia, which culminated in the battle for Mogadishu in 
May-June 2006. It also led to the humiliating defeat of the warlords’ alliance, with the 
Islamic Courts Union taking control of Mogadishu (Quaranto 2008: 41; Prendergast and 
Thomas-Jensen 2007: 68).   
 
Another landmark in Ethiopia’s involvement in the Somali conflict, and indeed a watershed 
in the conflict, is Ethiopia’s overt military operations in and occupation of Somalia from 
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2006 – 2009. Following the Courts’ defeat of the ARPCT, the sacking of the TFG in 
Mogadishu and the lightning speed with which the Islamic Courts Union took control of most 
southern Somali regions, the TFG invited the Ethiopian government to help it ward off the 
Islamic Court challenge. Ethiopia wasted no time in amassing its troops and moving to 
directly confront the Courts inside Somalia. High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative 
(2012), Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012), Somali Diaspora I (2012) and Senior AMISOM 
Commander (2012) agreed that Ethiopia’s military involvement inside Somalia can be 
explained in two ways. Firstly,  the TFG, which the Islamic Courts Union’s ascent to power 
threatened, was Ethiopia’s ally. It is on record that the TFG invited Ethiopia to assist 
militarily in dealing with the Islamist threat. Secondly, it was evident from its experience in 
the hands of al-Ittihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) -- a defunct Somali Islamist movement of the late 
1980s to the mid-1990s -- that Ethiopia would do everything in its power to forestall the 
emergence of an Islamist-controlled Somalia.       
 
Ethiopia’s direct intervention in 2006 was not the first time it had conducted overt military 
action inside Somalia since the collapse of the Somali state. It invaded the Gedo region in 
1996 with both air and land assaults in pursuit of the al-Ittihaad. Again in 1999, Ethiopia 
militarily backed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army in their battle against Hussein Aideed’s 
militia in the Bay and Bakool region, leading to the liberation of the city of Baidoa that was 
under siege (Eritrean Ambassador to Kenya 2012; High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia 2012; Somali Diaspora I 2012). Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia 
appears to follow a pattern of balancing power among the opposing factions. Elmi (2010: 95) 
suggests that from 1999, Ethiopia has been in the habit of changing the power balance among 
the Somali fighting groups by sending weapons where its Somali allied groups are strong and 
using direct military intervention where the group it supports is weak and under threat of 
being subdued. As much as they may be justified, Ethiopia’s activities provoked a backlash. 
More than any other event, its engagement in an overt military offensive against the al 
Shabaab, the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, seems to have shaped the 
Somali conflict, throwing it irreversibly into an Islamist insurgency which it is today. 
 
Ethiopia’s presence inside Somalia from 2006-2009 mobilized resistance by Somalis -- 
moderates, radicals, locals, and members of the diaspora -- against external intervention 
and/or military occupation in Somalia. Above all it succeeded in providing a platform for the 
radical Islamists to appeal to Somalis, convincing many to adopt a hard line against Ethiopia. 
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Recruitment became easier and the appeal to the global Islamist network was better received. 
It was at this point that al-Shabaab (the military wing of the ICU) fighters who fled the 
firepower of the Ethiopian army regrouped in Eritrea and forged an alliance with other 
Somali jihadists under the aegis of Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), declaring 
its support for al-Qaeda and its global agenda. The ARS also declared an all-out war on any 
government in Mogadishu which is not based on sharia law.    
  
8.1.2 The US, alliances and the transformation of the Somali conflict  
The US’ involvement in Somalia has always been linked to its interest in counterterrorism. In 
Public Diplomacy Query of 7 February 2002, Walter Kansteiner
15
 described Somalia as a 
“failed state” and “a vacuum filled by warlord[s].” Kansteiner also outlined the goals of US 
policy on Somalia as: “the removal of the existing terrorist threat and the prevention against 
Somalia’s use as a terrorist base; the prevention of developments in Somalia that could 
threaten the region; and the overcoming of the lack of governmental authority that made 
Somalia a possible base for terrorism” (Woodward 2006: 143). The US policy on Somalia is 
a direct result of the sum of its experiences linked to Somalia. The tragedy and humiliation 
that the US military contingent to the UNOSOM suffered in October 1993, when the US 
Black Hawk helicopter gunship was shot down in a well-coordinated attack in Mogadishu, 
was attributed to al-Qaeda operatives. Osama bin Laden claimed to have coordinated the 
attack and called the United Nations Mission an “invasion of a Muslim country” (Bradbury 
and Healy 2010: 11). The failed state environment of Somalia also served as the staging 
ground for the 1998 terror attacks on US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam 
(Tanzania) by al-Qaeda. The same scenario was repeated in the 2002 attack on Israeli targets 
– a passenger aircraft and hotel – in Mombasa, Kenya. Another plan to attack the US 
Embassy in Kenya in 2003 was foiled. All these events explain and define the US’ attitude 
towards Somalia as well as its actual role in the Somalia conflict.   
 
Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012), Islamist Contact (2012), Somali Diaspora I (2012) and 
High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) agreed that the US co-operates with 
Ethiopia in taking sides with warring factions in Somalia. They pointed to clear cases of this 
kind of co-operation, including US backing for the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation 
                                                          
15
 Walter Kansteiner was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Africa by President George W. Bush in 
2001. He was selected for the post by the then American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, over the more 
favoured Johnnie Carson, the then US Ambassador to Kenya, for the wide range of experience he was believed 
to have in Africa, especially in growing businesses.  
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Council (SRRC) which was led by Hussein Aideed, the son of the US’ foremost enemy in the 
Somali conflict, Farah Aideed. Another leader of this organization, Abdullahi Yusuf, one of 
Ethiopia’s protégées, opposed the Transitional National Government that emerged from the 
Arta Conference of 2000.  The respondents added that the US trusted Ethiopia with the 
coordination of the ARPCT, a coalition of hitherto factional warlords brought together by 
Ethiopia and funded by the US to engage in the surveillance and capture of local Somali 
Islamists believed to have affinity with al-Qaeda. It is important to put the US’ involvement 
with the ARPCT into perspective. The US regards the Somali failed state environment as a 
place where terrorists can “operate beyond the law” thereby acting as a terrorist safe-haven, 
lacking in security and exploited by terrorists as a staging ground (US Institute of Peace 
2004: 9; Department of State 2006: i. d). The suspected al-Qaeda operative, Abdullah 
Mohammed, who led the 1998 attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 
the 2002 Mombasa attacks and the planned 2003 US Embassy attack in Kenya was stated by 
intelligence reports as hiding inside Somalia with other wanted terrorists, including Ali Saleh 
Nabhan and Abu Taha al-Sudani (Quaranto 2008: 28). Other local Somali Jihadi elements are 
also on the US wanted terrorists list, including Aden Hashi Ayro who was trained in an 
Afghanistan al-Qaeda camp. The US sees the al-Qaeda cell in Somalia as very active, made 
up of some of the most wanted terrorists and therefore a serious threat to the US’ regional 
interests in particular, and regional and global security as a whole (Senior Kenyan Academic 
I 2012; Osondu 2009: 71; International Crisis Group 2005: 9). For example, the January 2004 
report of the US Institute of Peace on terrorism in the Horn of Africa concludes that Somalia 
has become a “preferred site of terrorist attacks”, serving as “a short-term transit point for the 
movement of people and material …” (US Institute of Peace 2004: 9). It is in light of the 
above and the failure of the direct use of drone attacks that the US’ involvement with the 
ARPCT coordinated by Ethiopia should be assessed. 
 
The tripartite alliance of the US, Ethiopia and the Somali warlords changed the dynamics of 
the Somali conflict in many ways. Firstly, significant funds and arms were supplied to the 
warlords. They invested these funds in further re-arming themselves and consolidating their 
regional strongholds without commitment to the goals of the alliance. Furthermore, the 
warlords that the US invested in were by this time discredited among most Somalis as a result 
of the many atrocities associated with their activities. Therefore, they could not command the 
kind of confidence and followers required to effectively confront a very popular coalition 
with the pedigree (at that point in time) of the Somali Islamists (Hirsh 2006: 34). This 
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researcher concurs with this point of view in light of the fact that the Alliance was formed at 
the time the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was at the height of its glory, enjoying tremendous 
support across Somalia as a viable alternative to factional warlords’ control in Mogadishu 
and various regions in Somalia. As a result, most ordinary Somalis supported the ICU/al-
Shabaab in the May-June 2006 battle which ended the warlords’ control of Mogadishu. The 
ICU came to be seen as the only viable alternative and platform to mobilize Somalis against 
the “external aggressors”, Ethiopia and the US (High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative 
in Somalia 2012; Somali Diaspora I 2012; Hirsh 2006: 37; International Crisis Group 2006: 
14). While the Somali might differ individually in their beliefs and ideology, they are often 
one in their opposition to Ethiopia and the US. Somali combatants came from all parts of 
Somalia, including Somaliland, to join the fight against the US and Ethiopia (Somali 
Diaspora I 2012; Senior AMISOM Commander 2012; High-Ranking Nigerian Official in 
Kenya 2012; Somali Diaspora II 2012). Furthermore, rather than scaling-down the conflict, 
the US alliance with Ethiopia and the warlords, especially between 2005 and 2008, increased 
local hatred of the foreign actors and their “local collaborators” and expanded the local 
mobilization base for the radicalization of young recruits by the Islamists. The image of the 
enemy which grew over the years favours radical Islam. A moderate Somali Muslim is 
quoted by the International Crisis Group (2006: 3) as stating that: 
 
From Ethiopia’s perspective, it will be a war between Ethiopia and the 
Islamists (Ikhwaan). But for we Somalis, it is not so simple. I have to fight 
side by side with anyone who is fighting Ethiopia … People do not want 
to join the Islamists (wadaado)…. but if it comes to that, how can you 
refuse a coalition with them? It won’t matter who chews the qaad and who 
doesn’t when the enemy is just over the horizon. 
 
It is clear that, while all Somalis may not like the Islamists and/or their approach to the 
Somali conflict, when it comes to the issue of Ethiopia, Somalis seem to be united in their 
resolve to resist them, notwithstanding individual religious inclinations and perceptions. 
Responding to the question on what he believes to be Ethiopia’s interests and roles in the 
Somali conflict Somali Diaspora II (2012) passionately stated that: 
All we Somalis hate Ethiopia. They want to continue colonizing us. Every 
Somali joined in fighting the Ethiopians. Only the Islamic Courts Union is 
able to help us fight Ethiopia and they are calling us terrorists, using 
bombs to destroy Somalia. We will not stop fighting until we chase the 
last person who doesn’t want Somalia and Islam to succeed.    
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Furthermore, the sacking of the warlords and the taking over of Mogadishu by the ICU/al-
Shabaab in 2006 resulted in direct military action by Ethiopia, invited by the TFG to defeat 
the Islamists. The US supported Ethiopia’s December 2006 military onslaught against the al-
Shabaab inside Somalia. It used US helicopter gunships and airstrikes against fleeing 
Islamists. Coupled with Ethiopia’s two-year occupation of Somalia, this strengthened Somali 
Islamists’ resolve to formalize their alliance with the global Jihadi network, and the adoption 
of insurgency. Islamist insurgency has gradually but steadily grown into deadly Iraqi-styled 
insurgency and remobilization. Al-Qaeda’s strategy of penetrating, recruiting, mobilizing and 
forging a viable Islamist resistance to the US was crystallized. While it was evident that the 
US airstrikes failed to kill some of the targeted al-Qaeda operatives and Islamists fleeing the 
Ethiopian military operations, they galvanized global Islamist terrorists to focus on Somalia 
as one Jihad arena (Copson 2007:  117). This led to a very high level of internal recruitment 
of Islamist militia fighters and an influx of foreign Islamist fighters into Somalia, mainly 
through Eritrea and Yemen. This scenario completely transformed the Somali conflict from a 
civil conflict into an Islamist insurgency. In its October 2006 report to the Security Council 
(2006: 40) on events in Somalia between May 2006 and September 2006, the UN Monitoring 
Group on Somalia reported that:  
 
Importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare 
and special topics and techniques, including the making of bombs and 
their use against different targets, such as different types of transport and 
buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of 
assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the Monitoring 
Group that ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into an Iraq-type 
situation, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and 
other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities. 
 
It is important to note that this scenario has persisted with greater tenacity over time. The 
Somali conflict has continued to degenerate with the al-Shabaab formally declaring itself an 
affiliate of al-Qaeda in 2010. 
 
One other important fallout of the interwoven alliances and conflicts in Somalia between 
2005 and 2009 is that  a huge quantity of weapons and military equipment was sold and 
bought inside Somalia by the warlords, the ICU and the TFG.
16
 Senior AMISOM 
Commander (2012), High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) and 
Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) were of the opinion that this points to the corresponding 
                                                          
16
 See Figures 2 and 3 on weapon purchases in the Bakaraaha Arms Market inside Somalia. 
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channelling of resources into Somalia not only by the US through Ethiopia to the TFG and 
the coalition of warlords, but also from the global Islamist network to the Somali Jihadists 
through Eritrea.  
 
8.1.3 Eritrea, alliances and the transformation of the Somali conflict 
The respondents tended to agree that Eritrea has not been overtly involved in the conflict 
inside Somalia. To a large extent, Eritrea’s involvement has been confined to covert 
operations in response to its perception that Ethiopia is using Somalia as an extended 
territory. High-Ranking Eritrean Official in Kenya (2012) argued that Ethiopia sees Somalia 
as “a region within its jurisdiction in which it must sanction whatever happens there or it will 
not happen”. Initially, Eritrea provided access and shelter for the Somali Islamists. However, 
as the conflict progressed and Ethiopia began to play a more decisive role in Somalia, 
Eritrea’s support for the Islamists expanded to playing go-between in arms and material 
supply, and other logistics to spite Ethiopia (Ray 2007). The report of the UN Monitoring 
Group names Eritrea as “the principal clandestine source and conduit for arms supplies to the 
Shabaab” – the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 9). 
One such occasion was in December 2006 when the dislodged Somali Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU) regrouped inside Eritrea. Together with other radical Islamist elements, they formed 
the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and launched a counter offensive on the 
Ethiopian military inside Somalia. Senior Kenyan Academic II (May 2012) argued that 
Eritrea’s support for al-Shabaab is one of the major factors driving the Somali conflict. He 
added that the Eritrean government provides a shield for the Islamists against any offensives 
and undermines the processes of peaceful settlement of the conflict in Somalia. He noted that 
Eritrea provided bases and logistics for the regrouping of the radical elements that were 
sacked from Somalia to launch a comeback against the TFG, which is supported by Ethiopian 
troops, and to plan and execute insurgency operations.  
 
8.1.4 International Islamist Network, alliances and the transformation of the Somali 
conflict 
 
At the outset of the Somali conflict, religion was not one of the issues in contest. Somalia is a 
significant example of a socio-culturally and religiously homogeneous society. However, the 
global Islamist movement has long existed in the Somali failed state environment. The local 
Somali Islamist group, al-Ittihaad al-Islamia (AIAI) which emerged with the demise of Siad 
Barre was believed to be strongly connected to al-Qaeda. The two are believed to have 
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cooperated in the 1993 war between the Farah Aideed warlord militia and a UNISOM 
detachment of US marines in which the US lost 14 marines. This led to the early exit of the 
US contingent and the eventual winding-up of the UNISOM operation without achieving its 
goals. Since the collapse of the Somali state, international Islamist operatives have been 
fingered for hiding inside Somalia and training Jihadists.  
 
Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 terror attacks the US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, the 2002 attacks on Israeli targets in Mombasa and the foiled 2003 attack on the 
US Embassy in Kenya. These attacks were directly linked to terrorists operating from within 
Somalia, who had remained in the country, shielded by the AIAI Islamists (Otenyo 2004: 7; 
Dempsey 2006: 14; Menkhaus 2004: 71; International Crisis Group 2005: 98; ). Somalia was 
“a trans-shipment site and safe haven” for the terrorists (Osondu 2009: 71; International 
Crisis Group 2006: 11; US Institute of Peace 2004: 4). Following the 11 September 2001 
terror attack on the US homeland, the AIAI was declared a terrorist organization and some of 
its leaders were placed on the US wanted-terrorists list.  
 
Islamism first occupied centre stage as a major platform in the domestic political contest in 
Somali conflict in 2006. This followed the rise of the Islamic Courts Union, their defeat and 
the dislodging of the warlords from the capital, Mogadishu and the introduction of strict 
Sharia law in the area they controlled. The war that followed in December 2006 involving the 
TFG backed by a full Ethiopian military complement saw more foreign Islamist fighters in 
alliance with local Islamists. Al-Qaeda’s leadership called for a jihad against the “foreign 
invaders”. Before the December 2006 battle which sacked the Islamists from most parts of 
southern and central Somalia, it was strongly believed that al-Qaeda was running training 
camps inside Somalia where recruits were trained in weapons and explosive handling 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 4-6; UN Security Council 2007: 9; New York Times. 20 
March 2007: 16).  The October 2006 report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (2006: 
40) noted that foreign Islamist volunteers were engaged in training Islamist recruits in 
“guerrilla warfare and special techniques” which included how to make bombs, targeting, 
snipping, kidnapping, and assassination. 
 
In a message posted on 1 July 2006, Osama bin Laden warned the US and all its allies of al-
Qaeda’s readiness to fight them in defence of Somalia. He called on all Somalis to fight and 
build an Islamic state. It is believed that many Islamist foreign fighters from Afghanistan, 
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Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen and Lebanon entered the country and fought on the side of the 
Somali Islamists (Tadesse 2007: i.d; Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d). As previously noted, 
before bin Laden’s warning and appeal, one of the leaders of the ICU was quoted as 
challenging Islamists around the globe to participate in the Somali conflict (Ross, D. and 
Roggio, B 2006: i.d). The International Islamist Network regarded the conflict in Somalia as 
a Jihad even before Ethiopia’s overt involvement in December 2006. The June 2006 audio 
message, purportedly delivered by bin Laden, defines the conflict beyond local Somali 
Islamists as “an affair of the Global Jihad”. It reads: “we will continue, God willing, to fight 
you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan, until we 
waste all your money and kill your men and you return to your country defeated as we 
defeated you before in Somalia”. In July 2006, he again warned of the consequences for any 
country which sent its soldiers to Somalia as part of an African Union peacekeeping mission 
mooted by the UN (Osondu 2009: 72; Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d). This declaration 
situates the Somali conflict within the global Islamist struggle against the West. Foreign 
jihadist and Somali diaspora jihadists were, therefore, attracted to the Somali conflict. It is 
believed that about 2,000 Eritrean soldiers and between 4,000 and 5,000 foreign jihadists 
fought on the side of the ICU in December 2006 with the TFG backed by the Ethiopian army 
(Osondu 2009: 72: International Crisis Group 2007: 4). The 2010 declaration of al-Shabaab 
as an affiliate of the al-Qaeda global Islamist network was simply a formal proclamation of 
what had existed for a long time (High-Ranking Ethiopian Official in Kenya 2012; High-
Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative 2012, High-Ranking Ugandan Official in Kenya 
2012; High-Ranking US Official on Somalia 2012).  
 
More than most other external actors in Somalia, the involvement of the International Islamist 
Network has ideologically transformed the conflict from a conflict with internal focus to one 
driven by a universal group agenda. This has shaped international perspectives on the conflict 
and at the same time made internal settlement more difficult. Senior Kenyan Academic II 
(2012), High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative  (2012), the High-Ranking Nigerian 
Official in Kenya (2012) and High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) 
argued that the enemy image of al-Qaeda and the hard-line posture of the Islamists on the 
strictest form of Sharia-governed Somalia or nothing have rendered peace processes in 
Somalia impossible.     
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Therefore, it is clear that external actors’ involvement in the Somali conflict has continued to 
play a very significant role in the shaping and sharpening of the conflict. Table 8.2 below 
shows the various external actors, their allies in the Somali conflict and the mode of their 
involvement. Except for Eritrea, the other three external actors, the US, Ethiopia and the 
International Islamist Network are directly intervening inside Somalia. The US does not 
directly supply arms to local actors. Its arms supplies go through Ethiopia to the TFG and 
some warlords. All the external actors have at one time been involved with the warlords. It 
was a case of who best served their interests at a particular time. The most stable alliance is 
that of the International Islamist Network with the Islamists in Somalia. This focuses on the 
Islamic credentials of the ally, be they an internal actor, a member of the Islamic Courts 
Union, a warlord or a trader in the arms market inside Somalia (High-Ranking Djiboutian 
IGAD Representative 2012).  
 
Table 8.2 External actors’ involvement with internal actors in the Somali conflict 
 
 United States Ethiopia Eritrea  International 
Islamist Network 
Covert Operations Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Overt military 
involvement 
Yes  Yes  No  Yes  




Islamists / Al- 
Shabaab 
Bases No Yes Yes Yes 




















Source: The Researcher 2013 
 
8.2 Conflict dynamics in Somalia 2006 – 2010 
This period of the Somali conflict is important for two major reasons. Firstly, with the 
exception of the battle of 1990-1991 that ousted Siad Barre and the immediate post-Barre 
contestation for control of state power among the once coalesced warlords, the Somali 
conflict has not seen a more ferocious battle than that which occurred at this period. 
Secondly, this was the period in which the roles of all four external actors under study were 
clearly manifest and the implications of their involvement and alliances were strongly felt. 
This section discusses the indices which mark this period in Somali conflict as very 
significant. These include, but are not limited to, the level of the flow of arms and their 
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distribution among local actors, the number of battle-related deaths, and the number of 
internally displaced persons caused by the conflict.  
 
8.2.1 Weapons procurement and distribution 
High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012) observed that at no time from the start 
of the Somali conflict had it witnessed the quantity of arms in circulation or the manner of the 
flow of arms as that between 2005 and 2008. The United Nations’ Monitoring Group with 
responsibility for the arms embargo on Somalia raised alarm over the quantity and quality 
and/or variety of arms in Somalia in its 2006 and 2007 reports. In the 2006 report, it 
highlighted the introduction of “new and more sophisticated” types of weapons into the 
conflict. These hitherto unused weapons included surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, 
infrared-guided anti-tank weapons and mines (UN Monitoring Group 2006:  45). The June 
2007 report concluded that Somalia was “literally awash with arms”. It stated that the 
“quantities, numbers and diversity of arms, especially in central and southern Somalia, are 
greater than at any time since the early 1990s” (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 3).  In this 
section, data from the UN Monitoring Group for April 2006-September 2006 and December 
2006-May 2007 are used to show the patterns of arms procurement among the major actors 
engaged in the struggle for supremacy in Somalia. One critical observation from Table 8.3 
below is that the fighting of May-June 2006 between the ICU and the warlords for control of 
Mogadishu did not simply flare up. There was a build-up to the fight. The Table shows that 
by April 2006, both the ICU and the warlords had started buying weapons. The total 
percentage of the weapons bought by the ICU between April and September 2006 - 57.25 
percent - indicates that the ICU was on the offensive, followed by a period of consolidation. 
It will be recalled that by 20 June 2006, the ICU had defeated the warlords, sacked them from 
Mogadishu, and imposed a strict sharia system. By mid-October of the same year, southern 
and central Somalia had fallen under ICU control. The coalition of the warlords and their 
militia did not anticipate that this would happen. They were content with the resources 
flowing from the US for the apprehension of marked terrorists as well as with maintaining 
control of their various territories. However, they were caught napping in the two-month 
battle that saw them lose all the key areas they controlled. The total amount of the weapons 
they could buy was less than half what the ICU procured, 27.59 percent as against the ICU’s 
57.25 percent. The Table also reflects the purchase of 250 pistols by the ICU. Two factors 
may explain this. First, the ICU incorporated policing and intelligence gathering in its 
operations. Second, it armed insurgents with pistols for self-defence in clandestine missions.      
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Table 8.3 Weapons bought inside Somalia by the various internal actors, April 2006 – 
Sept 2006   
SN Type of Weapon TFG ICU Warlords Total 
1. AK-47 680/15.06% 2488/ 55.1% 1347/29.8% 4515 
2. PKM 150/18.84% 458/57.54% 188/23.61% 796 
3. RPG 106/23.14% 253/55.24% 99/21.61% 458 
4. DShK 8/8% 52/52% 40/40% 100 
5. Mortars - 61/62.24% 37/37.76% 98 
6. B-10 - - 7/100% 7 
7. ZU-23 - 6/75% 2/25% 8 
8. Pistols - 250/100% - 250 
Total Weapons Bought 944/15.14% 3568/57.25% 1720/27.59% 6232 
Source of data: UN Monitoring Group Report (2006: 69-73). Converted into a table: The researcher 
(2014). 
  
Table 8.4 is a total reversal of Table 8.3. The warlords out-performed the ICU in arms 
purchases between December 2006 and May 2007. While the warlords bought 86.29 percent 
of all the weapons thought to have been bought inside Somalia in this period, the ICU could 
procure only 13.71 percent.
17
 The TFG made no recorded purchases during this period. This 
scenario is the result of the change in the dynamics of the conflict at the time under review. 
Firstly, this period coincides with Ethiopia’s military incursion into the conflict and its battle 
with and sacking of the ICU from Mogadishu. The sacking of the ICU from Mogadishu by 
the end of December 2006 was followed by battles to recover other areas under ICU control 
and the consolidation of the TFG’s power by Ethiopian troops. This period also created an 
opportunity for the warlords to re-arm themselves, recover the territories they had lost to the 
Islamists and re-exert territorial control (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 190). The ICU’s 
emphasis on grenades and launchers depicts a group on the run, but determined to re-invent 
itself through a hit-and-run strategy – insurgency. Confirming this conclusion, it is recorded 
that the ICU invested significantly in anti-tank, anti-personnel and other kinds of mines. 
These were targeted at Ethiopian combat troops with all of their artillery (Spears 2010: 164; 
UN Monitoring Group 2007: 192). The TFG was not recorded as having made purchases 
during this period. This might be due to the fact that Ethiopian combat troops were fully on 
the ground and were supported by US combat aircraft.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 The traders in the Bakaraaha arms market were also making huge purchases of arms. It is believed that the 
price of arms inside the market was so low that most Somalis could purchase an AK-47 for personal use on the 
open arms market, where many types of arms were on display. 
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Table 8.4 Weapons bought inside Somalia by the various internal actors, Dec 2006 – 
May 2007 
SN Type of Weapon TFG ICU Warlords Total 
1. AK-47 - 494/11.34% 3860/88.66% 4354 
2. PKM - 34/11.76% 255/88.24% 289 
3. RPG - 96/21.81% 344/78.19% 440 
4. DShK - - 14/100% 14 
5. Mortars - - 79/100% 79 
6. B-10 - 9/52.94% 8/47.06% 17 
7. ZU-23 - 2/100% - 2 
8. Pistols - 60/100% - 60 
9. Grenade Launchers - 27/77.14% 8/22.86% 35 
10. Wagle - 5/100% - 5 
11. Dhuunshilke - - 3/100% 3 
12. Sekawe - - 1/100% 1 
Total Weapons Bought - 727/13.71% 4572/86.29% 5299 
Source of data: UN Monitoring Group Report (2007:50). Converted into a table: The 
researcher: 2012 
*** These are in addition to a variety of anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, hand grenades, belts and assorted ammunition which were 
bought by both the ICU and the warlords along with these other weapons. More weapons were also bought without the quantity being 
accounted for.    
  
 
It is important to note that funding to purchase these weapons was supplied by external 
actors. While the US through Ethiopia accounted for much of the funds channelled to the 
warlords and the TFG invested in arm purchases, the ICU depended on funding from the 
International Islamist Network and some Arab countries through Eritrea.  Many more 
weapons may not have come under the purview of the UN Monitoring Group. These include 
arms from Ethiopia for the warlords and the TFG, and those Eritrea and the International 
Islamist Network provided to the ICU/al-Shabaab. It is possible that there are more 
unaccounted for weapons in the hands of the warring parties than those that are accounted 
for. The evidence produced here simply shows that many weapons were acquired by the 
internal actors in the conflict, the timing of which coincided with the period when external 
actors aligned themselves with these actors, Ethiopia and the US with the warlords and the 
TFG, and Eritrea and the International Islamist Network with the ICU/al-Shabaab.  
 
As part of the above analysis, movements in the arms prices in the Mogadishu Bakaaraha 
Arms Market are important. We seek to show a correlation between the price movement at 
specific periods and the tenacity of the conflict and the internal actors’ activities in alliance 
with external actors. Table 8.5 shows a graphic variation in arms prices in the Arms Market 
during various periods in the conflict. By January 2006 when the warlords were in control of 
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the capital, Mogadishu and a sizable proportion of the southern and central parts of Somalia, 
arms prices were very high. This coincides with the period when the coalition of the 
warlords, the Alliance for Reconciliation, Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) was 
mobilized financially by the US through Ethiopia to track down suspected terrorists hiding 
inside Somalia. It also falls within the period when the ICU was arming itself and had started 
a gradual push towards Mogadishu for its May-June heavy battle with the warlords’ coalition. 
By September 2006, arms prices had decreased by an average 59.83 percent from the 
previous period. The prices of some weapons like the Zu-23 decreased by 85.71 percent. This 
was a period of stability following the ICU’s defeat of the warlords’ coalition in June 2006. 
The ICU’s influence was extended beyond Mogadishu and maintained relative peace via 
strict Sharia law. Dealey (2006:  35) quoted an arms trader in the Bakaraaha Arms Market in 
November 2006 as complaining that: “the only good job was selling guns. Now I don’t know 
what I’ll do”. This trader’s average daily sales had dropped from 15 to three AK 47s. Prices 
had also gone down. Ethiopia’s intervention in December 2006 saw a further reduction in 
arms prices. Arms prices were at an all-time low by January 2007. However, by May 2007, 
arms prices had increased by an average of 369.44 percent compared with the previous 
period. This was the direct result of the sacking of the ICU, its preparations for a counter 
offensive and the re-arming of the previously defeated warlords (Osondu 2009: 87; UN 
Monitoring Group 2007: 19).   
 
Once again, the statistical evidence demonstrates that the Somali conflict continues to be 
influenced by the activities of external actors in alliance with some internal players. Much as 
the involvement of the Ethiopian Army in the fight against the Islamists led to the Islamists 
being pushed out of Mogadishu, it brought new dynamics to the conflict. The Ethiopian 
troops’ focus on the Islamists proved not to be a solution to the Somali conflict. The warlords 
were indirectly or inadvertently enabled to regroup and re-arm, re-establishing regional bases 
and controls. The Islamists were pushed into insurgency, which has given the conflict its 









136 | P a g e  
 
Table 8.5 Prices of Arms at the Bakaraaha Arms Market January 2006 – May 2007 with the 





Cost of arms in US Dollars 
January 2006 Sept. 2006 January 2007 
 
May 2007 
Zu-23 70 000 10 000(85.71% down) 5 000 (50% down) 25 000 (500% up) 
DShK 14 000   5 000 (74.28% down) 3 000 (40% down)   8 000 (266.66% up) 
B-10   7 000    2 000 (71.42% down) 1 500 (25% down)   6 000 (400% up) 
PKM 12 000   6 000 (50% down) 4 000 (33.43% down)   2 000 (50% down) 
AK-47      400      250 (37.5 down)    200 (20% down)      200 (0%) 
RPG-2      500      300 (40% down)    150 (50% down)   1 500 (1000% up) 
Average % upward/downward price movement 59.83% down 36.45% down 369.44% up 
Source data: UN Monitoring Group Report (2007: 50). Converted to a table: The researcher (2014) 
 
8.2.2 Battle-related deaths 
Another index which shows that external actors in the Somali conflict escalated the conflict is 
the number of battle-related deaths recorded during the period beginning 2006 when all four 
external actors under study were involved in the internal actors’ quest to wrest power and 
impose their control. Figure 8.2 below shows that from 2000 to 2005, deaths relating to 
combat were only recorded in two years – 2001 and 2002. It should be recalled that the 
emergence of the Eritrean-backed Transitional National Government (TNG) in the Arta 
(Djibouti) peace process in 2000 led to the organization of an opposition group of warlords -- 
the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) -- by Ethiopia. It was SRRC 
successful strategy of engaging their rivals in low intensity and sustained battles in 2001 and 
2002 that led to the formation of the Ethiopian backed Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in 2002, which was controlled by the members of the organisation. This resulted in 
about 225 and 96 deaths in 2001 and 2002, respectively. A close study of the figure shows 
that the years 2003 – 2005 were relatively free of open conflict among the opposing groups in 
Somalia. This was a period of consolidation of the warlords’ territorial control and influence, 
peace talks, the TFG’s efforts to build national government, and the emergence, mobilization 
of support through security and service delivery, and strategizing for control of Somali 
society by the Islamic Courts Union. This observation is supported by the absence of any 
combat-related deaths during the period 2003 – 2005.  
 
It should be recalled that the US-funded and Ethiopian-coordinated Alliance for Restoration 
of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), a coalition of warlords, was put together at the 
close of 2005 with the aim of targeting and arresting suspected terrorists hiding inside 
Somalia. The taking control of Mogadishu by the warlords and the US and Ethiopia’s 
involvement in the conflict set the stage for a collision with the ICU. This face-off eventually 
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culminated in the May – June 2006 all-out war in which Al-Shabaab (the ICU’s military 
wing) defeated and sacked the coalition of the warlords from Mogadishu. By December 
2006, when Ethiopian soldiers entered Somalia, the Islamists had pushed the warlords out of 
most of the regions in southern and central Somalia, including the Hiran, Lower Shabelle, 
and Middle Shabelle regions (Elmi 2010:  95). About 547 combat-related deaths were 
recorded in 2006. Subsequent years saw the death toll rising to 1,589 in 2007, 1,483 in 2008, 
1,476 in 2009, 2,158 in 2010 and 1,916 in 2011. The seeming low death toll for 2006, despite 
two major battles in the year – the battle between the Islamists and the warlords in May-June 
and that of the Islamists versus the TFG backed by Ethiopia – had to do with the duration and 
the attitude of the combatants. While the battle between the Islamists and the warlords was 
ferocious, it lasted only two months. That with the TFG lasted less than a month. It was 
believed that the Islamists made a tactical withdrawal in the face of the Ethiopian soldiers’ 
strong firepower. Subsequent years witnessed a reorganized Islamists force externally backed 
by al-Qaeda, engaging Ethiopian soldiers in insurgent attacks. This explains the relative rise 
in the death toll from 2007. This trend continued through 2009 when Ethiopian troops 
withdrew, followed by the bitter war between the Islamists and the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) led by the Uganda and Kenyan military. This is beyond the scope of this 
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It is evident from figure 8.2 that Somalia enjoyed no conflict between 2003 and 2005. This 
was the period of the spread and consolidation of the ICU. 
 
8.2.3 Internally-displaced persons in war related activities, 2000 – 2010 
The displacement of people has been used as one of the indices to measure the intensity and 
effect of armed conflicts. In the Somali conflict, specific periods experienced this trend more 
than others did. These periods coincide with periods of intense struggle among the internal 
actors backed by their external allies. Figure 8.3 shows that between 2000 and 2010, two 
periods experienced displacement of persons inside Somalia as a result of fighting. The first 
statistics are for January 2000 which recorded less than 30,000 persons displaced. That 
occurred during the battle between the Ethiopian-backed Rahwnweyn Resistance Army 
(RRA) and Hussein Aideed’s militia for the control of the Bay and Bakool regions. By 
August/September 1999, the city of Baioda had been re-captured from the Aideed militia 
(Elmi 2010:  95). The battle resulted in the displacement of some people in the region. The 
next wave of population displacement occurred between 2005 and 2009. This period was 
characterized by a steady rise in population displacement as a result of the continued fighting 
among the contending forces in Somalia. One striking feature of this period was the 
involvement of external actors like never before. The conflict mutated from the ICU’s 
mobilization in late 2005 to a bitter fight with the warlords in May/June 2006. The battle led 
to the sacking of the warlords from Mogadishu, the imposition of strict sharia law by the 
Islamists and a wave of offensives on the warlords’ regional bases. The Islamists succeeded 
in taking over the entire southern and central Somalia with the exception of Baioda and 
surrounding areas where the TFG was holed-up. This led to the next stages – the entry of 
Ethiopian troops which flushed out the Islamists from Mogadishu and other regions and 
subsequent Islamist insurgency. The fierceness of these battles occasioned by the level of 
mobilization, morale and commitment to the goals and the quantity of arms deployed explain 
the increase in the number of displaced persons.  Between 2005 and 2008 about 3.1 million 
people were displaced inside Somalia as a result of fighting between the Islamists and the 
warlords, the TFG/Ethiopian troops and the ICU and the counter-offensive by the ICU.     
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As shown in Figure 8.3, about 40,000 people were displaced in 2005 as a result of the ICU’s 
mobilization for the eventual conflict with the warlords in the battle for Mogadishu in May-
June 2006. The involvement of Ethiopia, the US, and the international Jihadi explains the 
intensity of the battle in Somalia from 2005 – 2008. The years 2007 and 2008 show the 
highest number of displacements. While 2007 marked the launch of the comeback of the 
Islamist fighters who regrouped in Eritrea in 2008, the Islamists launched an offensive to 
recapture Mogadishu and other parts of central Somalia. In 2007, Ethiopia was consolidating 
its security beyond Mogadishu in order to protect the TFG. By 2008 it was fighting to 
maintain the TFG in firm control, recovering substantial territory before easing out as agreed 
by the international community. This explains the ferociousness of the battles in these years.  
 
It is reasonably clear from the above assessment that external actors influenced directly and 
profoundly the dynamics of the Somalia conflict. Through the actions of key external players, 
various aspects of the conflict, ranging from its intensity and extent to its duration and 
apparent intractability, were immensely shaped and fuelled.  The net results of external 
interventions are that Somalia experienced not only massive injections of sophisticated arms 
and external fighters but also the deepening of previously existing internal hatreds, growing 
splits and the associated formal cracks in the territorial integrity of the state, and drastic 
increases in the numbers of internally displaced people and war-related casualties in the 
country.   
  




Towards a workable peace initiative in Somalia 
 
9.0 Introduction 
The Somali conflict has endured since 1991. It has attracted diverse attention and 
commentary. It has also presented a challenge to the neighbouring, regional, and global 
community. Contrary to some opinions that Somalia was left to continue to deteriorate, 
several initiatives were taken to check the country from drifting further into chaos and to re-
engineer it to statehood and recovery. From the field responses, it is obvious that it was not 
the case that there was a lack of initiatives; rather, it has been the case of a manifest inability 
to produce a workable peace agreement and process. Indeed, many peace conferences and 
processes have been undertaken and numerous agreements reached and signed, but the 
conflict seems to have defied all possible solutions. This chapter reviews some of these 
initiatives with a view to understanding why they failed to deliver the desired solution to the 
conflict. It then discusses the various options being canvassed as best suited for the envisaged 
new Somali state. 
 
9.1 The peace processes  
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the ensuing bitter war for the capture of 
the power apparatus among various factions, many unsuccessful attempts have been made to 
find a solution to the conflict. Some of these efforts were launched by individual states, 
neighbours and friends, and others by regional and international organizations. It is important 
to underscore the fact that at the centre of the failure of the Somali peace processes were the 
divergent clan and personal interests which underpinned the mind sets, manoeuvrings, and 
actions of the various actors in the conflict (Saalax and Xildhiban 2010: 32). At some stage, 
attending a peace conference seemed to have become a goal in itself as opposed to the 
outcome of the conference. Rather than advancing the gains and dealing with the challenges 
of the previous conference(s), each new conference addressed the same issues, rendering it 
impossible to consolidate and move forward (Saalax and Xildhiban 2010: 32). The 
continuous fractionalization of existing factions hindered negotiations as new actors and 
interests surfaced on each occasion. Most of the outcomes of the peace conferences were 
dismissed or failed as a result of the ‘not inclusive’ phrase even when it was obvious that 
failure was due to the servicing of parochial interests. It should also be noted that some of the 
initiatives failed due to the manipulations of external actors that exploited the weak 
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dispositions of the internal actors by seeking to advance their own interests by influencing the 
outcomes or sabotaging agreements that had been duly reached. 
 
9.1.1 The Djibouti Reconciliation Meetings, June - July 1991  
United opposition military resistance to Siad Barre resulted in the latter’s ousting from power 
in January 1991. This did not result in a change of government as was the case in other 
conflicts. The conflicting interests of some of the leaders resulted in a bitter armed struggle 
among the factions. More than the fighting that forced Siad Barre out, this fighting brought 
the Somali state to a complete standstill and caused heavy collateral damage. There was, 
therefore, a need to broker peace among the factions to save the state and provide 
governance. Neighbouring states took the initiative to reconcile the groups. 
  
The first of these attempts was the two reconciliation meetings brokered by Djibouti among 
the factions; one took place in June while the other was convened in July 1991. These 
meetings, which were attended by six clan and sub-clan groups in Somalia, primarily aimed 
to end the fighting among the factions, and to form an interim government acceptable to 
them. These groups were mainly headed by individuals who had served in previous 
governments. It is important to clarify that most of these clan-based organizations were not 
grassroots-organizations. Rather, they were rather set up by the various actors as vehicles to 
advance their self-interests in the power vacuum that existed in Somalia. At the July 1991 
meeting in Djibouti, the groups in attendance signed an agreement to form a government, 
electing Ali Mahdi president. General Aideed, who was at the meeting, rejected the outcome 
(Saalax and Xildhiban 2010: 32). Both Mahdi and Aideed are from the Hawiye clan but from 
different sub-clans. Both were contesting the leadership of the United Somali Congress 
(USC). Aideed, a former Chief of Defence Staff under the Barre administration, claimed that 
it was his faction that defeated and drove Barre out of Mogadishu and, therefore, that he 
should head the new government. Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012), Senior Kenyan 
Academic II (2012), and High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) argue that the 
failure of these initial peace talks deepened the conflict, widening the fault lines, and setting a 
precedent for the future behaviour of the domestic actors in the Somali conflict. 
 
9.1.2 The New York Meeting and Joint Delegation 
The immediate post-Siad Barre war among the different factions coincided with an 
unprecedented drought in the country. It is believed that by the beginning of 1992, more than 
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half of Somalia’s population or over 4.5 million people were threatened with starvation, and 
ravaged by malnutrition and hunger-related diseases. It is estimated that more than 300,000 
Somalis died during the period, including an estimated one third of children below the age of 
five (United Nations 1996: 287). The human tragedy attracted the attention of international 
humanitarian agencies. As early as March 1991, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICF) and World Food Programme (WFP) were in Somalia to provide food and medical 
assistance. Following the continued intense fighting among the Somali factions, the 
humanitarian agencies found it difficult to penetrate and deliver services to the hinterland 
where thousands were dying. As the humanitarian situation worsened, the UN launched 
efforts to get involved in Somali conflict in late December 1991 as a way to facilitate on-





From 12 – 14 February 1992 the UN Secretary-General hosted a ‘peace consultation’ with the 
two main Somali factions led by Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aideed in New York. 
Representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) also attended. The two key goals 
were to secure a ceasefire and to agree on the need for and support the convening of a 
national peace and reconciliation conference for Somalia. The involvement of the OAU, OIC 
and LAS sought to secure their common and cooperative involvement in finding a solution to 
the conflict. The UN hoped to leverage these organizations’ ability to influence the leaders of 
the Somalian factions to cease hostilities and accept reconciliation. While a ceasefire and 
cessation of hostilities would aid humanitarian relief, it was hoped that a peace and 
reconciliation conference would steer Somalia back to statehood, rebuilding and healing 
(United Nations 1996: 289).  The meeting lasted three days. The Secretary-General met with 
all the delegates on 12 February and only the representatives of the factions on 13 February. 
The UN, OAU, OIC and LAS delegations held a meeting with the two factions later on 13 
February and again on 14 February. The outcome of the meeting was a commitment by the 
factions to stop fighting. It was also agreed that the UN should, as a matter of urgency, lead a 
delegation that would include representatives of the OAU, OIC and LAS to Somalia to work 
out an agreement to maintain the ceasefire.  
 
                                                          
18
 Javier Perez de Cuellar did not actually get involved in the Somali conflict. Rather, he placed it on the UN’s 
agenda. Boutros Boutros-Ghali who took over from him, managed the UN’s involvement in Somalia. 
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9.1.3 Mogadishu Peace Meeting 29 February 1992 – 3 March 1992 
Following the agreement at the New York meeting, the UN despatched a delegation 
comprising UN, OAU, IOC and LAS representatives to Somalia. From 29 February to 03 
March 1992, the delegation was locked in separate meetings with Ali Mahdi and Farah 
Aideed. The “Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire” was signed by Aideed and 
Mahdi on 03 March 1992. The components of the agreement included: 
1) the disengagement of forces by the factions and cessation of hostilities, 
encroachments and deployments into others’ territories;  
2) restriction of troops’ movements to their positions;  
3) facilitation of uninhibited humanitarian aid delivery to all parts of the country;  
4) the handing over of the ports (airports and seaports) to the UN while loyal forces 
relocate to agreed areas; and  
5) that the UN should send a technical team to Somalia to work out a stabilizing 
mechanism for the ceasefire (United Nations 1996: 290).  
One thing which became apparent at this meeting was that Ali Mahdi and Farah Aideed did 
not agree on the level and nature of the UN’s involvement in the conflict. While Ali Mahdi 
believed that the UN needed to commit more to the conflict by way of sending a 
peacekeeping force to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire, cessation of hostility and 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to all areas in need, General Aideed vehemently 
opposed the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. This explains why General Aideed did 
not co-operate with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) when they arrived 
on 5 July 1992.   
 
9.1.4 Addis Ababa Ethiopia Somali National Reconciliation Conference – UN organized 
(March 1993)   
As the conflict in Somalia intensified, especially between the factions loyal to Ali Mahdi and 
Farah Aideed, humanitarian conditions inside Somalia continued to deteriorate. Humanitarian 
organizations’ efforts to deliver relief materials and medicine to the affected areas were 
rendered impossible by the continued factional fighting and pillage against the humanitarian 
organizations. Efforts were now concentrated on securing a ceasefire, disarmament and 
setting up administrative structures. An 11-day informal meeting was convened by the UN in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 4 – 15 January 1993 to among other things prepare the ground 
for a national reconciliation conference. Representatives of 14 different groups attended, 
including the two factions of the United Somali Congress – the USC/Somali Salvation 
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Alliance (USC/SSA) led by Ali Mahdi and the USC/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) 
led by General Aideed. It was also attended by representatives of the Chairman of the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Secretary Generals of the OAU, OIC and LAS, and the 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn (United Nations 1996:  
296). This meeting reached and signed two major agreements. First, a ceasefire and 
modalities for disarmament were agreed to. Second, an agreement on the National 
Reconciliation Conference was reached and a date was set for 15 March 1993. It was then 
agreed that a committee be set up to draw the agenda for the Conference and establish the 
criteria for selecting participants. While agreeing that the National Reconciliation Conference 
would be driven by Somalis, the Somali participants demanded that the UN provide logistics 
support for the conference “in consultation with the relevant regional and sub-regional 
organizations” (United Nations 1996: 296).  
 
Following this agreement, 15 Somali groups, including some minority groups, gathered in 
Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993 for the historical conference. Under the leadership of Mr. 
Lansana Kouyate, the Somalia Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, 
the OAU, IOC, LAS, the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn and the Non-
Aligned Movement were represented. Representatives of Somali elders, women, scholars and 
some community organizations not involved in the ongoing armed conflict were also in 
attendance. The conference lasted 13 days (15 – 28 March 1993) and unanimously reached a 
landmark agreement which was signed by all the representatives in attendance (Saalax and 
Xildhiban 2010: 32; United Nations 1996: 299). The agreement had four major components 
viz: “disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and 
settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanism” (United Nations 1996: 299). It was 
directed at comprehensive action that could reverse the conflict trend and set Somalia on the 
path to recovery. The component on the restoration of property was clearly directed at 
dealing with the issue of confiscated properties belonging to not only individual opponents 
but those grabbed by clans militias wherever they occupied, including land.  
 
Of all the components, the transitional mechanism was to be the most problematic because it 
involved broad-based participation which would whittle down the warlords’ control. The 
transitional mechanism was a two-year programme envisaged, on successful implementation, 
to resuscitate the Somali state. According to the UN (1996: 299), this would involve setting 
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up four levels of administration in Somalia, two at the national, and one each at the regional 
and district levels. It proposed: 
1) A Transitional National Council (TNC) which would be vested with supreme 
political and legislative powers. This Council of 74 members was conceived to be 
broad-based. Each of the 18 regions in Somalia would send three representatives 
(two men and one woman), there would be one representative for each of the 15 
groups in attendance at the Conference, and five members would come from 
Mogadishu, the capital. The Transitional National Council would, in conformity 
with “Somalia traditional ethics and Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
produce a Somali Transitional Charter;  
2) Central Administrative Departments which would re-establish institutions for 
socio-economic service delivery. It was hoped that this would eventually translate 
to gradual restoration of government departments and parastatals;  
3) A Regional Council in each of the 18 Somali regions. The size of each Regional 
Council would be determined by the number of districts in the region. A Regional 
Council would comprise three representatives drawn from each district in the 
region; and  
4) A District Council to be set up in all 92 Somali districts with members to be 
selected based on the traditions of the Somali people either by election or 
consensus.   
 
While celebrating the successful conclusion of the conference, the participants made a 
commitment to move Somalia forward and revalidated their support for the earlier January 
agreement on ceasefire and disarmament. They also requested the vigorous involvement of 
the UN in ensuring that the agreement was implemented. One outstanding feature of the 
Reconciliation Conference was the Somaliland-based Somali National Movement (SNM)’s 
refusal to participate, although invited. The agreement collapsed following General Aideed’s 
rejection of the process for forming the new government.  
 
9.1.5 Ethiopia Sodere - the birth of Puntland (1996) 
Another major attempt at reconciliation and rebuilding Somalia was the November 1996 – 
January 1997 conference held in Sodere, Ethiopia. The conference attracted 27 of the warring 
factions in Somalia. Its outcome which was almost a rehashing of the previous ceasefire and 
disarmament agreement was rendered less consequential following the boycott of the 
146 | P a g e  
 
conference by Hussein Aideed and four other factions allied to him. One thing which stands 
out about this conference is the discussion of the possibility of allowing autonomous regional 
peace processes which would in turn form the basis for a unified national process. The end 
point of this process would be the building of a decentralized federal structure for a new 
Somali state (Menkhaus 2010: 17). It is on this basis that the state of Puntland was born as an 
autonomous administrative territory within the rebuilt Somali state that was being pursued. 
This marks the beginning of the “building-block” option which featured in every subsequent 
discussion on a viable Somali peace process.   
 
9.1.6. Cairo Conference (1997)   
This conference was convened by Egypt in collaboration with Libya. It primarily aimed to 
counter the Ethiopian-convened Sodere conference and mobilized opposition to the outcome 
of that conference which agreed on a federalist arrangement for Somalia. The Cairo 
Conference’s issue with the federal system was that it would undermine the warlords’ 
influence at the national level (Menkhaus 2010:  17) by broadening participation and 
delimiting their power base. The conference was attended by 28 groups some of whom had 
attended the Sodere conference. While the presence of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi 
strengthened the Cairo Conference, anti-Ethiopian sentiment and the newly established 
Puntland administration led to a walkout of the factions close to Ethiopia and those who 
supported the federal option for Somalia. Abdulahi Yusuf, who emerged as the President of 
Puntland, pulled out. This weakened the conference and the agreement signed could not be 
implemented. The result was that neither the Sodere Agreement nor the Cairo Agreement 
could be implemented. The state of Puntland withdrew and began its own internal peace 
process. This led to noticeable stability in the Puntland territory. Another outcome of the 
Cairo Conference was the emergence of the Benadir Administration backed by Egypt and 
Libya which could not be successfully established following the disagreement between the 
two major factions in Mogadishu, Mahdi and Aideed (Bradbury and Healy 2010: 13). 
 
9.1.7 Djibouti Somali National Peace Conference (2000) 
The 2000 Djibouti Conference is formally known as the Arta Process. This national 
conference of Somali people was organized by the Djibouti government in the town of Arta. 
The Arta Peace Process was unique and significant in many ways. Following the failure to 
persuade the warring factions to respect any of the previous agreements, the Arta Conference 
was planned to be civil society-driven. It side-lined the warlords around whom previous talks 
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and conference were organized and, for the first time, brought together moderate religious 
leaders, traditional clan leaders, intellectuals, women and the business community inside 
Somalia (Bradbury and Healy 2010: 13; Menkhaus 2010: 17). Somaliland and Puntland were 
not officially represented following their insistence on being recognized as “territorial 
entities”, which the conference convener was not disposed to accept (Hoehne 2010: 34). 
 
The conference produced the Arta Declaration of August 2000 which produced the first 
Somali national government since the state collapse in 1991 – the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) – led by President Abdulqasim Salad Hassan. The life span of the TNG 
was three years. Clan participation in the government was to be based on an equal 
proportional representation ratio of one for each of the four major Somali clan families and .5 
for each of the minority clans and .5 for women (Bradbury and Healy 2010: 13). The TNG 
attracted a measure of support from local Somalis and the international community. For the 
first time in 10 years, Somalia reoccupied its UN seat as well as in regional and sub-regional 
organizations. The government was modelled around a centralized system which favoured the 
anti-Ethiopia coalition. This became part of its major undoing. Following the March 2001 
formation of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) by Abdullahi Yusuf 
and 17 other Somali groups in the Ethiopian town of Awasa, the Arta Declaration ran into 
problems. The SRRC mounted serious opposition to the centralist government produced by 
the Arta Process, opting for a federal system instead. 
 
9.1.8 IGAD – Kenya (Eldoret/Mbagathi) Peace Process (2000)   
A two-year peace process was initiated by the sub-regional organization, the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and held in Eldoret, Kenya. It is also 
known as the Mbagathi Conference. The purpose of this process was to reconcile the two 
major coalition blocks in the Somali conflict at the time – the TNG (centralists) and the 
SRRC (federalists). This was imperative as the TNG had not been able to function following 
lack of support from the SRRC coalition. The lifespan of the government was fast running 
out. Compared with the Arta Peace Process, the 300 delegates to this conference were drawn 
mainly from the rival factions, the Diaspora, academics and the political elite. The 
involvement of regional actors, primarily Kenya and Ethiopia, was also evident.  Regional 
influence may explain the outcome of the Mbagathi conference which resulted in the 
jettisoning of the centralized administrative arrangement for Somalia on which the TNG was 
based.  The Transitional Federal Charter establishing the Transitional Federal Government 
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(TFG) was drafted and signed by the delegates. The TFG was composed of a 275-member 
parliament which in October 2004 elected Abdullahi Yusuf as president. Abdullahi Yusuf 
was the President of the Puntland State of Somalia, an ally of Ethiopia, an ardent supporter of 
a federal system of administration for a new Somalia and an anti-Islamist. This caused 
divisions within the TFG from the very beginning, and lacked the support of most Somalis, 
the federal arrangement notwithstanding. The TFG could not, therefore, operate from 
Mogadishu following the lack of cooperation of the Mogadishu warlords.  
 
9.1.9 UN Mediated- Djibouti mediation Process (2008) 
The TFG stumbled on from 2004, through the 2006 war with the ICU. Its invitation to 
Ethiopian troops to Somalia to back it against the Islamists stripped it of whatever support it 
had. The December 2006 defeat of the ICU/al-Shabaab by the joint Ethiopian troops and TFG 
militia led to the formation of the Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Eritrea. The 
conflict slid into Islamist insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian troops. By May 2007 
AU Peacekeepers had entered Somalia amidst vehement rejection of their presence by the 
Islamists. It became clear to the regional and other external actors that there was a need for 
another serious engagement (Senior Kenyan Academic II 2012; McGhie 2010:  20). The 
eight-month Djibouti peace process – June 2008 to February 2009 – primarily consisted of 
UN mediation between the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)-led TFG 
and the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The talks were 
overseen by Ambassador Ould Abdallah, Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General. The TFG was led by the Prime Minister, Nur Adde, and the ARS was led by Sheikh 
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.  The August 2008 agreement included the cessation of hostilities, the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the setting up two committees, the High Level Political 
Committee and the Joint Security Committee, geared to drive the cementing of agreements 
reached (McGhie 2010:  21). While the process of forming a new government was on-going, 
President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned on 29 December 2008, paving the way for the emergence 
of the new centralist moderate Islamist TFG headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a 
former head of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Sheikh Ahmed’s government has continued 
to wobble along in the face of opposition from the federalist forces that lost out in Djibouti. 
Most worrisome is the armed opposition from his former constituency which plays out in 
attacks against his government by the al-Shabaab Islamists, who accuse Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed of selling out to foreign powers in allowing the AMISOM contingents to remain in 
Somalia. The search for peace in Somalia continues.  
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9.2 Issues and lessons from the failures – the common denominators 
The snag in the Somali conflict has not been the lack of peace processes. Rather, it has been 
the failure of the numerous processes to yield workable agreements (if any) and/or 
compliance. At last count, this may have involved 26 known peace talks. It is therefore 
important to ask why the peace talks have not yielded the desired goal of delivering Somalia 
from the protracted conflict and state collapse. This is one of the answers this study sought 
from the respondents. The difficulties on the path to peace in Somalia have been both locally 
and externally generated. This section highlights some of these factors as recounted by the 
respondents.  
 
One of the major reasons for the failure reconciliation and peace-making processes has been 
the continuous factionalization of existing groups. High-Ranking Ugandan IGAD 
Representative (2012) and High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) 
argued that the on-going splitting of the warring factions hinders efforts to find common 
ground. According to Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012), because the factions are built 
around individuals it is attractive, rewarding and self-serving to head a faction. Senior 
Kenyan Academic I (2012) observed that in an attempt to foster an inclusive peace processes, 
the convenors of these talks allow new (breakaway) factions of existing groups to attend. 
This hinders these processes as the new factions are expected to sit face-to-face with their 
former leadership. The issue(s) which led to the break-up of these groups are then brought 
into the peace processes. High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) 
noted that it has become a regular occurrence for new actors to be allowed to enter on-going 
peace processes only for them to redefine the processes with their new agendas. This lack of 
continuity and consistency has become a major obstacle to an enduring peace agreement in 
Somalia. The economic/financial benefit of participating in Somali peace processes as an 
independent group has been identified as one of the factors fanning the indiscriminate 
factionalization of existing groups (Spears 2010: 244; Saalax and ‘Xildhiban’ 2010: 33). 
Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012) suggested that these peace processes have tended to 
become a “jamboree” of sorts for warlords ever ready to be invited to Ethiopia, Djibouti or 
Kenya, quartered in a hotel and fed for months or even years as was the case with 2002 – 
2004 Eldoret peace process.     
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Furthermore, Somali peace processes lacked accountability. Somali Diaspora I (2012) and 
Somali Diaspora II (2012) insisted that the peace processes did not touch the important issues 
in the conflict which include exposing the crimes of the past, acceptance by those who are 
responsible, and forgiveness, all of which engender reconciliation. High-Ranking Kenyan 
IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012) referred to this issue as the “abandonment of what 
builds for what separates”.  He observed that in the midst of the dispossessed, displaced, the 
maimed, and those who lost their loved ones, the actors are encouraged to sit at the table to 
discuss how they would share power to rule the brutalized. Senior Kenyan Academic II 
(2012) argued that the peace conferences failed because “criminals were celebrated, funded 
and equipped” by the international community and external actors who were championing the 
peace processes. The domestic actors usually assembled by the convenors of these peace 
processes were “self-interested, unrepresentative and unaccountable” conflict processors 
(Johnson and Raghe 2010: 49). Johnson and Raghe (2010: 50) argue that if Somali peace 
processes are targeted at the restoration of “social relations between communities and 
reinstitute a system of law and order,” then “reconciliation is considered central to success 
and is achieved through restitution and restorative justice rather than retribution. The 
declaration of responsibility by the aggressor is seen as representing more than a third of the 
part to a solution” (Johnson and Raghe 2010: 50). Isaaq and Said (2010: 56) emphasize 
“telling truth” or “confessing wrongdoing” as “an essential precursor to a settlement”. Again, 
the top-bottom approach of Somali peace processes neglected the important Somali 
traditional value of bottom-top decision-making processes. According to Somali Diaspora I 
(2012), the fact that Somali traditional elders are not given a central place in the peace 
processes resulted in the failures of these processes. He argued that their absence robs the 
processes of authoritative bases to reach and enforce agreements. High-Ranking Ugandan 
IGAD Representative (2012) sees the central aim of the peace processes conducted for 
Somalia which basically target re-establishing a functional government as part of the undoing 
of the processes. This is based on the opinion of many conflict engagement practitioners that 
government is central to resolving conflicts, especially with legitimate exercise of power 
within a territory (Leeson 2007:  691). The argument that Somalia would be better and peace 
processes would be faster with the reversal of state failure might not have been the best way 
to go. While efforts to form a government at the centre continue to falter, pockets of regions 
and neighbourhoods are getting on with local arrangements, and delivering governance, 
security and development at the local level.  
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Another major factor which has impacted negatively on the Somali peace processes is the 
tension between Islam and the West (Petrie 2012:  40). According to Senior Kenyan 
Academic II (2012), the Islamic world is suspicious of all the West’s engagements, including 
humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts. He argued that the US’ involvement in Somalia and 
its alliance with Ethiopia are seen as furthering a long-term anti-Islamic regional project. For 
Somali Diaspora I (2012), the facts are reasonably straightforward: “America has no goodwill 
for Somalia. America is out to destroy Somalia using Ethiopia and Kenya to achieve this 
because we are the only Islamic country that can stand against America here in East Africa”. 
He went on to argue that the counterterrorism mind-set in Washington compels the American 
leadership to place such a high premium on the safety of its citizens that it sometimes causes 
it to act against “others” with much less care. Abdul (2012) argued that in the 1993 clash 
between the US marines and General Aideed’s militia in Mogadishu, hundreds of Somalis 
were killed by the marines. He pointed out that these casualties are never mentioned while the 
dead marines continue to be honoured.  
 
In the Somali conflict narrative, the US has been labelled a Christian invader out to destroy 
the Islamic state of Somalia. The irreconcilable thirst for power among most of the domestic 
actors has hindered the implementation of the numerous agreements reached at the peace 
processes. In the main, the main difficulties experienced by all the “governments” put in 
place since the 2000 Djibouti conference has been (and remains) the deep divisions between 
the members of each of the governments (despite being expected to work together). High-
Ranking Ugandan IGAD Representative (2012) observed that the balance between the major 
domestic actors has made cooperation very difficult. Each of the actors sees himself as equal 
to the head of the government, thereby preventing allegiance and accountability to the head 
of government by individual members of the government. Apart from their irreconcilable 
interests, the internal actors fear that allowing an opponent to control the machinery of state 
power exposes them to possible reprisals. Therefore, they are constantly ready to play the role 
of spoilers by not allowing a new government to take off whenever any agreement and/or 
arrangement seems to go against their entrenched interests (Senior Kenyan Academic I 2012; 
Leeson 2007: 707-708).   
 
High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD Representative in Somalia (2012), High-Ranking Djiboutian 
IGAD Representative (2012) and the High-Ranking Nigerian Official to Kenya (2012) 
attributed the failed peace processes to the conflicting interests of the external actors in 
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Somalia. Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) argued that Ethiopia and Eritrea are using 
Somalia to continue their wars and would prefer the Somali conflict to continue. The 
competitive interests of the external actors produce alliances with internal actors who are 
simply clients of the external actors and financiers. Disagreements among the Somali actors 
widen due to the divergent interests of the external actor. The inability of the TNG formed at 
the end of the Djibouti 2000 peace conference is mainly attributable to the lack of support 
from and mobilization of opposition by the Ethiopian-aligned SRRC groups. When the 
Ethiopian-aligned groups emerged in 2002 in the TFG, other actors supported by Eritrea also 
made it impossible for it to function. 
  
Table 9.1: Responses of participants in the Focus Group discussions on the solutions for 
ending the Somalia conflict 
Category of 
Paticipants 
Response to discussion questions 





 Somalis should be allowed to lead the peace process. 
 Islam must form the basis for any law that will govern Somalia. 
Former Somali 
Clan Elders 
 The traditional role of the Somali clan elders have to be restored to 
maintain law and order in all the Somali clans. 
 The various regions of Somalia should be allowed to have a measure of 






 The UN should take steps to stop the insurgency in Somalia.  
 A peace process which will be representative of all Somalis would be 
able to genuinely address the real problems of Somalia. 
 All former warlords should be made to stand trial for all the crimes they 
committed during the period of war. 
 UN in collaboration with AU should design reconstruction and 




 The international community should help Somalia build a strong army 
and police force which will enable it protect itself from internal 
dissensions and external aggression.  
 The Somali people should be allowed to choose their leaders and not 




 al-Shabaab should be pushed out of Somalia completely. 
 A peace process which is organized by the UN instead of the 
neighbouring countries should be convened. 
 A truly federal arrangement should be introduced for Somalia. There 
should be an arrangement to rotate the leadership of the central 
government among the regions. 
Source: The Researcher 2013 
The Sodere (November 1996 – January 1997) and Cairo (March 1997) conferences were 
examples of how different external actors -- in this case Ethiopia and Egypt with Libya, 
respectively – desire and seek different outcomes in Somali peace processes. The Cairo 
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Conference was primarily convened at the insistence of Egypt (with Libya’s support) to 
counter the federalist arrangement agreed on at the Sodere (Ethiopia) Conference in favour of 
a unitary government. This resulted in the failure of the implementation of the agreements 
reached at both conferences and laid the foundation for the failure of other conferences as 
they continued to switch from unitary to federal arrangements.   
 
9.3 Rebuilding the Somali State: the options 
The long duration of the Somali conflict and the shattered hopes of having achieved solutions 
at successive peace agreements have created a sense of fatigue with some observers arguing 
that external actors would be better off leaving the Somalis to their own fate
19
.  There is even 
a view that the country has fared better under the current state collapse than it did in the 
periods before the collapse with all the institutions of governance in place.
20
 Notwithstanding 
the failure of the many efforts to establish a functioning central government in Somalia and 
the fear of failure in the future or the seeming attraction of remaining without a central 
government, there is still a concrete need for a national government to deliver services, 
maintain law and order, and represent Somalia in the comity of nations. The greatest 
challenge is how to achieve all that and what government system may best suit Somali 
society considering its social formations and national history. Different Somali actors as well 
as regional and global external actors’ understanding of Somalia as well as their interests, 
will inform such preferences and any final decisions on the proffered choices. The country 
has adopted both federal and unitary systems in the past. In the immediate post-independence 
period, there was a federal arrangement. The military under Siad Barre applied the unitary 
option. Each of these options came with its own difficulties. The options are explored 
alongside the consociational federalist alternative. 
 
9.3.1 Unitary Option  
Some Somalis and friendly neighbours have shown a preference for a unitary system of 
government. This hinges on the perceived strength of a state with sufficient power at the 
centre to hold all the clans together and avoid any threat to the greater Somalia project. A 
typical unitary state is a centralized system in which all powers are constitutionally vested in 
                                                          
19
 See for instance, BBC News, “Somalia: Should foreign countries broker peace?” Tuesday, 25 April, 2000.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/debates/african_debates/716751.stm. Accessed 17 March 2015. 
 
20
 One respondent in Johannesburg argued that position pointing to the entities like Puntland as 
demonstrating governance possibilities that did not exist previously. 
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the central government. In this arrangement, the centre determines the extent and duration of 
the authority and responsibilities of regions or states. The centre has powers of withdrawal 
for such delegated powers at any time it deems fit. Policy choices and appointments can be 
legally made by the centre without consultation with the regions or states. Regions are 
expected to implement central government policies without modification and comply with the 
centre’s decisions without questioning them. A major argument for a unitary system of 
government is that it has been shown to be the most appropriate for the mobilization of 
resources, both human and material, for nation building. In the immediate post-independent 
Somalia, a unitary option was preferred by the political class who believed that a strong 
centre was needed to imbue the young nation with a sense of national cohesion and unity. 
Northern and Southern Somalia’s different colonial experiences under Britain and Italy, 
respectively, tended to make nation building a very serious challenge. The successful fusion 
of Northern and Southern Somalia into a strong Somalia was seen as the first step in bringing 
the Somali living in the Ogaden region and the Somalis in the British Northern Frontiers, 
which form part of present Ethiopia and Kenya respectively, into the “greater Somalia”. This 
dream has predisposed a cross section of Somalis to argue against a federal system of 
government, insisting that it promotes divisions. One of the research respondents, Somali 
Diaspora I (2012), argued that regional powers like Ethiopia and Kenya want to weaken 
Somalia by breaking it into many parts instead of a powerful country, which can challenge 
these regional powers. For Somali Diaspora I (2012), “Somalia used to be the strongest 
power in Africa. Ethiopia and Kenya supported the warlords against Siad Barre because they 
were afraid of our brothers in Somalia and Kenya coming back to us”.  
 
The workability of a unitary system in Somalia remains very much contested considering the 
sad experience of post-independent Somalia as both a democracy and dictatorship. The 
emergence of self-governing entities like the Puntland State, Jubaland and the Lower 
Shabelle in Southern Somalia with some measure of stability in those territories may make it 
difficult for them to surrender to absolute control by a central administration in the event of 
the resolution of the conflict. The secession and declaration of independence followed by the 
giant developmental strides achieved by Somaliland since 1991 compounds the problems 
confronting advocates of a unitary form of government. Those who oppose that form of 
government argue that the initial adoption of the unitary system in post-independent Somalia 
was a disastrous error. They note that attempts to unite British and Italian Somaliland, each 
with its own distinct colonial experience, failed. The lack of cohesion and inadequate 
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commitment to common statehood manifested from the very beginning of the merger of the 
two independent territories (Spears 2010:  132; Osondu 2009:  51). The adoption of one 
centre of power, Mogadishu, not only distorted the pre-colonial Somali social system which 
the colonialists respected, but also reduced the level of participation by citizens allowed by 
colonial administrations, especially in British Somaliland. Drysdale (2000: 78-79) argues that 
the unification of the north and the south of Somalia after each had separately obtained 
independence, and the adoption of a centralized government significantly expanded the 
political space and narrowed the democratic process. Marginalization and alienation are 
major issues central to the discontent and struggle which ensued in the early life of the young, 
independent Somalia.  Discussing Northern Somalian discontent in the post-independence 
Somalia, Spears’ (2010: 132) argued aptly that:  
 
Northerners and their problems were now far away from the centre of 
decision-making in Mogadishu, and the traditional elders, who had 
previously managed local issues, were replaced, in the name of democratic 
convention, by elected representatives who did not benefit from the same 
degree of oversight time local politics had allowed. 
 
Power and control of the state’s resources resided fully at the centre. This made the centre 
very attractive and caused destructive competition among the political elite for whom the 
capture of the state guaranteed control of national resources (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33). It is 
argued, therefore, that this competition among the political elite for control of state power 
caused the elite to use clan identity as a platform for political ascendency. This destroyed 
post-independent Somali democracy as well as the Siad Barre administration that followed 
(Dersso 2009: 2). Indeed, the application of a unitary system of government in the immediate 
post-independent Somalia and later by the Siad Barre administration is believed to be one of 
the major causes of the Somali civil war and the eventual state collapse (Ahmed and Green 
2007: 118). The Barre administration which exploited the monopoly power of the central 
government became a victim of the abuse of the same power. For example, Siad Barre 
received massive support from Somalis who welcomed his condemnation and actions against 
clannishness and corruption that characterized the civilian government he replaced. However, 
he soon resorted to abuse of power by favouring his Darod clan in appointments over others 
(Osondu 2009:  41; Ajulu 2004: 77; WSP 2001: 9; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 79). Discontent 
resulting from regions and clans’ perceived exclusion from the national spoils crystalized in 
opposition to Barre. The coalition of opposition groups in the ensuing fight to remove Siad 
Barre resulted not only in his defeat, but also threw the entire country into an intractable war 
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which culminated in the enduring collapse of the Somali state. It was that collapse of the state 
that, in turn, triggered both the secession and declaration of independence by former British 
Somaliland as the Republic of Somaliland and the declaration of the autonomous self-
governing Somali State of Puntland (Ahmed and Green 2007: 118). Recent attempts to forge 
unitary government as part of the peace process have suffered setbacks. While some Somalis 
favour this system of government in order to resist the influence of the perceived interests of 
unfriendly neighbours in a dismembered Somalia, some major political actors and clans fear a 
possible backlash in the event of power falling into the hands of their rivals in the protracted 
conflict. In a unitary state, both decision-making and implementation are vested in the person 
or persons controlling power at the centre. This fear was the undoing of the outcome of the 
2000 Arta Conference. The Transitional National Government (TNG) put in place by the Arta 
peace process could not survive as most of the actors were interested in maintaining their 
sphere of influence. They were thus not prepared to gamble with a national government they 
were not sure would accommodate their interests. Therefore, the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG), which replaced the TNG in 2004, was modelled along the federalist 
system.    
 
9.3.2 Federalism  
Many in Somalia believe that the federal system of government is best suited for the country. 
They cite the non-republican nature of Somali social formations and the differences in the 
colonial experiences of the north and south that united to form the Republic of Somalia after 
they received independence separately from Britain and Italy respectively. The stability and 
developmental successes of Somaliland and Puntland strengthen arguments in favour of the 
federalist option. Those who argue in favour of constitutional federalism in Somalia do not 
hesitate to point to the failure of the immediate post-independence unitary administration 
which threw the country into conflict, resulting in the assassination of the then president. The 
experience of most Somalis under the unitary dictatorship of Siad Barre -- which stifled all 
voices of dissent, promoted the domination of his clan above others, and brought untold 
suffering to Somalis -- carry many bad memories. 
 
In a classical federalist system of government, authority is constitutionally shared between 
the central government and the other federating unit(s) which can be regions, provinces, or 
states as the case may be (Okeke-Uzodike, 2004). It provides sovereignty for each level of 
government in certain areas and the sharing of power and responsibility in others. That is to 
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say, each federating unit, the central government and the states/regions/provinces, act 
independently in certain areas of their daily conduct of governance and legislation. Advocates 
for the federalist option in Somalia point to its strengths not only in bringing governance 
closer to the people, but also in enabling greater participation through regional political 
institutions. Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) argued that regional and municipal levels of 
government empower national minority groups. They offer the opportunity for ingenuity, 
committing themselves to their areas of comparative advantage and making themselves 
competitive among their counterparts in the federation. High-Ranking Kenyan IGAD 
Representative in Somalia (2012) believes that even though the homogeneity of Somalia is 
always expressed, peculiarities still exist from one region to another and among clans. The 
federalist option would accommodate these distinctive cultural and traditional values. Senior 
Kenyan Academic I (2012) noted that the major cause of the failure of the peace processes 
was the low level of participation in both selection and governance processes. He argued that 
a federal system of government would broaden participation, promoting a sense of belonging 
and ownership. Senior Kenyan Academic I (2012) added that sustainable development, 
reconstruction and the rehabilitation of post-conflict Somalia would best be achieved by 
means of local governance structures. Regional authorities would be better placed to 
understand citizens’ needs. Local administrations are best placed to determine priorities and 
are therefore more likely to deliver effective and efficient government. This will in turn 
engender a more cohesive Somali society.   
 
High-Ranking Djiboutian IGAD Representative (2012) argued that the intractable conflict 
that has ravaged Somalia since 1991 has so divided both the society and the people that it will 
be difficult to forge a centralist state. He concluded that most warlords are not ready to 
completely relinquish their spheres of influence to a power at the centre. This argument 
seems sound considering the role of the warlords in the failure of all the attempts to re-
establish government in Somalia. Another factor which lends support to the federal option is 
the reality of the successful self-governance entities that have sprung up in most parts of the 
country. Apart from Somaliland which declared independence in the wake of the collapse of 
the Somali State in 1991, and Puntland which established itself as a self-governing Somali 
state in 1997, regions like the Jubaland, Galmudug and the South Western State are 
progressively consolidating governance and security institutions. The international 
community is currently reviewing its efforts to reconstruct the Somali state on the basis of a 
strong central government while also considering the building block approach on the basis of 
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a regional peace process leading to convergence at the centre. High-Ranking US Official on 
Somalia (2012) confirmed the US’ change of attitude towards these self-governing entities. 
According to him, “the US is currently engaged in supporting Somalian local processes that 
are geared towards stabilization in which they are organizing themselves as it impacts their 
lives” (High-Ranking US Official on Somalia 2012). Senior Kenyan Academic II (2012) 
concurred that Somalia has gone beyond a centralized government solution. He drew 
attention to the reality on the ground; most local regions have been operating autonomously 
for many years based on their environment and resources. This, he argued, supports the need 
for a decentralized system of government. He noted that it will be near impossible for these 
regions to agree to subject themselves to a centralized government.   
 
However, the federalist option is not without its challenges, considering the peculiar 
circumstances of Somalia, the duration of the state collapse, the intractability of the conflict 
and the survival mechanisms adopted by the various regions and clans over the years. 
Feelings of injury have been deep and continue to deepen as time progresses. While most of 
the respondents, except the Eritrean Ambassador to Kenya, argued for a federal system of 
government for post-conflict Somalia, they re-echoed the need to manage the process 
carefully in order to avoid a situation where a region would refuse to federate. The next 
section proposes a tinkering with classical federalism to the effect that the critical aspects of 
Somalia’s peculiar way of life are factored into the system of government that may see the 
country bounce back to life.      
 
9.3.4 Consociational federalism for Somalia – a proposal  
Consociational theory was initially developed inductively during the 1960s by Arend Lijphart 
-- its foremost theorist -- as a theoretical framework for explaining political stability in some 
severely divided European democracies. Lijphart took the position that although the sample 
European societies were deeply segmented – particularly along ethnicity, class, language, 
religion, and regional lines -- the expected destabilizing effects of subcultural segmentation 
were counterbalanced at the elite level by non-majoritarian mechanisms for addressing and 
resolving conflicts (Andeweg 2000; Okeke-Uzodike 2004). With the discovery of 
consociational democracies and democratic features beyond Europe, the theory was further 
extended with the introduction of the somewhat related but wider concept of “consensus 
democracy”. In addition, a normative element was introduced, which directly advocated the 
use of consociationalism as a tool for social and political engineering in deeply divided 
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societies. As early theorists such as Arend Lijphart (1977; 1985), Ian Lustick (1979), and 
Jurg Steiner (2002) became increasingly exposed to different consociational arrangements, it 
became clearer that when individuals share cleavage lines across diverse social segments, the 
risk of conflict appears to be more limited.  This is because the individuals with crosscutting 
loyalties experience counteracting pressures that compel moderating attitudes and effects on 
their behaviours and, thus, on the incidence of socio-political conflicts. However, where 
social cleavages and pressures coincide, the political system would tend – at least 
theoretically -- to experience centripetal forces that weaken the chances of creating and 
nurturing effectively stable democratic political systems. However, with the discovery that 
indeed there have been such stable political systems, consociational scholars such as Lijphart 
and Steiner sought to understand how the operational arrangements managed to enable 
stability and peace.  The answer was essentially that in instances where social cleavages were 
not sufficiently crosscutting, elite groups emerged that were able to work together to avoid 
social and political disorder and conflict. Based on such capacity, many advocates of 
consociationalism see consociational engineering as a highly promising mechanism for 
emplacing stable democracies and assuring peaceful co-existence in societies with deep 
cleavages. 
 
Also known as “power sharing”, consociationalism has four key elements drawn by Lijphart 
from extrapolations of case studies and other studies on African governments: 
1) Government by Coalition – provides a formal institutional setting that allows 
representation and decision making for all significant segments on common concerns 
while allowing autonomous decision making for all other issues; 
2) Segmental Autonomy -- such as federal arrangements; 
3) Proportional Representation -- in the electoral system, civil service appointments, and 
the allocation of public funds; and  
4) Minority Veto Power -- to enable minority groups to protect their vital interests. 
Consociationalism is comparatively (and significantly) very different from majoritarianism.  
Perhaps due to that profound difference (given the historical evolution and familiarity with 
majoritarianism across the West and elsewhere), consociational democratic arrangements 
have attracted wide criticisms. Importantly, much of the controversies have failed to focus on 
the soundness of its central logic. As one scholar puts it,  
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Consociationalism has always been controversial, but rather than one great 
debate about its validity, there have been many small debates about the 
countries, the concepts, the causes, and the consequences associated with 
consociationalism. These debates can become more fruitful if 
consociational theory is formulated less inductively and at a higher level 
of abstraction, and if the critics of consociationalism focus more on its 
principles and less on the operationalizations provided by its most 
important theorist, Arend Lijphart. The erosion of social cleavages in 
many consociational democracies raises the question of whether the very 
logic of consociationalism should lead to a prescription of more 
adversarial politics in those countries (Andeweg 2000). 
 
Indeed, one of the major fears of the participants and groups in the Somalia political 
processes pertains to the prospect of losing political relevance. It is easy for an individual 
politician or group to lose relevance in the national political space in a majoritarian, multi-
party democratic process. This generates tension in the system. A multi-party system with 
proportional representation is more likely to be successful. Coalition governments are easier 
in a system where identity cleavages are rife. Both national politics and internal party 
arrangements should, in terms of constitutional provisions, reflect proportional representation 
of the ethnic nationalities (in this case -- the clans). Noel (2005: 25) argues that when there is 
contestation over the identity of the “authentic natives” or who the homeland people are, 
consociation tends to be more difficult. In Somalia, the contestations among the clans do not 
take the form of origins and history. Somalia is a homogeneous society in terms of descent, 
language, culture, and religion.  
 
The nature of cleavages and the relationships between cleavages in divided societies are very 
important factors in consociations. If the cleavages that give rise to antagonism are not 
addressed in a consociational arrangement, the process of consociation might fail. However, 
it is also important to note that a consociational arrangement may not be able to deal with 
some forms of division such as in Sri Lanka where a nationalist community with authentic 
secessionist ambitions pushed for complete separation. The attraction of the consociational 
arrangement for Somalia is that unlike cleavages due to ethnic divisions which often generate 
rival nationalities in deeply divided societies (Barry 1975: 403), the clan cleavages in 
Somalia do not point to separate nation states. The success of autonomous national 
governance in Somaliland is a product of colonial mapping rather than clan or ethnic national 
self-determination. Even in Somaliland, the strength of the entity is based on the proportional 
participation of all clans, big and the small. Again, consociation may not be hindered by 
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cleavages as cross-cutting cleavages tend to dampen themselves (O’Leary 2005:  27). In the 
case of Somalia, clan cleavages are mitigated by class cleavages and vice versa. This then 
presents more than a platform for mobilizing for political participation.     
 
While it cannot be denied that the clan system is a challenge to building a coherent Somali 
society (Samuels 2010: 88), the failure of the federalist attempt to re-establish a central 
government in Somalia was more due to the fact that the arrangement was still centralist in 
nature. It rested on the problem of representation. For any system to succeed in Somalia, the 
clan social formation which has been used by the political class as a platform for power 
contestation and demand for representation must be factored in. The system has to address 
the fear of domination of one clan by another or a coalition of clans against others. It is on 
that basis that this study proposes a constitutionally guaranteed bottom-top representation of 
all the Somali clans, no matter how small the clan. The agitations against Somali peace 
processes mainly rest on the issue of representation and/or exclusion. For example, 
Abdulqadir Haji Ismail Jirdeh, the Vice-Speaker of the Somaliland parliament is quoted in 
Spears (2010: 154-155) as warning that the international community’s encouragement of the 
Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu to claim authority over “groups, 
territories and entities” which do not see the TNG as representing them would lead to further 
war. It is therefore imperative that the system is inclusive of all the clans and is a government 
in which Somalis see their own representatives sitting around the table among other clan 
representatives. This is likely to translate to popular ownership of government. While some 
Somalis might oppose the application of the clan system in addressing the political problems 
in the country, any sound prescription on political representation must consider the 
perceptions of the Somali people themselves. Dersso (2009: 2) supports this notion when he 
argues that the resolution of the Somali conflict should include a framework that provides for 
“institutional guarantees for all Somali groups against exclusion and marginalization”. Clan 
identity cannot be wished away or swept under the carpet in any genuine attempt to resolve 
the Somali impasse. A process which transparently accords all the clans, major and minor, 
recognition and accommodation in the commonwealth of Somalia, stands the best chance of 
raising Somalia out of its protracted collapse and promoting peaceful coexistence.  
 
The model of consociational federalism proposed here should be a constitutional arrangement 
which provides adequate representation for all clan and regional entities based on their 
population. Constitution building as a major part of peace-making in Somalia cannot be 
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overemphasized. This demands an arrangement that will not be divisive but rather 
“sufficiently representative and participatory based” (Samuels 2010:  88). Three-layer 
federating units of administration may be desirable. The arrangement proposed sees the 
federating units as the federal, regional, and local government levels with the responsibilities 
shared and vested in each level clearly outlined in the constitution. For example, the federal 
government should have the exclusive authority to recruit and control the army, and 
immigration (applying the quota system in recruitment and balancing promotions), and 
maintain foreign relations. The federating units could share responsibility in other arears such 
as education, health care, economic policies, and the justice system, with the regions running 
the police. Social service provision and cultural issues are better reserved for local and 
regional administration. Each level of administration should have its own legislature while a 
customary judicial system should be allowed at the regional and local levels to complement 
the civil courts. The application of proportional representation should run through the federal, 
regional, and local government levels of government. Applying the quota system means that 
at all levels of government equal proportions of appointments are allocated to each of the 
regions and local governments and zones. Where some regions, local governments or zone 
are much smaller in population size compared to others, a proportional arrangement should 
be built into the constitution to maintain equity. A rotational arrangement should also be built 
into the constitution and a decision should be taken from the beginning as to which region, 
local government or zone takes first shot and who follows until the process starts again. The 
attraction of this arrangement is that the centre is made less attractive and the regional and 
local governments that are close to the people become more attractive. It assures all the 
groups in Somalia a measure of representation at all levels and guarantees key political actors 
roles in the new system -- no matter how small their group or clan may be. Another 
advantage of the proposed consociational federalism is that it supports a top-to-bottom 
political system, building ownership and commitment by all groups, including minorities. 
Minority clans will be empowered at regional and local government levels where they have 
sufficient electoral power to influence policy outcomes. This would enable them to promote 
agendas that are self-sustaining, protecting themselves from marginalization. The 
arrangement would also stimulate national cohesion by accommodating economic and 
cultural diversity which will engender diversity in national development.    
 
Evolving local polities in Somalia tend to follow the old pre-Siad Barre regional boundaries. 
These self-governing organic polities can be supported to develop local structures that will 
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form local or municipal governments.  A bottom-top sequence can be implemented. This 
would mean the constitution of the local, regional, and federal governments in that order with 
sufficient time between each process to allow for consolidation at each level before engaging 
in the next level. Success at the lower level would strengthen commitment to the next stage. It 
would also contribute to healing Somali society from the inside, as “Nothing happens until it 
happens locally” (Anikwenwa 2011:  27). Enduring peace in Somalia requires that the peace 
we seek to infuse at the centre be a convergence of stability at local level. The need for 
Somalis to take pride in their ownership of the commonwealth is essential. Further proposals 
are made in the recommendations in the final chapter.    
  




Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
10.1 Summary 
This study has examined the roles and interests of four targeted external actors in the Somali 
conflict, the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the International Islamist Network – al-Qaeda. The 
study’s major focus was how the interests of each of these actors motivate their behaviour in 
relation to the conflict and how these have affected the dynamics of the conflict. The first 
chapter provides an overall background to the study, what it set out to investigate, and how it 
intended to achieve the set goals. Chapter two highlights Somalia’s history and geography. It 
presents an overview of the country’s geographical location and how this geography has 
defined social and economic patterns. The size, population, position, landscape, altitude, and 
climate were discussed. This chapter also highlights social formations in Somali society 
including the clan kinship system, language, religion, and occupation - the nomadic life of the 
majority of the population except for those of Bantu descent and Arab Somali settlers living 
in and around the south-east coast who are agrarians. Early contact between Somalia and the 
Arab world and early advances were outlined. The chapter presents historical landmarks in 
pre-colonial Somalia, its colonial experiences under multiple colonial powers, anti-colonial 
movements, independence, and the unification of the north and south as one country. It 
concludes with a discussion of the struggle for the control of the state power among the 
political class as it gradually but steadily slid into state collapse.  
 
Chapter three provides a review of the literature on the general phenomenon of war. It defines 
war vis-a-vis conflict, shed light on the various levels of conflict, and addresses the issue of 
when a conflict can be said to be war, noting that while all wars are conflicts, not all conflicts 
are wars. The chapter discusses the general nature and scope of wars. The typologies under 
which contemporary armed conflicts can be categorized were outlined, as well as the features 
of intra-state, inter-state, and international wars. The causes and theoretical explanations of 
war were robustly discussed. Addressing the causes of armed conflicts in Africa, this chapter 
discusses ethnicity, the impact of the Cold War and other possible underlying and proximate 
causative factors such as structural violence, territorial contests, competition for natural 
resources, state capacity, and governance problems. It concludes with an introduction to the 
Somali conflict.  
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Chapter four focuses on the theoretical frameworks used in this study to build its arguments 
and make rational conclusions. The Realist Theory of International Relations, the Political 
Economy, the Securitization and the Enemy Image Theories were employed to highlight both 
the overt and covert behaviour of the four external actors under study.  The application of 
these theories reveals that the convergence of power politics, fear of the other, grievances, 
and mutual suspicions characterize the mind-set which, in turn, defines the actions of the four 
external actors as each tries to interpret the actions of the other(s) in the quest for survival.  
 
Chapter five presents a general discussion on the implications of external actors’ involvement 
in conflicts in other nations. This trend tends to be a reoccurring feature of global politics 
under the present international system. Such interventions influence the dynamics of these 
conflicts and often determine their outcome. The chapter draws a distinction between the 
great powers’ interventions in conflicts within other states from the 19th to the mid-20th 
centuries on behalf of a party (which tended to result in short conflicts and decisive victories) 
and interventions during the Cold War (which resulted in lengthy and destructive wars 
involving the two super powers, one on each side of the conflict). The reasons for external 
actors’ intervention were discussed, including the need to prevent an internal conflict from 
spilling over into neighbouring states or spreading into an entire region, checking their own 
internal insurgence by the intervening state, supporting a weak state, aggression, and 
opportunism. Chapter five concludes with an examination of the various implications of 
external actors’ intervention in other countries’ internal conflict. Central to these implications 
is the influence of such interventions on the dynamics of the conflict as well as a possible 
swing in the outcome.   
  
Linked to chapter five, chapter six turns to the involvement of external actors in the Somali 
conflict. It evaluates critically the interests and roles of the four external actors under study. 
The descriptive analytical method was used to present these actors’ views of their interests 
and roles in the conflict. It then examines critically these self-assessments by comparing them 
with the actors’ assessment of one another’s interests and roles. To achieve a measure of 
objectivity, the views of other independent but knowledgeable respondents on each of the 
actors were also presented. Chapter six concludes with an analysis and discussion of the 
interests and roles of each of the four actors, using the actors’ self-assessment, cross-actors’ 
assessment and those of the independent respondents to draw informed opinions and 
conclusions.  
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Chapter seven examines internal factors in Somalia which are exploited by internal actors to 
insert themselves actively within the political contestations around the conflict. These include 
the collapsed nature of the Somali state, the colonial legacy, the large population of 
unemployed and uneducated young people and the negative application of the clan system in 
national politics. Other factors include elite contestations for power, the secessionist 
ambitions of some political actors, enclave opportunism, and the sectarian application of 
Islam. The chapter also explores how those internal factors dispose the conflict to the active 
involvement by external actors; and how the external actors sometimes latch onto them to 
promote their own agendas. The chapter argues the position that external actors would not 
engage in the Somali conflict in the absence of some of these factors in alliance (or at least 
cooperation) with domestic actors.  
 
Chapter eight links the interests and behaviour of the US, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the 
International Islamist Network to their perceived roles in the Somali conflict. The chapter 
provides an analysis of the interactions and alliances of these actors with domestic actors in 
the conflict and how the various scenarios affect and shape the dynamics of the conflict.  A 
diagram was used to present the interesting counterpoint alliances: the US-Ethiopia-warlords; 
and the International Islamist Network-Eritrea-warlords. The discussion centred on how the 
opposing activities of the alliances have driven the Somali conflict, transforming it from one 
phase to another. Tables showing weapons procurement and distribution among the local 
actors and the movement of arms prices during different periods in the conflict were used to 
illustrate how the interaction between the external and internal actors influences the tempo of 
the conflict. Statistics are also presented on population displacement and combat-related 
deaths over time to show that the high number of deaths and population displacements 
occurred at certain periods in the conflict – specifically, when its intensity increased on 
account of augmented activities on the part of the protagonists in either offensive or defensive 
roles. 
 
Finally, chapter nine attempts to find a way out of the Somali conflict. It examines critically 
some of the numerous peace processes brokered among the warring factions. The reasons 
why these processes failed to restore normalcy to Somalia are highlighted. Various possible 
alternative routes to peace and the rebuilding of the Somalia state were interrogated and the 
benefits and disadvantages of unitarism and federalism were discussed. This chapter conclude 
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with a proposal for a constitutional consociational federalism which could address the 
peculiarities of Somali society that predispose the country to conflict.  
   
10.2 Conclusion 
This study has sought to navigate the highly challenging task of interrogating one of the 
neglected aspects of the Somali conflict, which has lasted for more than two decades. Much 
attention has been paid to the ever-resonating internal factors, including clannishness of 
Somali people, the opportunism of warlords, the struggle by elites for power, and the divisive 
influences of the different colonial legacies. However, the nature and dynamics of the Somali 
conflict, and its intractability despite the many efforts to resolve it, require that we look 
beyond internal causes and drivers. While the reality of these internal factors is not in 
contention, an investigation of the synergy of those internal factors and the activities of 
external actors produces an interesting understanding of how and why the conflict has 
unfolded the way it has. The narrowing of this investigation to four external actors -- the US, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and the International Islamist Network made for clearer analysis.   
 
The divergent interests of these external actors are clearly expressed in the manner in which 
they participate in the conflict which impacts the conflict, and its duration and intensity. The 
US’ interest in Somalia was apparent early on when it volunteered to join in the United 
Nations Mission, UNISOM, in a quasi-independent operation to disarm and demobilize the 
fighting militia factions. The US has never hidden its interest in preventing the Somali failed 
state environment from developing into a full-blown terrorist hub in the Horn of Africa. The 
US acted as a super power sponsor of Somalia in the 1980s, and as such is aware of the 
military capability of the Somali state before it collapsed. Washington is also aware of the 
activities of the radical Islamist organization, Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI), inside Somalia 
and within the region. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the Somali state and the factional 
fighting that followed, sparked fears in US security structures. This was due to concerns 
about the danger of sophisticated weapons and equipment falling into the hands of radical 
Islamists. The downing of the US Air Force gunship in 1993, which resulted in the 
humiliating killing of 18 US marines by General Farah Aideed’s militia, terrified the US and 
it hurriedly pulled out of UNISOM. The US’ interest in Somalia was rekindled following the 
August 1998 terrorist attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania for which Somalia was 
used as the staging ground. US attention to the failed state environment in Somalia was 
heightened considering Somalia’s location at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden and the very 
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busy Indian Ocean international trade route. Somalia can easily act as a gateway to the entire 
east coast of Africa. The US policy on Somalia changed from benign suspicion to taking 
direct action following the 11 September 2001 attack on the US homeland, and another terror 
attack on the Kenyan Mombasa airport in 2002 in which Somalia was again used as the 
staging ground. From this point, US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa centred on 
preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and forestalling the 
domestication of jihadist groups inside the country.  
 
Somalia and Ethiopia have long been enemies. Ethiopia’s interest in the conflict in Somalia 
has remained its national security interests. It considers that the outcome of the Somali 
conflict will have both domestic and international implications for Ethiopia. It will be 
recalled that Somalia fought an unsuccessful war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden (Somali) 
region in the present Ethiopia. Somalia’s irredentist posture which it expressed in its 
sustained desire for the Greater Somalia Project remains a threat to the internal security of all 
its neighbours. Ethiopia, therefore, is genuinely interested in what happens in Somalia or the 
nature of the government that emerges from the conflict because this will determine the 
nature of political stability in the Ethiopian Ogaden region.  
 
Eritrea entered the Somalia conflict because of Ethiopia’s involvement. Eritrea has been in a 
bitter boundary war with Ethiopia. For Eritrea, therefore, this is a proxy war; whatever it can 
do to get at Ethiopia is acceptable.  
 
The International Islamist Network (al-Qaeda) is interested in creating an Islamic state in 
Somalia. The history of Somalia shows a steady rise of the Salafist ideology and early contact 
with international jihadists in the 1980s. The high-handed treatment by the Barre 
administration and occasional Ethiopian raids decimated the radical AIAI during the late 
1980s. The fall of Siad Barre and the collapse of the Somali state presented a huge 
opportunity for reconnection and reengagement of local Somali Islamists by the International 
Islamist Network.  
 
These divergent interests of the external actors find expression in their roles in the conflict. 
They find it convenient to prop up certain internal actors who want to maintain their 
relevance in the conflict. They also exploit domestic factors in advancing their goals. The 
alliances among these external actors into two opposing parties and the lining up of the local 
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actors behind them contributes significantly to the intensity, complexities and duration of the 
conflict. The US operates independent covert and overt interventions in Somalia. In alliance 
with Ethiopia, it funded a coalition of Somali warlords, the Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), with responsibility for surveillance and the arrest of 
US suspected terrorists inside Somalia in 2005. This coalition’s activities helped to mobilize 
Somali Islamists who fought and dislodged them from Mogadishu in June 2006.  By 
December 2006, the Islamists controlled more than two-thirds of south and central Somalia. 
Ethiopia’s full military intervention at the invitation of a rattled Transitional Federal 
Government once again changed the dynamics of the conflict. Ethiopian troops were able to 
defeat the Islamists and push them out of Mogadishu and other important towns. However, 
more than any other single factor, Ethiopia’s overt war against Al-Shabaab and its continued 
occupation resulted in two scenarios. Firstly, it provided the platform for mobilizing the 
support of ordinary Somalis for the Islamists because to the average Somali, Ethiopia is an 
enemy state. It also attracted Islamist fighters from around the globe to join in a war the al-
Qaeda leadership called a jihad. Eritrea provided the base and facilitated supplies and the 
training of newly mobilized fighters for an offensive which has taken the form of an 
insurgency.  
 
Even though Ethiopian troops left Somalia in early 2009, this pattern of interests and 
alliances continues to play out in every aspect of the Somali conflict including efforts to 
resolve the conflict. The failure of the Arta, Cairo, Sodere, Eldorat and other peace processes 
can be traced to the interests and meddlesomeness of the external actors, especially the two 
neighbouring state actors, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Each is interested in a friendly government in 
Mogadishu. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the Somali conflict may not have lasted as 
long or taken such a monumental toll on Somali society were it not for the involvement of 
external actors. The US’ counterterrorism-inspired intervention in Somalia opens another war 
front for its engagement with the International Islamist Network which the latter welcomes. 
Ethiopia and Eritrea continue their proxy war in Somalia while it remains a collapsed state.    
 
10.3 Recommendations 
This research study would not be complete without recommendations, especially in light of 
the highly destructive and protracted nature of the Somalia conflict. The recommendations 
presented here stem from a critical appraisal of the research topic and offer what it is hoped 
are a set of workable options. They offer possibilities for the transformation and resolution of 
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the Somali conflict and the rebuilding of a Somali state in which citizens can live in peace 
and prosperity.  
 
The case of Somalia has shown that half-hearted engagement in the form of intervention 
carries the danger of complicating the conflict environment. The manner of the UN 
intervention in Somalia early in the conflict left much to be desired. Somalia is an unfinished 
UN project. The use of regional and sub-regional forces in military operations in Somalia has 
not yielded the desired results. Neighbouring states’ military intervention or the conversion of 
such neighbouring states’ military forces into a regional multiregional force operating in 
Somalia raises the threat of the expansion of the conflict environment to these states. In light 
of this, the UN should, as a matter of urgency, design and undertake a new and more robust 
and comprehensive engagement in Somalia. This should be a direct UN engagement, which 
should impose itself on the Somali peace process in the interests of the majority of Somalis. 
Such an intervention is long overdue as it is obvious that the Somali state completely 
collapsed since 1991. The argument of sovereignty would not, therefore, arise.  
 
Reconciliation has not been given the priority attention it deserves in the numerous attempts 
for peace in Somalia. Most of the efforts by international organizations, regional and sub-
regional bodies, and friendly states in Somalia have focussed on rebuilding the Somali state. 
These efforts were concentrated on the reestablishment of a central government in 
Mogadishu, with the major Somali actors comprising the heads of the formations touted as 
Somalian governments since 2000. Interestingly, these processes tend to reward the warlords 
to the exclusion of the ordinary Somali people. The failure of these processes has shown that 
the Somali state may not become a state again without dealing with the issue of reconciliation 
and healing. Therefore, it is recommended that reconciliation should be the primary target in 
any efforts to peacefully resolve the Somali conflict. Many people have lost their loved ones 
and livelihoods. Some know those who are directly involved in these calamities. Many 
women were raped, people were dispossessed of their land and businesses, and dislocated, 
and children were conscripted into militia by different warlords. Without reconciliation and 
national healing, the people’s commitment to any peace process would remain weak or 
equivocal. The warlords also need to reconcile with one another. Any efforts to bring them 
together in a power-sharing arrangement will be scuttled if the pain of sabotage, blackmail, 
defeats, insults, and other losses suffered by individual actors are not dealt with. Fear, 
suspicion and the desire for revenge, are bound to continue characterizing the relationships 
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between these sworn enemies. This can follow the roadmap of Truth and Reconciliation but, 
in this case, it should be conducted by the United Nations. 
 
The Somali conflict which has endured since 1991 has resulted in massive displacement and 
dispossession. People were forcefully ejected from their ancestral domains where their hearts 
and souls are bound. Many are living as internally displaced persons inside their country with 
others occupying their possessions. Others are scattered around the world where they suffer 
degrading treatment such as xenophobia in South Africa and other places in the world. As a 
major component of reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of the Somali conflict, Somalis 
who forcefully dispossessed others of their towns and villages should be encouraged to give 
them up and the original owners resettled on their lands. Peace and reconciliation cannot 
neglect restoration, resettlement, and restitution (the 3Rs).  
 
In the previous chapter, the adoption of a consociational federal arrangement was proposed as 
a mechanism not only for reconstituting and repositioning the collapsed Somali state but also 
for emplacing enduring stability and peace. The post-independence Somali state exhibited an 
unmitigated concentration of power and control at the centre, making it very attractive to 
local political actors. In the competition for control of power at the centre, the elite deployed 
all available weapons to achieve their goals, including destructive clannishness. The return to 
clan sentiments by the average Somali may not be the result of strong cultural differences 
among the various clans or interests in the land they occupied. Rather, it was repression and 
exclusion by successive governments in Somalia -- including the colonial administrations -- 
that prepared the ground for clan identity politics in Somalia. To resolve the Somali conflict, 
genuine efforts must be made to adopt a system that is inclusive of all Somalis. The 
deconstruction of the Somali state, therefore, is imperative. A system which transfers 
reasonable authority to the regional and local levels is required in order to build a new society 
in which the government is committed to the interests of the people and where consensus 
building and dialogue form part of governance. If well applied, consociational federalism, 
with provision for rotational leadership at all levels, would engender a sense of inclusion and 
shared responsibility for the survival of the state.  In turn, this would result in identity 
reconstruction, where the clan identity would no longer be an encumbrance to an individual 
because both individuality and collectivity are accommodated in the system.  
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Constitution making can pose a great challenge to the resolution of the Somali conflict. It is 
important to appreciate that Somali society has some peculiarities which ought to be given 
due consideration in deciding on its legal code. The researcher is of the opinion that both 
Somali traditional and moderate Islamic legal codes should be incorporated in the law that 
governs the new Somali state. In the absence of the state, most Somali clans have continued 
with their traditional institutions to resolve conflicts and maintain order. The elders’ councils 
are the Somali clans’ only alternative in the absence of legal institutions. Drawing from the 
experiment in Somaliland where the elders are constituted into a legislative chamber, it has 
been shown to provide a measure of stability because of the confidence that Somalis have in 
the elders. Furthermore, before the emergence of radical Islamist movements in Somalia, 
moderate Islamic laws operated side by side with Somali traditional laws. On the strength of 
this, it is recommended that Somali traditional and moderate Islamic legal principles be 
incorporated into a new legal system. 
 
The many years of conflict and the multiplicity of actors commanding militias have resulted 
in a situation where Somalia has become awash with weapons. Even businessmen are known 
to operate armed security outfits. Youths run independent militias, providing security for 
whoever demands and can pay for it and at the same time terrorising their vicinities. Until 
recently, it was said to be easy to buy an AK-47 assault rifle on the open arms market, the 
Barahaart market. The large quantity of weapons of various types in Somalia poses a grave 
danger to the success of any peace process. Most warlords have huge stockpiles of weapons 
that they resort to in the event -- by their calculation -- of an unfavourable political context or 
process. There is, therefore, an urgent need for a well-planned and comprehensive 
disarmament of all militias and combatants in Somalia. The disarmament programme should 
be a UN process that is seen to be transparent, comprehensive, and impartial. 
  
Arms are supplied or facilitated by external actors. No disarmament programme will succeed 
if the supplier or the supply channels are not dealt with. Earlier in the conflict, the UN 
imposed an arms embargo on Somalia. It followed it up with the establishment of a 
monitoring committee which indicted some Arab states such as Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and Yemen. Neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as certain domestic 
organizations and individuals were also indicted (Yoh 2003: 90; UN Security Council 2003: 
19; International Crisis Group 2004: 14; UN Monitoring Group 2006: 21, 26; UN Monitoring 
Group 2007: 9). However, the UN did nothing or too little to stop arms supplies, even in 
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cases of proven violations. This has posed one of the greatest challenges to tackling 
lawlessness in Somalia. As part of the support programmes for the disarmament programme 
recommended, the UN should design and enforce a comprehensive arms embargo on all 
parties in Somalia. Sanctions should be imposed on those who violate the embargo.   
 
Large quantities of the arms in Somalia are in the hands of a massive population of 
uneducated and unemployed young people. These young people are locally known as “the 
mooryaans,” which translates to “the robbed or dispossessed” (Menkhaus 2000: 191). This 
clearly portrays the psychology of these young people. Impoverished youths comprise a 
generation that has known no semblance of peace in Somalia for the past 23 years. While 
some serve in the various warlords’ militias or in the Islamist Al-Shabaab, others are not 
under the control of any authority. Freelance arms-wielding youths sell their services to 
whoever is prepared to pay for security. They have also been linked to acts of robbery, 
intimidation, extortion, house raids and murder (Ahmed and Green 2007: 117; International 
Crisis Group 2007: 1). The ready availability of the youth has made recruitment by the 
warlords and Islamists much easier. As part of the comprehensive peace process for Somalia, 
a carefully crafted demobilization, education and reintegration programme should be urgently 
pursued to complement the disarmament project. The education and reintegration programme 
should take the form of training in entrepreneurial skills and empowerment to enable the 
youth to live a settled, independent life in the envisaged new Somali society.   
 
The maintenance of law and order cannot be over-emphasized in any society. With the 
collapse of the Somali state in 1991, all institutions of control and maintenance of law and 
order crumbled. Somalia disintegrated into tiny polities of clan jurisdiction and militia 
control. Even wealthy business people control territories (Jhazbhay 2003: 77; Menkhaus 
1998: 220). A new Somali society would require efficient and effective law enforcement to 
weather the challenging efforts to rebuild the society and the state. The failure of law 
enforcement in post conflict societies has resulted -- in many instances -- in reversals of gains 
made in resolving such conflicts. Sometimes, there is a relapse into worse conflict situations. 
The recruitment and training of a disciplined national police force would be a necessary step 
towards rebuilding the state. The large number of unemployed, arms-wielding youths serving 
either in the militias or as independent agents who are to be demobilized presents a ready 
pool of recruits for such a project. The UN should include this as part of its comprehensive 
programme for Somalia.  
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The Somali conflict did not only consume the institutions of governance and law 
enforcement. The other major casualties are Somali social life and infrastructure. The 23-year 
conflict has resulted in the complete destruction of both social and economic infrastructure. 
For example, most schools and hospitals were destroyed. Transportation infrastructure has 
completely decayed. The condition of a country in which no school, hospital or road has been 
rehabilitated, not to talk of constructing new ones is better imagined than witnessed.  A 
radical reconstruction of infrastructure is required to get the country going again. The UN 
should launch a Somali reconstruction fund to respond to this need. Reconstruction efforts 
should target education, social services and economic sectors that will directly benefit 
ordinary Somalis.  
 
The Somali Diasporas have been very active in the economic survival of the Somalis during 
the long years of conflict. They have supported those back home with remittances and other 
forms of assistance. They have also been vocal and visible in bringing the attention of the 
international community to the continued carnage in Somalia and drumming up support from 
international NGOs that still assist internally displaced persons inside the country. This 
research study observed that the Diasporas have not handled their involvement in the various 
peace processes in which they participated well. They tended to hijack these processes, 
excluding local elders and other members of the local population who should own these 
processes. It is therefore recommended that the Diasporas trace their origins back home and, 
together with the traditional elders, situate the processes within Somali society where these 
peace talks and reconciliation activities will have an impact. This will go a long way in 
placing the Somali peace process in the hands of Somalis who alone can determine the 
success or failure of such processes.   
 
With the collapse of the Somali state, Somaliland declared itself independent. Although it has 
continued to weather difficulties and obstacles which threatened the attainment of its goals, it 
has shown resilience. With determination and sacrifice, Somaliland is thriving today. 
Enjoyment a strong measure of stability, it has achieved a peaceful transition through 
internationally acknowledged free, fair and credible elections. In fact, Somaliland operates a 
constitutional consociational system of government, which accommodates representation of 
all the clans in both the upper and lower legislative chambers. It is recommended that the UN 
recognize Somaliland as an independent state. It has gone so far in consolidating its 
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“independence” that any attempt to force it back into a union with the South would inevitably 
lead to another war. It should be remembered that the union of the North and the South was 
willingly entered into and that a common legal argument is that either party reserves the right 
to withdraw from the marriage. Allowing Somaliland to go its own way does not violate any 
known statute. The AU statute is only against any division which destroys colonial 
boundaries. In the case of Somalia, the North and South were formerly British Somaliland 
and Italian Somaliland, respectively. Allowing or even encouraging them to go their separate 
ways may serve a more peaceful purpose than forcing a union that will know no peace.  
 
Finally, to effectively implement the decentralized constitutional consociational federalism 
proposed by this study, there may be a need to restructure Somalia’s administrative units. The 
18 states created by Siad Barre were arbitrary. A careful study of the present alignments 
inside Somalia shows some emerging organic administrative entities. These entities can be 
supported to stabilize and then become the building blocks for the new Somali state. Puntland 
is already stable. Galmudug in the centre, and Southwestern State and Jubaland in the south 
have formalized and consolidated their formations as regional administrative self-governance 
entities. The remaining part in central Somalia can equally evolve into one or two regions to 
form five or six regions for the proposed Somali Federation. The international community 
should support these self-administered regions to carve out local or municipal government 
structures and begin the implementation of consociational federalism, bottom-top.  
 
These recommendations form an important part of this study and, in that way, contributes to 
the global effort to transform Somalia from its nearly two-and-a-half decade catastrophic and 
complete collapse. While the recommendations are not exhaustive, they could assist 
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Appendix One: ` Research Interview Questions 
 
TOPIC: War and Alliances: The transformative role of external actors in the Somali 
conflict 
 
Hypothesis: The divergent interests of external actors in a stable Somali state have sustained 
the Somali conflict. 
 
Motivation 
In order to achieve the best result in this research interview, the interviewees have been 
grouped under six (6) clusters. These include: 
 
Cluster one: Diplomats/Bureaucrats/Officials of the governments of United States; Ethiopia; 
and Eritrea. 
 
Cluster two: Representatives of the Somali Transitional Federal Government; Somali 
Islamists; and Somali Diasporas. 
 
Cluster three: Diplomats/Bureaucrats/Officials of other countries’ governments. 
 
Cluster four: Envoys/Officials of the United Nations (UN); African Union (AU); and 
Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD). 
 
Cluster five: Conflicts/Security Analysts (Academics and Journalists) 
 
Cluster six: Field Workers (Members of NGOs).  
 
Questions are drafted for each cluster to cover the whole objectives of this research. 
  
Research Questions for Cluster one: Diplomats/Bureaucrats /Officials of the 
governments of United States; Ethiopia; and Eritrea. 
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles;  
a. Is your country, ... a major actor in Somalia? 
b. What have been the major interests and roles of your country in Somalia? 
c. Which other two countries would you consider to be major actors in the Somali 
conflict; and what do you consider their interests and roles in the conflict in 
Somalia? 
d. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
e.  What are al Qaeda’s specific interests and roles in the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (ii). To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of these 
external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts; 
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a. In what ways are the interests and roles of your country in Somalia in conflict 
with that of the other actors? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests have contributed in 
sustaining the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
 
a. What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
b. How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors 
in the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict? 
b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 




Cluster two: Representatives of the Somali Transitional Federal Government; Somali 
Islamists; and Somali Diasporas. 
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles; 
 
a. Do you consider the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the major actors in the 
conflict in your country? 
b. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
c. What do you consider to be the interests of each of the external actors in Somalia, 
and what specific roles are they playing individually in the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (ii).  To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of 
these external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts 
 
a. What differences do you see in the interests and activities of external actors in 
Somalia? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests and activities of external 
actors contributed to the continuation and escalation of the Somali conflict? 
 
 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
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a. What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
b. How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors 
in the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict?  
b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 
bringing an end to the conflict and state collapse? 
 
Cluster three: Diplomats/Bureaucrats/Officials of other governments 
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles; 
 
a. Do you consider the Unites States, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the major actors in the 
Somali conflict?   
b. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
c. What do you consider to be the interests of each of the external actors in Somalia, 
and what specific roles are they playing individually in the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (ii).  To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of 
these external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts 
 
a. What differences do you see in the interests and activities of external actors in 
Somalia? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests and activities of external 
actors contributed to the continuation and escalation of the Somali conflict? 
 
 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
 
a. What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
b. How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors 
in the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict? 
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b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 




Cluster four: Envoys/Officials of the United Nations (UN); African Union (AU); and 
Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD). 
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles; 
 
a. Do you consider the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the major actors in the 
Somali conflict?  
b. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
c. What do you consider to be the interests of each of the external actors in Somalia, 
and what specific roles are they playing individually in the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (ii).  To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of 
these external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts 
 
a. What differences do you see in the interests and activities of external actors in 
Somalia? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests and activities of external 
actors contributed to the continuation and escalation of the Somali conflict? 
 
 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
 
a. What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
b. How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors 
in the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict? 
b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 
bringing an end to the conflict and state collapse? 
 
Cluster five: Conflicts/Security Analysts (Academics and Journalists) 
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles; 
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a. Dou you consider the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the major actors in the 
Somali conflict?  
b. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
c. What do you consider to be the interests of each of the external actors in Somalia, 
and what specific roles are they playing individually in the conflict? 
 
 
 Objective (ii).  To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of 
these external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts 
 
a. What differences do you see in the interests and activities of external actors in 
Somalia? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests and activities of external 




 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
 
a. What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
b. How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors 
in the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict? 
b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 
bringing an end to the conflict and state collapse? 
 
 
Cluster six: Field Workers (Members of NGOs).  
 
 Objective (i). To identify the external actors involved in the Somali conflict and their 
specific interests and roles; 
 
a. Do you consider the United States, Ethiopia and Eritrea as the major actors in the 
Somali conflict?  
b. Do you consider al Qaeda/International Islamist Terrorist Network as an important 
actor in the Somali conflict? 
c. What do you consider to be the interests of each of the external actors in Somalia, 
and what specific roles are they playing individually in the conflict? 
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 Objective (ii).  To determine the extent to which the divergent interests and roles of 
these external actors contributed to the sustenance and escalation of the Somali conflicts 
 
a. What differences do you see in the interests and activities of external actors in 
Somalia? 
b. In what ways do you think that these conflicting interests and activities of external 
actors contributed to the continuation and escalation of the Somali conflict? 
 
 Objective (iii).  To identify the internal factors which are exploited by the external 
actors pursuant of their interest, which have in turn contributed to the shaping and 
transformation of the Somalia conflict 
 
 What internal factors/conditions in Somalia do you feel have enabled external 
actors to pursue their specific interests in Somalia? 
 How have the synergy of those internal factors and conditions and the activities of 
external actors contributed in shaping the conflict? 
 
 
Objective (iv).  To proffer suggestions on external engagement with the domestic actors in 
the Somali conflict towards a genuine and enduring peace process 
 
a. How do you think the domestic actors in the Somali conflict could be engaged in 
order to find a sustainable solution to the conflict? 
b. What other measures would you consider necessary in the efforts aimed at 
bringing an end to the conflict and state collapse? 
 
